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ABSTRACT
THE FAMILY AND AMBIGUITY:
THE POLITICS OF ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF SELF AND
SOCIETY
FEBRUARY 1990
PHILIP T. NEISSER, B.A.
, POTSDAM COLLEGE OF ARTS
AND SCIENCE, SUNY
M.A., GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain
In this work I argue on the one hand that the modern
family of the west deserves criticism for its role in the
persistence of unmet need, of hurtful and unnecessary
inequality, and of a harmful management, denial and
denigration of difference. On the other hand, I also
argue that the modern family deserves some defending, both
for its role in creating us as people for whom the
legitimacy of our order can be an issue, and because it is
a locus of much that people experience as worthwhile.
I am concerned in this work not only with the ambiguity
of the modern family, but also with the general problem
posed by ambiguity and affirmation. I approach this issue
from the point of view on an "ontology of discordance."
By this view, each way of constructing a self (and so any
possible way of forming society) necessarily involves
exclusion and loss, and perhaps means denial and
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denigration as well. I do not think, however, that this
fact is necessarily any cause for "pessimism," as there
are still grounds on which to defend social order as an
achievement. In particular the fact of discordance calls
on us to create forms of order which acknowledge their own
impositional quality. This means that we must create
greater institutional space for unmanaged difference.
Along these lines, I affirm the importance, in modern
conditions, of maintaining a category of "family, ' but by
this term I mean only a relation whereby child care and
household are accorded some distance from the state and
from the "public" realm. The point is that we should
avoid detailing what constitutes a "family" and instead
provide vastly increased across the board support for
multiple forms of householding. in particular we need to
support all the individuals who care for and protect
chi ldren.
My conclusion is that under modern conditions this kind
of minimalist defense of family best serves the causes of
equality for women, space for difference, and the end of
the imposition of social class.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
in this work I defend two related claims. On the one
hand I argue that the modern family of the west deserves
criticism for its role in the persistence of unmet need,
of hurtful and unnecessary inequality, and of a harmful
management, denial and denigration of difference. These
crimes are systematic features of modern order, and
today's family is both directly and indirectly part of
their perpetration; it serves as one of modern society's
mechanisms of provision, division, and management, and it
also helps to provide legitimacy to the social order which
deploys these mechanisms. On the other hand, I also argue
that the modern family deserves some defending, first of
all for its role in creating us as people for whom the
legitimacy of our order can be an issue, and second of all
because it is a locus of much that people experience as
worthwhile or even deeply satisfying. In sum, both the
modern family form and the modernity of which it is a part
are profoundly ambiguous in their implications and
effects. They are deserving of criticism at the most
basic level, in that they do harm by virtue of
characteristics that are central to what they are, but
they also stand as real achievements, worthy of being
defended as such.
Neither of these claims are new, but I think it
important to make them together, and so in this work I try
to delineate some of the ways that the modern family plays
its ambiguous role. This is not, however, the only goal
that shapes the following pages. I also have been
motivated by a concern to confront an issue raised by
ambiguity in general; this is the problem of how in the
first place it is possible to make any affirmations ~
defend, celebrate or recommend anything if what is
"good" can (even from the same point of view) at the same
time be seen to be "bad." I believe not only that this is
possible, but that it is desirable, even essential. We
(if I can be rude and ethnocentric and use this pronoun to
personalize the culture of the west which so dominates the
world today) need both to make affirmations despite
ambiguity and to affirm ambiguity even as we make other
affirmations.
This claim is also not new, but I hope in this work to
add to the discussion of just what is involved and at
stake in affirming ambiguity (and to be newly persuasive)
by virtue of the way I connect these issues to the
particular institution of the modern family. Many of us
experience the ambiguities of life very powerfully in our
families, and at the same time the institution of the
family is implicated in some of our modes of denying
ambiguity. This means that the family is implicated in
some important forms of power. The discussion of family,
then, can (I believe) provide evidence both of the
importance of acknowledging ambiguity and of the very
existence of that ambiguity.
In this introduction I do four things: I explain (very
provisionally) what I mean by "the modern family," i
summarize my overall argument, I explain what I set out to
do in each of the chapters that follow, and I point out
some of the limitations of this effort.
Today 's Family
Today's "family" exists in at least two ways — it is a
social and economic institution, and it is an image that
circulates.
While the ideal of family is far from the norm, as a set
of assumptions it forms the basis of a host of features of
our society: wage levels, taxes, custody rulings,
benefits, names, etc. A particular form of household is
enforced as the most successful means available of pooling
resources, avoiding isolation and loneliness, ensuring the
ability of parents and children to stay together, and
avoiding invasive regulatory intervention.
The same assumptions that structure our options in these
tangible ways also operate on us as assumptions. There
are of course a great variety of views - both academic
and personal
- regarding the meaning of "family, " and the
differences between them are important, but there is
nonetheless enough commonality among them to speak of a
single ideal of the family as predominant in the west.
"The family" as an image stands at the very least for
harmony, intimacy, stability, and mature responsibility,
and it also incorporates (somewhat shifting) assumptions
about gender roles, gender identity, class aspirations,
personal aspirations, and political involvement.
Argument #1: The Modern Family and Power
One aspect of the modern family's connection to power
is fairly straightforward. The modern family is
implicated in "oppression."
Oppressive power denies or prohibits, and the
structuring of our society around a certain form of family
helps deny the provision of needs to many. The family is
placed in charge of meeting certain needs, but even
"model" families cannot meet these needs and many people
don't live in model families. Many needs that the family
fails to address or addresses inadequately go largely
unmet, and for many people in the bottom half of our
socio-economic strata this means a good deal of privation.
specifically, many people in modern societies lack
economic and emotional security, protection from abuse and
options to abusive relationships, a place they can call
home, and adequate nutrition, medicinal care and
education.
Oppression of this sort exists alongside the continuing
legitimacy of the institutions that are party to it,
including the family. This legitimacy can be accounted
for partly by reference to another aspect power not easily
captured by the idea of "oppression." it is also poorly
rendered by the concept of "ideology," although it does
have to do with the way outlooks, judgments, and goals are
produced. This power concerns not so much the denial of
need as the way people's "needs" are constituted. This
form of power can be (and has been) called "normalization"
or "subjugation."
Normalization works, first, by classing some people as
below the threshold of normality and then subjecting them
to different treatment — aid, therapy, regulation — than
that received by others. It works second by encouraging
those above the threshold to interpret their internal
murmuring, resistance, or disquietude as signs of their
chances of falling into abnormality and deviance, of
losing that integrated status that makes them qualify as
people with rights and interests. To be deployed around a
norm is to be pressured to fit in anH ~ i •tix. d to police oneself so
that one fits in.
Normalization is at work when welfare recipients are
classed as immoral or lazy, when poverty is explained as
the result of bad family ways, and perhaps when many in
the United States blame the Soviet Union for modern
tendencies of centralization and social management. m
each case the classifiers are constructing themselves and
the world so that they can view themselves as free and as
ethical (they earn what's theirs, they contribute to a
free system of government, they resist temptations), and
in each case the categories can operate to make people
police themselves (construct themselves as productive, as
members of good families, as ready to be mobilized against
"socialist tendencies").
Normalization differs from oppression in that it doesn't
imply so easily an opposite called "liberation." To be
pressured to become and remain within the normal is
different than to be held down and forbidden from
something. In fact, a commitment to liberation can play a
role in enhancing or maintaining effects of normalization,
and this is true regardless of whether freedom is seen as
the exercise of rights by those qualified or,
alternatively, as self-realization through integrative
participation in a radical or alternative community. The
taming of normalization requires slack, or space, in the
order; not si.ply an alternative to the prevailing vision
of the good life.
Argument #?; The FamiTy ao Worth
While the modern family is implicated in onerous forms
of power, the tremendous appeal of the family idea cannot
be adequately explained by reference to effects of
normalization, any more than it can be explained by
reference to the powerful interests sometimes served by
this appeal. This is where the second part of my argument
comes in. The modern family has a basis in human nature
and in the human condition (as we shall see, to call
something "natural" is neither to give that something an
automatic grant of legitimacy nor to make an uncontestable
claim). Because of this, and because order is not
entirely successful at appropriating and putting to use
this human nature, the reality of family experience cannot
be reduced to a prop of order. It is more than that. Our
order, similarly, is more than mere order; it is not
entirely unredeemable. The disciplining of the modern
self is costly and deserves critique, but should not be
simply dispensed with.
What is the "natural basis" of today's family form? To
be human is, it seems, to be embodied, finite, reflective
(in various ways and degrees), dependent for existence on
some sort of pattern of social relations, and formed as a
self by virtue of participation in some set of moral,
rather than merely utilitarian, allegiances. if for the
moment we understand by the term "family" simply the
marking of kin ties, however done, family is an apparently
universal response to these features of human life. To
put it another way, humans have so far as we can tell
invariably used the category of the biological to help
make concrete distinctions amongst each other - to posit
specific obligations, and to recognize specific shared
memories and experiences.
That something is natural does not mean it presents no
problems; it does suggest that it may be hard to dispense
with or dispensed with only at great cost. I think that
some kind of valorization of specific personal ties
between generations deserves defending because of the way
it serves to create selves as caring and moral. The
recognition and experience of involuntary ties to specific
others, to the past, and to the future, serve as a means
to "ground" caring — as a means to make the experience of
caring for others an aspect of identity, rather than
dependent on a merely voluntary concordance of feelings.
It can be looked at this way: the fact of personal ties
to past and future gives us each a story, and it is by
thinking of ourselves as a part of a narrative that we
each come to have an identity — to come to see ourselves
as an "I." But here's the ambiguity again. Such ties are
"tangible" not only in the real existence of parents and
children but also in the ways that the raising of children
binds people to the specific future that their social
institutions are pointed towards. m fact, out
tenuousness and our ambivalence towards the ideal of
family is rooted not only in the structures of mobility
that undermine actual families and not only in the
recognition that we sometimes have of the losses that
families impose on us, but also in the doubts many of us
have in the worth of the specific future we are building.
The ChaptPrg
In chapter one I present the interpretation of modern
western culture and institutions in which I situate my
discussion of the politics of the contemporary family.
This interpretation is composed of two claims. The first
is that modern western social orders (and increasingly
this means the global order they command and depend on)
are sustained by heavily enforced but nonetheless fragile
assumptions of the possibility of concord, or harmony,
inside the self and between the self and its world. This
mode of order has its benefits, but, I argue, it exacts
heavy costs as well.
The second claim is that our problems of order, self,
and freedom can be best understood from a point of view
which has been dubbed "the ontology of discordance."
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According to this view there r^r, k~ ~-Lew mer can be no concord of self and
world, as each way of constructing a self has as a
byproduct the creation of particular forxns of disharmony.
And according to this view it is at least possible to
conceive of forms of order which acknowledge such
disharmony. Such order could be, the argument continues,
less oppressive and normalizing. The ontology of
discordance thus offers a vision of life as thoroughly
politicized and a vision of democracy as the appropriate
mode of living together given this fact.
In chapter two I discuss the role of the institution of
family in the modern order. Specifically, I discuss the
ways this institution participates in oppression and
normalization. I focus on the way assumptions of
concordance embedded in our familial discourse and
practice play a role in these forms of power. While I am
in this discussion especially concerned with criticizing
today's family, both as institution and image, I
nevertheless end up defending it as well, as the power of
the family to do harm stems in part from the good that it
offers.
I put off this issue of the modern family as achievement
until chapter four, and in chapter three I attempt to
buttress the case I have made in chapter two by showing
that assumptions of concordance, and so normalizing
implications, are indeed built into much of today's
discourse on family.
in chapter four I return to the philosophy of
discordance, first by discussing some views of the modern
family which assume discordance rather than concordance,
but which do so in accordance with the assumptions of
psychoanalytic theory, rather than the more genealogical
approach I rely on in chapter two. I argue that the
psychoanalytic tradition, while offering important
insight, tends to lead to the undue valorization of the
concept of
-personality," at the expense of the apparently
extra-familial spheres of political culture, political
history, and occupational structure. Moreover, when the
latter are given their proper due the psychological
evidence appears inconclusive with regard to the question
of what is to be done. The psychological approach points
us toward the question of the "right" mode of family, and
this, I argue, does more harm than good.
I offer instead a "minimalist" defense of family. By
this view "family" should be held to signify not so much a
particular form of child care or household as instead a
relation whereby child care and household are accorded
some distance from the state and from the "public" realm
where everything is considered equally everyone's
business. This does not mean that "the private" is not
political; it is. The point is to insist on the
12
maintenance of an institutionalized distinction between
the public and the private, even as the nature of this
distinction is rightly a matter vigorous debate. The
point is also that we should avoid detailing what
constitutes a family and instead provide vastly increased
across the board support for all the individuals who care
for and protect children.
Conclusion, Limitation s, and Qual ifications
The central limitation of this work stems from its broad
range. It is quite likely that each of the many claims I
make are better made elsewhere. The point, again, is to
make them together. For example, today's image of family
as the seat of intimacy, the only possible "home" for
harmony, and the proper locus of personal commitment is
more hurtful to women than it is to men (even as it hurts
us all in some ways)
.
This is a grave injustice, but in
this work I am not so much concerned with demonstrating
this as with asserting that its persistence is linked to
assumptions of concord that are widely held, linked to
"the family," but highly problematic. I have enough
trouble making clear just I what I mean by this without
also trying to "prove" or even exhaustively delineate the
other claims I merely assert or rely on. Because of my
focus, this work might not qualify as "feminist" in the
strongest sense of the word. I want to say, however, that
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it not only is rooted in a feminist commitment but is also
entirely dependent on the prior existence of the feminist
movement and feminist political thought. Without
feminism, this book could not exist. I am especially
concerned to say this because feminist theory, like other
forms of theory, often relies on assumptions of
concordance, and I use some of the pages in this text
calling attention to this and labelling it a problem.
To summarize again my overall purpose, I am concerned in
this work to show how the ambivalent import of family is,
like the ambivalent import of our ideas of legitimacy,
typically lost in our discourse, theoretical and
otherwise. This is, I argue, because of the dominance
(and institutionalization) of a philosophy of concordance.
I want to make the case that the modern private family
should be evaluated from the point of view of discordance.
We should, in other words, do a kind of "cost-benefit
analysis" at the level of the self.
My particular version of this evaluation leads to this
conclusion: today's family is thoroughly bound up with a
kind of enabling that is particularly disabling when it
comes to political change. This is partly because of its
location within a civilization built around the pursuit of
growth, affluence, and concordance. On the other hand
this criticism should be tempered by the recognition that
we will need something like today's family if we are to
14
strive towards a less normalizing and oppressive order,
if, in other words, we are to develop individual
empowerment, slack in the order, space for difference, and
(a condition of many other goals) a political movement to
tame growth imperatives.
This historical possibility does not require a complete
overthrow of modern traditions; instead it would mean a
kind of wholesale shift, a rearrangement of elements to
accommodate the loosening of growth imperatives and the
cultural acknowledgment of the inevitability of
arbitrariness and injustice in any social form. The most
complete change might not be noticed as such: this would
be a transformed understanding of politics. The politics
of the self would come to be an issue. And so the social
policing of families would, without necessarily coming to
ar end, be referred to by some metaphor which expressed
its impositional and political character, it would be
contested.
This argument is, I think, likely to appeal mostly to
those who already wonder at the legitimacy enjoyed by
modern orders, and who have perhaps thus far dealt with
this problem by expressing disappointment in the working
class, crediting "ideological" machinery as too powerful
to overcome, seeing structural obstacles to change as all-
encompassing, or placing their hopes in an impending
immiseration and collapse of legitimacy. In fact our
investment in the current order is founded in reason,
fraught with ambiguity, enforced by various imperatives
and disciplines, and subject to change.
CHAPTER 2
THE ONTOLOGY OF DISCORDANCE
in this chapter I present the interpretation of modern
western culture and institutions in which I situate my
discussion of the politics of the contemporary family.
The argument is that modern western social orders (and
increasingly this means the global order they command and
depend on) are sustained by heavily enforced but
nonetheless fragile assumptions of the possibility of
concord, or harmony, inside the self and between the self
and its world. This mode of order has its benefits, but
it exacts heavy costs as well.
It is probably inevitable that humans will deal with
life's ambiguities and finitude by creating compensatory
philosophies of concordance. People are, in Nietzsche's
words, "homesick animals." Modernity, however, has its
own special version of concordance, with the subject at
its center. The modern order is perhaps unigue in the
degree to which it relies on, and produces, the pursuit of
concord, rather than a less demanding and less aggressive
assumption of concord. God no longer guarantees that we
re
s
are at home; instead home seems to lie at the point whe
we have created conditions of existence for ourselve
which we endorse upon reflection.
This idea of legitimacy is responsible for some very
real and important achievements, but it has a
"normalizing" or subjugating element built into it; and
this emerges powerfully in the context of the modern
economic order. Modern legitimacy has this repressive
potential because it lacks an appreciation of the "dirt"
and ambiguity lodged in any ideal. And this is
particularly a problem because our world (not
coincidentally) is increasingly a single order requiring
extensive social management and governed by demanding
imperatives. in this situation, the aggressive quest for
legitimacy all too easily turns inward; people tend to
define themselves so they can see themselves as free (and
the order as legitimate) within the existing constraints.
And numerous institutions, practices and linguistic
distinctions support this process.
To put it another way, the pursuit of concord is
implicated in forces of social control. The conventions
required for the order to function become norms, people
are encouraged or impelled to produce themselves in
accordance with those norms, and room for the
unpredictable, the eccentric, the new, the reborn, the
18
rebellious, or si»ply th. different, is squeezed^ ^
response to this we need „ore than rights. „e need to
tame the Operatives of the order and introduoe a healthy
suspicion of our categories.
I explain this notion of the modern order in the pages
ahead, and then go on in the following chapters to argue
that the modern institution of family plays a pivotal, and
ambiguous, role in the processes of the reproduction of
that order. The modern family is on the one hand the
locus of much of the best of our modern world, while on
the other hand it a central means of the maintenance of
much of the worst. The ambiguous import that family has
for most of us is in a way an analogue for, or a
representation of, the ambiguous import of modernity
itself.
First, however, a word about theory. I formulate my
position with the help of assumptions about the self and
the world which are in keeping with what William Connolly
calls an "ontology of discordance." I begin, in other
words, with assumptions of disharmony, rather than
concord. 1 This is akin to what is often called a
See Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity (The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1987), esp. pp. 9-16, and also Jane
Bennett, who speaks of "fractious holism." Unthinking
Faith and Enlightenment: Nature and the State in a Post-
Hegelian Era (New York University Press, 1987), pp. 149-
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"genealogical" approach. As „iohael shapiro explains
"Genealogy views every for* of life as producing its human
identities and systems of value in a struggle with other
possible forms of life." 2
in my view this perspective is invaluable in coming to
terms with the meaning and effects of the modern
institution of family. On the other hand I also think
that the more traditional questions of political theory -
specifically questions of human nature and human needs -
must also be given at least provisional and situated
answers if the modern family is to be understood. Kin
demarcations and kin loyalties speak to some of the
deepest needs of human beings. The trick is to make one's
affirmations, as well as one's critique (concerning human
nature and human needs)
, consistent with assumptions of
disharmony. This "trick- is of course necessary to make
my position on the family hold together, but, more
importantly, it is also essential in the process of
building any politics of social change which stands a
chance of allowing for a less controlling, less demanding,
less "productive" form of order. This, at least, is my
conviction. This work is, therefore, not just about the
family and politics; it is about theory as well. A theory
2
"Politicizing Ulysses," Political Theory Vol. 17, N. 1(February 1989), p. 22.
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of ambiguity can tell us about the modern family, and
today's politics of family can tell us about the need to
acknowledge ambiguity in theory.
Ontologies nf rv^„r^
An ontology is a point of view, or theory, that speaks
to the nature of being in some way. A social ontology is
a set of understandings concerning the nature of human
being and its relation to the world. Modern political
theories, says Connolly, are, for the most part, alike in
that each
gravitates toward an ontology of concord. That is
2iSa?S
U
?S
S Pr°Perly constituted and
'
s tu ted the individual or collective subiectachieves harmony with itself and with the otherelements of social life. 3
Theories which are alike in assuming concord can
otherwise be very different. One way to assume concord is
to privilege the individual subject as an essence. 4 Some
theories instead privilege the community as the medium
through which individuals can situate and realize their
essence. The individualist theories currently enjoy
political ascendancy compared to the more collectivistic
ones, and the former are also (typically) more celebratory
3Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity
, p. 10.
To cite a contemporary example, see John Rawls, A Theory
of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1971)
.
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(rather than critical) of contemporary western social,
economic, and political arrangements. These differences
are certainly of great political import. On the other
hand, their shared assumption of concord is also
important. They are all based, to use Connolly's words,
on "the principle of a subject realizing its essence in a
larger world. -5 They are, that is, based on an ontology
of concord. 6
What, more precisely, is the assumption of concord that
is so widely shared? it is, in brief, the assumption that
the world and the self are constructed such that there is
(or could be) a "common good" consistent with the nature
of the actual or potential self. One version of this
assumption holds that there is such a thing, at least
potentially, as a self which is at "home" in the world.
To be at home is to occupy "a place of meaning in a
meaningful world," says Jane Bennett, just as to
experience disharmony between the self and its world as a
problem to be overcome is "homesickness." 7 This kind of
5Politics and Ambiguity
,
p. 9.
6Bennett likewise uncovers this affinity between parties
otherwise opposed — they being in this case the various
sides in the environmental debate. She shows them to be
distributed between the poles of "environmental
management" and "natural holism," both of which are
dependent on a faith in the possibility concord. See
Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment , p. 4.
Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment , p. 2. Bennett is
following Neitzsche in characterizing modern philosophy as
one more example of "homesickness."
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"optimism" about the possibilities of being at home is
often combined (by Marx, for example) with a trenchant
critical reading of the
--homelessness- imposed by current
orders.
I am all for trenchant critique ~ our modern orders
deserve plenty
- but I also think, following Connolly,
that there is a problem when such critique is bound up
with, or based on, a "politics of the common good" which
assumes that individuality and commonality can in the
right context be made to "harmonize nicely. »8 Marx , s idea
of harmony is repeated, albeit in a very different way, in
the work of the "individualists," such as Hobbes and
Locke, whom he opposed. In a certain sense Hobbes is a
philosopher of discordance, as he is quite "pessimistic"
about the possibility for selves to be "at home" in the
world. He considers the self and world to be divided. On
the other hand Hobbes holds on to the idea of harmony in
his notion of individuals as rational agents, transparent
to themselves, or at least properly held responsible to
answer to the reasonable dictates of order, as
underwritten by God and his law. The goal for Hobbes, as
for Locke, is to spell out the rational way for human
beings to adjust to the fact that they are not and will
never be fully at home in the world.
Politics and Amhiguity
. p. 6.
I in many ways share this goal, but I cannot similarly
speak of individuals as separate fro. "the world" in which
they cannot be at home.* And once tnis assumption Qf
division is suspended it becomes impossible to use the
word "rational" as Hobbes did. ah ways of adjusting to
the world are also ways of adjusting the self, and these
have internal as well as external costs. 10 There is no
one "rational" mode of adjustment.
The idea shared by Marx and Hobbes is that of the true,
or consistent, self, whether thought of as a state to be
achieved or as already naturally occurring, the coherent
self is understood by both as a being centered by a self-
consciousness who has a sense of her/his own integrity,
who can be held accountable, and who adheres to rational
truth criteria. By this modern view of the person, the
impulses that are unthought and which manifest themselves
as intrusions upon the subject ought to be (or already
are) chosen among, ranked, channeled, assessed, or
integrated by the subject in a way that is rational and
harmonious. Herein lies the danger; modern political
Thus Bennet speaks of the philosophy of discordance asfractious holism." The self is, like the world ingeneral, a multipicity which cannot be entirely
integrated, but the self is not separate from the world.
...human and non-human elements ...are interconnected
constituted in part by their relations to one another."
Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment
, p. 149.
10See Connolly on Hobbes, Politics and Ambiguity
, p. 12.
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theories tend to overlook and even abet the extension of
pressures to define oneself within the ambit of the
»nor»al... To see how this is the case we need to look at
the self, and at the history of the modern self, from the
point of view of the philosophy of discordance.
The Disrm
-dant .qAl f
The "Other" is the term used by Michel Foucault, as well
as by Bennett and Connolly, to refer to those aspects of
self and of bodily experience which intrude upon the
ordered reality striven for by self
-consciousness; the
Other is that which, within a particular way of ordering
the self, does not fit into that ordering. it is "the
locus of wishes, feelings, and desires that escape
articulation," e.g., disorder, irrationality, madness,
covert impulses of resistance, and eccentricity. 1 ! Every
world necessarily has its Other.
By this view, we should accept both of the following
propositions. First, "the homecoming [of the self] cannot
be arranged, for there is no set of philosophical or
political or psychological conditions where the fit
between self and world will be neat," and, second, there
Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity
, p. 106. See also
Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment , p. 6, and
Focuault, The Order of Things; An Archeology of the Human
Sciences (Random House, 1970), p. 328.
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is no single and most rational way to adjust to
ho.elessness.12 This is because
, on ^ ^^ ^
way of constructing a self has as a byproduct the creation
of particular forms of disharmony, and, on the other hand
there are no rational (independent in principle from any
particular order and its way of life) criteria by which
one could select a particular mode of living as
incontestably superior.
Since the self is not "designed" to fit perfect!
v
into any way of life, we mult anticipate^t everygood way of life will both realize something in the
its'for^
S?^nter elem-ts in the self resistance
This notion of the Other is meant to draw attention to
the commonalities of theories of concord which, whether or
not they recognize that our current social orders spawn
their own forms of the Other, nonetheless postulate
harmony
- the absence of an Other - as a conceivable and
desirable state of affairs, it is for example often taken
for granted, in the debate over whether or not it makes
sense to say that people are "alienated," that there is a
true self from which we are or are not so divided. This
notion of self is very important to modern institutions
and modern achievements. It is this self which is
Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment , pp. 1-2.
Connolly, Ambiguity and Politics
,
p. 114.
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understood to confer authority, which is taken as capable
of being held responsible for her/his actions, and which
is contrasted with those considered lacking in rights,
incapable of responsibility, disorganized, out of order,
and, in a word, irrational. it is also this self which'
modern societies (and revolutionary movements) so often
promise us as a measure of their legitimacy, citizens are
urged to pursue and express their true selves, to "find
themselves," usually with the proviso that the results fit
in with the prevailing standards for selfhood and the
economic imperatives of order.
Unfortunately, in order to see ourselves as free and at
home we typically adjust ourselves to accommodate the
imperatives of the order and the prevailing standards of
rational behavior. Alternatively, we sometimes find a
stance from which to critique the existing order by making
reference to a idea of the authentic self which could be
realized in a transformed world. Either way a profoundly
anti-political urge is built into our standards for
legitimacy. The idea is that humans should be at home in
a meaningful world, and the result is not only that
political power is considered to appropriately rest on the
consent of such beings, but also that such power is
encouraged to work to "assist" and so transform or control
those not capable of reasoned consent or hampered by false
consciousness. m sum, forces of normalization are built
into the modern pursuit of legitimacy.
The ontology of discordance attempts to both locate
instances of normalization and enable resistance to it.
It does this by offering a vision of life as thoroughly
politicized and a vision of democracy as the appropriate
mode of living together given this fact. Life is, for
humans at least, profoundly ambiguous, and we need
standards of legitimacy and institutions of order which
take this into account. This is, for Connolly at least,
what democracy at its best is all about.
Democratic politics of the sort endorsed here does
Tt K^T* ^
,
nSed f°r n0rms
'
Jt ins^ts upon
? *ondltions right, and when asufficient number of citizens have affirmeddiscordance as part of the human condition,democratic turbulence subdues the politics of
normalization. it supports the ambiguous relation topublic life essential to freedom. 14
Given my purpose — to speak of the ways the modern
family bears on issues of power and democracy — i need to
point to what is implied but not spelled out in this
connection. Freedom requires an ambiguous relation to
private life as well as public life. It requires, to be
more exact, the valorization of our already existing
ambiguous relation to private and public life. Democratic
turbulence is a healthy thing when it comes to processes
Politics and Ambiguity
, p. 15.
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of coming to (and challenging) collective understandings
of the norms of public life and the politics of personal
life, our thought about what "family.. is and should be ^
best undertaken with the help of assumptions of
discordance.
To go on and make this case I need to say a good deal
more about normalization, and to this end I will follow
Foucault, Bennett, Connolly, and Charles Taylor in
comparing modern ontologies of concord to an ontology of
concord which preceded them and which, by its decline,
marks the onset of modernity.
Concord in a Meaningful Order
The world is seen, from this earlier vantage point, as
an integrated, meaningful whole. This western view can be
characterized, says Bennett, as a "Robust Faith" ~
robust, that is, compared to the weakened faith that
endured the transformation of the enlightenment and
subsequently the rise of modern science and industrialism.
From the point of view of robust faith, "The world is a
creation, a vast web whose threads are those of
resemblance." 15 Charles Taylor, referring more broadly to
all western traditions prior to modernity, speaks of the
Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment
,
p. 9.
notion of the world as a "meaningful order. "16 The long
dominant idea of the world as filled with purpose and
speaking through resemblance is expressed, to use Taylor's
example, in the notion that because there are seven holes
in the head there must be seven planets. 17 ; mtbm notion
is that different elements in creation express or embody a
certain order of ideas. "18 Foucault put ^^ ^
to the end of the sixteenth century, resemblance played a
constructive role in the knowledge of Western culture.""
The self is, by this view, defined by its relation to
this order. The world is alive with meanings - for
robust faith these meanings are the words of God's text ~
and the proper role of humans is to put themselves in tune
with these meanings. By this view, "...man came most
fully to himself when he was in touch with a cosmic
order." 20 Humans are thought to be special in their role
as the interpreters of this order. For robust faith,
"Knowledge consists of an approximate recovery of divine
intentions embodied in the natural world and revealed in
signs. "21 Mortal knowledge is, by this view, necessarily
'Hegel (Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 3-11.
Hegel, p. 4.
Hegel, p. 5.
The Order of Things
f p. 17.
Taylor, Hegel , p. 6.
Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment , p. 10.
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incomplete and imperfect. We moderns are likely to see
the ambiguities in the signs as "evidence" that the notion
of a meaningful order is an illusion, but this is not the
only way to interpret this lack. From the point of view
of robust faith it shows the opaqueness of the order to
limited human reason, as well as "the temporality and
finitude of material things." 22
in such a meaningful order, a concord of the cosmos is
guaranteed by presumption, whatever the state of human
knowledge and human affairs. if this presumption of
incompletely visible harmony can be sustained, a
considerable amount of experienced disharmony, difference,
anomaly and mystery can, it follows, find space for
itself, at least in the sense that its meaning is
experienced as ambiguous. That which is "Other" is, on
the one hand, threatening — it is sin, madness, error, or
evil, on the other hand, it is also a sign of the limits
to mortal abilities of interpretation — it expresses
limits, mystery, and hidden truth. Its existence does not
indicate that the universe is not a harmonious whole, does
not necessarily pose a challenge to existing customs and
understandings, and does not call automatically for
corrective action of cure or assimilation.
Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment , p. 10.
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The relation to Otherness of ambiguity does not, it
should be understood, by any means automatically redeem
medieval practices regarding that which did not fit in.
This is not the point. The comparison of then and now
can, however, draw attention to hard to redeem features of
modern practices. Foucault has done this by counterposing
older and modern understandings of the relation of truth
and madness. "m the Middle Ages and until the
Renaissance, man's dispute with madness was a dramatic
debate in which he confronted the secret powers of the
world." we have travelled from this point to "our own
experience, which confines insanity within mental
illness. "23 Madness now is no less fear-inspiring and
fascinating, but it is medicalized or assimilated to
reason, rather than excluded and wondered at.
A purposeful world can, finally, be characterized by the
notion of authority that it sustains. "Authorities," says
Connolly speaking of the late middle ages, "claimed some
privileged access to the purposiveness of the world." 24
Authority was seen to be present everywhere, as all of
creation is an expression of God's will. Authorities in
such a world are those who are convincing in their claim
23Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the
Age of Reason (Random House, 1965), p. xii.
24Politics and Ambiguity
, p. 129.
to interpret "Cod's signs" authoritatively, particularly
as found in sacred texts. Their interpretations may be
and soxneti.es were, challenged, but as long as authority
is thought to reside in the teleological structure of the
universe there is a presumption in favor of existing
social customs. The past and its expression in the
present are privileged as lived moments of creation,
themselves subject to various interpretations.
The Transition to Modernii-y
Most of us, of course, do not experience or speak of the
world as a text expressing God's purpose. Nor is this
idea taken seriously in public parlance or in the
scientific community, what has happened to presumptions
of telos? They survive in weakened form: in the practice
of fragile, small, very dependent, somewhat privileged
communities; in faith's "attempt to locate one's true life
in a world beyond;" in the championing of Platonic and
Aristotelian political theory; and to some extent in fast-
disappearing non-modern cultures. 25 The theory and
practice of these communities provides an important
critique of and counterpoint to modern societies, but the
idea of telos has trouble consistently engaging widespread
adherence in its own right.
Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment , p. 21.
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To explain the decline of telos and its current
defensive posture, we would have tQ ^^ ^
following: the flaws and contradictions in the idea of the
universe as a harmonious order of meaning; the inability
of medieval faith to survive certain economic and
political changes; an
- inadequacy- of medieval faith from
the point of view of modern economic processes and
political structures (with their very demanding
imperatives of social coordination)
; the highly visible
technical achievements that have come with the new
"enlightenment" ideas which put human beings much more in
the center of things; the possibility for a variety of new
and powerful understandings of human freedom and rights
which have come with those same ideas; the institutional
edifice of consumption which makes revised understandings
incompatible with making a living for so many people; the
power of people's ongoing identification with the order in
which they have invested so much of themselves; and,
finally, the effect of the various disciplines which help
make people into selves who try to see themselves as free,
and so who can
-identify with- and
-invest themselves
into" the current order.
As one speaking from the point of view of an ontology of
discordance, I am not calling for or hankering after the
restoration of robust faith. I therefore can beg off the
34
difficult task of discussing every element involved in the
decline of telos.26 ^ x ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
transition to modernity meant a new idea of the self and
its relation to nature. This makes it important that we
consider the problems inherent in the medieval premise of
telos, not in order to "correct" them, and certainly not
because these problems "caused" the transformation to
modernity, but because the heart of modernity was formed
in this transition. What is of the most importance here
is the presumptions, and the problems, which we did not
free ourselves of, despite the magnitude of change
involved, while medieval solutions in the long run failed
to hold, resulting in the disenchantment of the world,
this disenchantment was far from any rejection of the
26 It should be obvious from this list that I do not
S^o^ the0ry that exPlain* the weak position ofteleological doctrine as due largely to either the
empirical falsity of its claims or the "ideological"
conditioning and manipulation perpetrated by today's
societies. The first of these views ignores the
unavoidable rooting of experiences of "empirical" realityin ontological assumptions, and neither of them shows
enough respect for the ordinary participants of the
medieval and modern worlds. It should also be clear that
I am equally uninterested in the kind of explanation thatprivileges a particular category of social reality — such
as "ideas" or "economy" — as first of all intelligible
considered by itself and secondly as somehow primary in
causing historical change. I follow Foucault in holding
that there are always elements of the arbitrary and the
multiple at work in any historical transformation.
Several changes come together, perhaps, and are taken
advantage of, transformed, and put the service of
something else.
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assumption of concord. it meant rather its
transformation, into, among other things, new tools of
normalization. it also meant, as we shall see, the rise
of the figure of the private nuclear family as a
compelling image of harmony.
Both Bennett and Connolly, informed by Hegel's
conception of modernity and Hans Blumenberg's historical
work, argue that teleological doctrines were not simply
repudiated, as in some act of hubris that could be
repented, nor were they lost in the popularity of new
ideas of human independence or power, "...they rather came
unraveled by the very attempts in the late medieval and
early modern eras to perfect them. "27 This CQuld happgn
because, first of all, "strong" teleological doctrines
(such as robust faith) are, Bennett tells us, inherently
precarious as modes of consciousness. "...the will to
believe in resemblances coexists with the suspicion that
the truth of things may not be so comforting." 28
Secondly, late medieval thought dealt with this problem in
a way that fatally undermined its own premises and paved
the way for modernity. This, at least, is the argument of
Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity
,
p. 135. See also
Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment , pp. 18-21,
Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Cambridge,
MIT Press, 1983), and, Charles Taylor, Hegel
,
Chapter II,
pp. 51-75 and Chapter XX, pp. 537-571.
28Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment , p. 18.
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s a
Blumenberg that Bennett and Connolly accept, and it goe
long way toward making sense of modernity as a new
response to the older problem I mentioned earlier:
homesickness.
Hegel sees the problem of modernity as the need to
accommodate and give full due to the modern commitment to
the reflective self (capable of individual freedom and
entitled to individual rights, while at the same provide a
world in which that self can be truly at home. It is not
for nothing that Neitzsche called German philosophy the
most fundamental form of homesickness, as Hegel sought to
restore, at a new self-conscious and less immediate level,
what he believed succumbed to the "enlightenment- movement
due to the contradictions in its medieval version: an
experience of oneness between faith and reason, autonomy
and belonging, self and world, consciousness and culture,
humans and nature. 29
The threat to the medieval world view, Blumenberg tells
us, was always the problem of evil. 30 How could God aUw
evil to be? The onset of modernity is marked, in this
view, by the victory of the nominalist solution to this
problem over the Augustinian. Whereas Augustine explains
evil as the work of humans, who were given free will by
29Taylor, Hegel , p. 65.
30The Legitimacy of the Modern Aae
r p. 130.
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God, nominalism simply says that humans^ understand
why evil exists because divine will is absolute and
incomprehensible to humans. The first view has the
problem of positing an all-powerful God who nonetheless
could not make a free human being without evil. The
second view saves the power of God, but in a way that
removes his immediate presence in the forms of signs to be
read. Modernity, the argument goes, is marked by an
experience of God as more distant and of nature as more
alien; the experience of homesickness, to which robust
faith had been a response, was forcefully reinvigorated by
the rise in a nominalist outlook. The enlightenment
conception of the world in terms of need and desire, as
something to be mastered, was, by this view, the response
which carried the day. Bennett puts it this way.
In an indifferent world, homesickness returned. One
SSSTV*0 thlS existential uncertainty was the
"matter. »?i
maS ^ C°ntr01 3 "ature c°"«ived as
This change in its turn entailed a new centrality for
the category of the human self. The self came to be seen
not so much as an expression of God's will who has been
given its own will after God's image, but as the source of
all active will and purpose. God is in the modern scheme
of things reduced to the role of the original creator, and
Bennett, Unthinki ng Faith and Enlightenment , p. 20.
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is perhaps the forgiver as well, if he is believed in at
all. While the idea of a harmony between self and world
has by no means faded away, we have lost the presumption
that it is already inscribed in the cosmos. instead the
assumption is likely to be that we can and ought to make
this harmony ourselves, in an active process of both
finding and defining our true selves. One way to
understand this change is to say that the self has
replaced God as the "subject," as, in other words, the
point of reference for which the universe can be said to
"exist." Taylor speaks of this change in the self in
terms of its changed relation to nature. "The essential
difference can perhaps be put this way: the modern subject
is self-defining, where on previous views the subject is
defined in relation to a cosmic order." 32
This idea of the self is of course exactly that, an
idea. It is, however, also more than that, it is a
reality of subjects who are striving for self-
consciousness, who understand themselves as free only if
they endorse upon reflection all the restraints that apply
to them, and who by virtue of this are subjected to a host
of juridical and disciplinary mechanisms that enforce the
Hegel, p. 6. See also Connolly's and Bennett's
characterization of the transition to modernity as a new
relation of self and nature. Connolly, Politics and
Ambiguity, pp. 129-130. Bennett, Unthinking Faith and
Enlightenment , p. 7.
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normal. The modern idea of the subject is, in otner
words, integral to the institutional order of modernity;
and this order, while it grants a great deal to the self
in the for* of rights and powers, also demands a great
deal in the way of self-discipline. The modern pursuit of
self
-consciousness is, by this view, the heavily enforced
pursuit of concord; it is the normalizing (as well as
liberating) demand that we integrate, deny, or eliminate
any
-Otherness- in us. It is enforced by a host of
mechanisms: medical, economic, religious, familial, and
otherwise. Both the best and worst of our modern forms of
order are linked, then, to the pursuit of a concord of
consciousness (symbolized wonderfully, perhaps, in the
modern image of "the family- as a locus both of harmony
and of benevolent discipline)
. This duality of
implication becomes clearer, I think, when considered in
the light of some of the paradigmatic features of modern
orders, as identified by Connolly.
Modernity and Sel f
-consciousness
Connolly points out that the standard for authority in
modern societies is endorsement by the rational self,
rather than, say, access to the purposiveness of the
world. Authorities refer for justification (oftentimes
deceitfully of course) to the "rational consent of agents
40
who agree (or promise, to obey „les an(J
installed according to the proper procedures. "33 This
idea of authority is problematic, even though compelling
in many ways, as any given instance of "consent" can
always be shown to fail to live up to this standard, m
fact, "The enlightened, rational character of obedience
through consent also locates irrational dimensions of
authority in the depth psychology of the consenting
adult. -34 By mQdern standards< fchen( fQras ^
authority through consent are dangerous. People will at
times oppose authority when they ought not to, just as at
times they will interpret their own coercion as the
exercise of proper authority, in order to see themselves
as free. In modernity the status of the inner psychology
of persons becomes valorized in new ways; it becomes
central to questions of freedom and political power.
Modern societies are also characterized by the
"conventionalization" of social life. The presumption in
favor of existing social customs is weakened, as their
authority comes to depend on the possibility of their
discursive justification by those participating in them.
Like the modern idea of authority on which it depends,
Connolly, Politics and Amhjguity
. p. 130.
Connolly, Politics and amhjauitv
. p. 132.
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conventionalization gives a new political importance to
the internal mental condition of society's participants.
tn^corofl^acc^ntuati^n^r,6 ^ th6 "°rld ' aft"
social custols^a'fofrnee'co^ratlon1 X ^re-conventions that are, directly or inar^ctTv Ythfproduct of individual and collectivfwuf YThev aretherefore understood to be revisable through wUlfulaction and to be hateful forms of constraint anri
^SWS SS ft ^ -resp^tTSL^n of
Third, and this follows from what has just been said,
modernity is future oriented. Authority requires support
not so much from the belief in the authenticity of certain
accounts of the past as from a shared faith that
"obedience to a set of procedures, norms, and authorities
today will help to foster the sort of world we want for
ourselves or progeny tomorrow." 36 This brand of authority
is "fragile," in the sense that its ability to defend
itself as in accordance with rational will depends to a
great extent on the anticipated results of its exercise.
Modern authority is, in other words, more potentially
accountable than its historical precursor.
These three related features of modernity are certainly
at the heart of its greatest achievements and its most
favorable possibilities, but the way I have characterized
Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity
, pp. 130-131.
Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity
, p. 131.
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then, points already to their down side as well. „e can
explore this ambiguity of effects by
characterization of the conventionalization of social life
as
-thematization," which, she says,
-permeates modern
life. -37 „e of modern . ty arej by argument>
particularly driven to give intelligible form - in
conception, category and theory - to all of the liquidity
of experience. Conventionalization means a potentially
never-ending process of inquisition and categorization.
On the one hand, thematization is an achievement. To
thematize is to politicize; we become aware of the human
made character of categories, beliefs, roles, and social
forms, thus
-admirably enhancing the possibility of social
change. -38 0n the Qther ^ thematize ^ ^
categorially delineate a world, and this - from the point
of view of discordance - is to impose form on material
not perfectly designed to receive it. Modern
thematization is the aggressive categorization of the
world.
Thematization enlightens and politicizes, extendingthe realm of conscious human management; at the sametime, thematization enlightens and subjugatestorturing the space for the unmanageable. 39 '
Unthinking Faith and Enl inhl-.pn.»nh
, p . i42 .
Unthinking Faith and Rnl i.ghtenment
r p. 143.
Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment
, p. 145.
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The idea is that thematization involves subjugation
through normalization.
"Thematization turns difference
into deviance, and that is its truly black effect. "40
This idea is at the heart of Foucault's critique of the
modern pursuit of self
-consciousness. Foucault, more than
any other thinker, has relentlessly advanced the thesis
that there is an insidious form of entrapment involved in
the pursuit of an order based on a freely held consensus.
He in other words criticizes modernity at the level of its
(our) quest for legitimacy; in seeking a legitimate order
we participate in the process whereby all are hammered
into a shape that suits the order. Some of us are made
into those who endorse the order, while others are
constructed as objects of treatment and as counter-
examples for the first group. Every consensus has its
Other, whether embodied in specific individuals designated
as lacking in some way, or located inside each of us as
the rumblings of dissent and discomfort which we root out
and reform. Modern ideals of a society based on consensus
hide the violence which is necessarily a part of any such
concord
.
Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment , p. 146.
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Modern Institution*
[jagaaUaflfcLan
This idea, that the same kind of self-consciousness that
brxngs us modern conceptions of democracy and individuai
rights also provides a powerful iMpetus to forces of
normalization, becomes more plausible when one considers a
fourth important feature of Modern societies identified by
Connolly. This is that imperatives of social coordination
have, for a variety of reasons, become more complicated
and pressing. We are encouraged, and sometimes impelled,
towards such coordination by the very structures -
Physical and discursive
-that provide the context within
we as individuals make our way. This happens even as the
fragility of authority has in_theory put any putative
architects of the regulation of individual activity on the
defensive.
By social coordination I mean the management of
individuals regarding all or any facets of their activity
— where they live, how they look at life, what they are
good at, what they believe in, what manners they have, how
they are divided into groups, what family means for them,
how they account for their problems, etc. The modern
world depends more and more on the problematic exercise of
such management. Normalization is not only made necessary
by our complex interdependence, it is provided with the
perfect pretext as well. Norms work with manipulation,
45
incentives, and coercion to encourage, shore up, and
sometimes simply substitute for the consent needed for the
exercise of authority.
our very in^erdep^ndeic^^fve^acToTs^T* '
operation of the order by coercive means
8m°°th
When I speak of a growing need for social coordination I
refer especially to the patterns of production and
consumption which tie us to imperatives of growth (meaning
by "growth" the continual increase of production and
income levels). 42 To summarize, these imperatives propel
41Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity, p . 134<
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Hi^hn MheHWOf\° f Andr* G°rz ' Marshall Sahlins, and
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chael Best and Connolly have developed the
in the h q 5°™! • ° f consumPtion permitted or encouragedU.S. put citizens on a treadmill where only thepromise of continual growth in income stands a chance ofmaintaining their allegiance to the order. The prevailingalternatives in transportation, housing, food growthpurchasing and storage, education, and other realms ofconsumption force most people to continually pursue anelusive affluence. They can never make ends meet withoutdifficulty, no matter how much "richer" they becomeInstead they find that the luxuries and vehicles to
success of one day are turned into unliberating
necessities the next — cars and B.A. degrees are
examples. This system of consumption, it is further
argued, cannot be transformed without corollary changes in
other institutions such as the organization of work. See
Best and Connolly, The Politicized Economy
,
Second Edition(D.C. Heath and Company, 1982), pp. 5-7 and throughout;
Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity
, p. 27-30; Gorz, A
Strategy for Labor (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 11;Gorz / Socialism and Revolution (Garden City: Anchor Books,
1973) ; Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason (University
of Chicago Press, 1976) ; and Hirsch, The Social Limits to
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us in the direction of greater normalization in two ways.
They do so directly because, fro. the point of view of the
pursuit of growth, certain disciplines and particular
orientations are required, such as the prioritizing of
investment, the acceptance of class difference as the only
rational incentive system, the placement of a variety of
growth-threatening causes on the back burner (e.g.,
environmental and health concerns)
, and the imposition of
hardship on service workers, welfare recipients, single
mothers, and others. 4 3 0ur institutions push us to view
upward mobility, marriage, and self-support as normal -
as appropriate models for behavior - even as many of us
do no fit into these models very well.
Imperatives of growth also promote normalization
indirectly as they generate disaffection and resistance
from the promises around which modern institutions are
constructed. While the modern pursuit of growth has been
justified largely by the promise of the universalization
of affluence and the possibility of democracy, today it
seems to require of us that we drop or amend both of these
*************
Growth (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977).
43 ,The proponents of "^industrialization, " recognizing
these imperatives and uncritically embracing them, are at
the forefront of calls to reinforce the "traditional
moralities" of, in George Gilder's words, "work, family,
and faith." Wealth and Poverty (Bantam Books, 1981), p.
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ooals. Dissection from the order of growtn ^
often expressed and even experienced only covertly
because of both the absence of credible alternatives and
the strong desire of reflective subjects to see themselves
as free. Individuals sometimes, even as they evade taxes
coM.it crimes, and opt out of political life in every way,
condemn overt expressions of resistance such as protests
and radical political arguments because these are found to
be threatening to the future which they are trying to hold
onto, and which they have already
-freely- committed
themselves to. The growth of disaffection and resistance
leads, under conditions of tight structural limits on the
possible, to counter-movements of surveillance,
disciplinary action,
-values- campaigns, "public service
announcements , " etc
.
To pursue growth as an unambiguously good thing is, of
course, to participate in a kind of ontology of concord.
While there are probably few people today that
unhesitatingly endorse growth in this way, the imperatives
of growth help tie us to philosophies of concord
nonetheless. This is because these imperatives, through
their reduction of "slack" (space for unthematized or
unmanaged difference) in the order, tend to intensify the
experience of homesickness which first made the
enlightenment view of the world as matter to be mastered
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so appealing. It is, after all, not easy to live „ith thejudgment that one's civilization is on a course which one
neither endorses nor can alter for the better. This
situation provides excellent conditions for the extension
of mechanisms of social discipline. 44
and^s nrne^senLVa6 °ld m°VTio^ «<=edes
replace itr-^^TSi2t? !^!^fto
?iZ >, ;?ffectlon m some circles and theintroduction of new means of social control andideological management of hope in others!^
All this suggests that, as long as we cannot relax the
imperatives of growth governing our societies, we can look
forward to continued and increasing economic disparity,
I hope it is clear that I do not contend that thedevelopment of a variety of practices that inculcate andenforce norms is caused simply by the fact that any socialcustom is, m modern times, subject to challenge. To
explain the role of reflexivity in today's normalizationit is necessary to refer to institutional structures withtheir tendencies, direction, and imperatives. Reflexivity
will never be an entirely innocent, liberating affair, but
I am not "opposed" to it (quite the opposite)
. Nor, onthe other hand, am I claiming that the normalization we
see around is an entirely necessary set of practices given
our economic arrangements, it is only that the hand of
normalization is enabled and to a degree forced by those
modern institutional imperatives, set in motion by
enlightenment ideas, which make the continued operation of
society such a daunting task.
45Politics and Ambiguity
, pp. 33-34.
greater reliance on manufactured consensus, a more and
-re far reaching demand for civic virtue, a large degree
of mostly covert resistance, and more and more
surveillance and discipline (exercised, as we shall see,
with the help of the institution of family)
.
Normalization anH Discerns
I still have not spoken directly of how it is that
normalization proceeds. Foucault speaks to this question
By his reading, the last several centuries have seen the
growth in the reach and social importance of "positive-
techniques of power - powers "organized around the
management of life rather than the menace of death. "46
The new "bio-power" is based both on the active
disciplining of individual bodies and the social
regulation of a newly conceived entity — the
"population.
"
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted
as l^l* that Lt d°esn/t onlv weighon us
n „
rce that says no, but that it traversL andproduces things, it induces pleasure, formsknowledge, produces discourse, it needs to be
considered as a productive network that runs throughthe whole social body. 47 y
46The History of Sexuality, vm
, i. An introduction ,
trans, by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1980)
p . 147
.
^The History of Sexuality
, p. 119.
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This productive network consists of a whole series of
more or less infinitesimal mechanisms "which each have
their own history, their own trajectory . "48 These
mechanisms, which include architecture, social rites,
documentation of people's lives, commonly held meanings
and expectations, and official and unofficial forms of
punishment, assistance, correction, treatment, and advice,
are "positive" in that they work to produce individuals as
particular forms of selves. Foucault, then, points out
that social management is by no means simply the
application of rules and incentives; it also is the means
by which people are made to construct themselves along the
lines of certain dichotomies, such as sexuality and
deviance, sanity and insanity, responsibility and
criminality, and sickness and health. People are
deployed, in other words, within categories of the normal
and the deviant, usually seeking to put themselves at the
pole of the former, which is associated with truth,
reason, knowledge and liberation.
Language, as an ordering of the world which carries and
imposes meanings and interpretations of reality, and which
inserts its understandings into the design and practice of
most all human construction and activity, is not merely
4
8
"Two Lectures," Power/Knowledae: Selected Interviews and
Other Writings. 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books,
1972)
, p. 99.
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one more mechanism of normalization; it is central to its
»eans of operation. How we speak helps to make us what we
are. Foucault, cognizant of this fact, examines the
ways that various disciplines of the self, such as
psychiatry, penology, and therapy, have as their aim the
production of the appropriately revealing discourse. „e
shows how the techniques of these disciplines increasingly
inform the practices of a variety of social practices,
rules, and structures. The point, he says, is in each
case to get people to speak, to individualize themselves,
bare the truth about themselves, defend themselves, find
their inner coherence, etc. And, indeed, this is a common
feature of job and loan interviews, questionnaires, job
application forms, drug treatment programs, welfare
checkups, self-help courses, therapy sessions, parole
board reviews, family court hearings, alternative
community group meetings, and problem resolution sessions
between lovers. We are, as Foucault says, a
"confessional" society.
Foucault 's various histories seek to document how theimposition and elicitation of discourse is complicit inthis process of normalization. See Madness and
Civilization, Discipli ne and Punish: The Birth of t-ho
Prison (Random House, 1979) , The Birth of the CI inic: an
Archeology of Medical Perception (Random House, 1975) TheHistory of Sexuality
, and The Use of Pleasure; The History
of Sexuality. Volume Two (Random House, 1986)
.
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To sum up, we are
, by this read . ng Qf sQciety(
Pressed in numerous „ays to forn , narrative ^.^ ^
ourselves and to sticK fast to this identity as the
condition of our freedom This has an effect
of normalization because the ways we come to see ourselves
and the commitments we make as responsible selves can
amount to the acceptance of the prevailing alternatives
for the organization of the self.
One way to understand normalization is to compare it to
"oppression," the latter implying a form of pQwer^
holds down and prevents, which in other words is
unjustifiable because it keeps people from something they
need or would be better off having. Normalization
operates through mechanisms which create and direct,
rather than merely prevent. The implication is that such
power is unjustifiable insofar as it unnecessarily reduces
slack in the order, if it participates, in other words, in
an unnecessary and hurtful privileging of certain
individuals, certain powers for individuals, or certain
ways of being.
These different conceptions - power as oppression and
power as normalization - are at odds in certain respects,
but the philosophy of discordance does not, at least by
the reading I endorse, rule out the possibility of
oppression. People can be, and often are, "held down" in
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that they have real needs ^ ^.^^ ^
-adequately addressed and could be better addressed. The
philosophy of discordance only disallows ^ interpretation
of a particular set of needs and desires as the
"authentic,"
"truly fulfilling," or "true" ones. To so
privilege is to pave the way (at least theoretically, for
normalization, as the positive production of the needs and
desires thought to be part of the true self win be
disguised. The project of the "liberation" of our "true
selves" can in fact come to serve the ends of an
established order.
One example of this process is of great relevance to the
question of the effects of the modern institution of
family; this is the "deployment of sexuality," as traced
by Foucault. I will speak more of this in the next
chapter, which concerns normalization and the family. But
a few words about it now might help in the present
discussion. As a form of "bio-power, " the deployment of
sexuality is concerned not so much with rules as with
knowledge. "Sexuality" is not, says Foucault, a
substratum or drive which can either be held down by rules
and force or liberated and allowed to flourish, it is
instead a modern construct — "it has been expanding at an
increasing rate since the seventeenth century." 50 it has
The History of Sexuality. Vol. i
r p . 107.
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been constructed, says Foucault, by means of the eliciti
of discourse
- people are asked or forced to speak of
their sexuality - and by the construction Qf
knowledges of sex. These knowledges are based on the
interpretation by authorities of the speaking of the
sexual subject.
"Sexuality" is, Foucault tells us, able to function to
make people speak first of all because of its status as a
truth to be discovered. it also serves to make people
talk because of the panoply of legal, medical and
therapeutic practices which assume the truth of sexuality
in their operations. On the one hand a certain pleasure
is involved in the "discovery" (construction) of our own
sexual "truth." Sexual "liberation" generates (and
appeals to) feelings of power for the individual. On the
other hand this "liberation" is an imposition of a unity
upon the multiple pleasures of the desiring body. 51 This
imposition takes place in the context of the reality of
therapeutic discipline. To fall outside the bodily norms
(perhaps to be "gay," "hermaphroditic," a "dwarf," etc.)
is to be subjected to exploitative and therapeutic
treatment. 52
ng
51Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Vol. t . pp. 152-153.
52See Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently
DiscoveredMemoirs of a Nineteenth Century French
Hermaphrodite, Introduced by Michel Foucault, Translated
by Richard McDougall (Pantheon Books, 1980)
.
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s on
It is hard, perhaps impossible, to finally differentiate
between those aspects of ourselves which we create through
our thinking and speaking and those which are somehow
any dents in Foucault's thesis, as his point is the
importance we attach to this difference and the effect
ourselves of our searches for the truth. On the other
hand, perhaps Foucault is wrong (I don't think so) and
"sexuality" is an underlying unity. Even so, our
society's emphasis on the meaningfulness of the experience
of this unity (the great joy of having sex, the importance
of having a sexual identity) can still be said to
constitute a normalizing force. "Sexuality., promotes the
idea of a concord within the self and between self and
world. It stands as just one example of an underlying
unity. it is part of a world that tells us constantly of
the importance of discovering just who and what we truly
are. And this perhaps promotes the idea that there are
incontestable truths around which we can perhaps one day
organize a world with no politics, if so, it follows that
the deployment of sexuality produces homesickness
(especially under modern conditions)
. As such, it likely
helps to maintain our commitment to the imperatives of
growth which so govern our orders.
Foucault would be the first to agree that social
..disciplines" — meaning by this social practices which
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construct, and so "tame," the self to a degree - are not
new. By his reading, however, today's disciplines have a
broader and deeper reach than in previous ti.es, waning
that they result in a more thorough-going construction of
the self and they apply across more areas of life. The
techniques of modern disciplines are, moreover, by his
reading especially reliant on reflexivity. At the same
point in history as new levels of self-conscious
reflection have made possible new heights of critical
reassessment and therefore allowed for new conceptions of
freedom, this self-conscious reflection has been put to
use
- not necessarily consciously - as a means of social
control. Modernity means, for Foucault, the advent of
"disciplinary society." Connolly summarizes Foucault
well:
The normalized self is, for Foucault, the self thatmaintains self-surveillance to avoid treatment fordelinquency, mental illness, or sexual perversity;disciplinary society is the order that extends
strategies of normalization into new frontiers of
The Ontology of Discordance Revisited
Most contemporary political theories are, as I already
have indicated, insufficiently aware of (or complicit
with) the problem of the production of homesickness and
Politics and AmMauity
. p. 104.
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normalised selves.54 Discordance distinguishes
from most of today's political prograns ^
always in acknowledging the injury done by any set of
norms; it could therefore possibly provide (if it could be
the basis of a political program) the philosophical
grounding for the taming of the imperatives which make us
depend so heavily on norms, it is, in Connolly's words,
compatible with and affirming of a brand of democracy
which idealizes politics and its strife as
-part of the
affirmation of life itself." 55
By some readings, to affirm democracy and politics is to
amend Foucault's critique of the pursuit of freedom and
legitimacy through self
-consciousness. Whether this is
the case depends on if Foucault is properly read as
The issue between them is how normalization is toproceed," says Connolly. Politics and Ambiguity
r p. 10.I have already mentioned George Gilder's offer of "workfamily, and faith" as the appropriate set of norms to
'
follow. Other cultural principles that can serve as thebasis for normalization include the pursuit of consensus,the rejection of materialism, and the libertarian
repudiation of any notion of the common good. An ontology
of discordance does not claim that these principles are
all equally valid or invalid — reasons can (and should)be given in support of some over others.
55Politics and Ambiguity,, p. 14. Connolly says that his
affirmation of democratic politics as the medium through
which "voices of otherness can find expression" ( Politics
and Ambiguity, p. 15) constitutes a step away from
Foucault and Nietzsche, the former being ambivalent
regarding democracy and the latter considering it the
triumph of the resentful and concord-seeking "herd
mentality" (see Politics and Amhigni
^y , p . 14).
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lectin, affiraation as necessarily nornalizi
certainly he is clear when h6 sayg^ ^
another system is to participate in the present systeB „ 56
Some go so far as to say that Foucault's relentless
politicization amounts to a nihilistic anti-politics which
xs helpless to offer any sort of response to the
normalization of modern bio-power. More specifically
Foucault is said to rule out the possibility of any
legitimate normative commitment to a politics of change «
I am not convinced by this reading; it seems to falsely
encapsulate Foucault, perhaps for the saKe of purchasing a
clear reading of his "overall position." Foucault, I
think, is committed simply to consistently playingthe
role of the nay-sayer to all our affirmations. 58 Connolly
57Varieties of this argument are offered bv ch an oeTaylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth « SiSlS? n*
l
(198b
'' ?P: and Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern
Praxis iTelntl
1
'Tf'8 ™* No™*ive Confusions^Inter ational i no . 3 (October 1981) tin oio-ort
•Michel Foucault: A Young
-Conservative'?" Ethic; 96 no
1 (October 1985), pp. 165-184. A summary ofthUepositions and a defense of Foucault is offered by TomKeenan in "The Paradox of Knowledge and Power: Reading
1987K ^s^a?^
3 '" Political theory. 15, no. 1 (February
58As Connolly puts it, Foucault prefers to play "the fool"for modernity. He offers the theorist of legitimacy adouble," a persistent voice of criticism. Politics andAmbiguity
,
p. 92.
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argues that even if Foucault excludes political
affirmation for strategic reasons his critique of
reflexive self
-consciousness does not in fact rule out
such affirmation, it only rules out the possibility of
unqualified affirmation,
"...the need remains to
establish a stance, even if it is an ambiguous one,
towards those limits most deserving of allegiance. "59
There is no need for me here to enter into the debate
about what Foucault 's position on this issue really is. j
believe, following Connolly's lead, that space does exist
in the order for the worthwhile pursuit of political
legitimacy; the challenge is to make this pursuit part of
a politics of the taming of normalization rather than of
its promotion. Towards this end, we need a politics based
on "a mode of reflexivity which
...acknowledges the limits
to the reflexive assimilation of the other ...»
Such a view
...supports, I want to say, an ideal of
social order which can sustain itself without havinq
control 60
mU°h
°f the order into the orbit of social
A world such as this, in which the ambiguous, and so
contestable and political, nature of even our highest
achievements is recognized, is not easy to imagine. It
would mean forms of speaking, modes of punishment, types
Politics and Ambiguity
r pp. 93-94.
Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity
, p. 94.
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of social assistance, and perhaps rituals of
acknowledgement which call attention to the harm done by
social categories and arrangements. And it would require
the loosening of the grip of those imperatives of
coordination which make the exercise of slack in the
application of social categories too threatening to order
itself, such a future may however present the only
credible alternative to a possible future of greater
disparity, new impositions, the extension of
normalization, and considerable hatred, resentment, fear,
and victimization for the sake of order.
The transformation to a world of greater slack would not
require the wholesale rejection of prevailing commitments
and practices, but rather a selective reformulation of our
commitments in the light of discordance. Nor would a
culture of discordance mean the end of norms. To say that
norms could disappear or become benign would be to assume
again the possibility of harmony, if there can be no
final or cost free harmony, if "the social order is
understood as a precarious and dangerous achievement,"
then human life is, as I said before, inherently
"political." 61 m keeping with this conclusion, a culture
of discordance does not reject authority, even as it
insists on the fact that every mode of authority brings
Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment
,
p. 153.
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losses and sacrifices to those that accept it, because
authority is necessary if any prized mode of sociai life
is to exist. 62
An ontology of discordance does not, finally, disallow
us from making arguments based on claims concerning "the
natural," even though it does, importantly, challenge the
idea that whatever is "natural" is unambiguously good,
inevitably compelling, or entirely consistent and unified
in its urgings. it is not inconsistent with discordance
to say that humans are embodied and situated in the world
in ways that both enable and constrain. The point of view
of discordance can, in Bennett's words, "appreciate the
natural and bodily world as an ambiguous setting in which
we reside, as both a medium and an impediment to human
fulfillment, as successively host and adversary." 63
Discordance and the Family
The issue of the natural provides me with the perfect
opportunity to turn this discussion to the question of
family. From Plato and Aristotle on, most political
theory has seen the family either as an obstacle to, or as
an unambiguously good and necessary building block in, the
achievement of a natural harmony within and among selves,
See Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity
, pp. 136-139.
Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment
,
p. 151.
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but family, like social order, is a precarious, dangerous
and necessarily hurtful achievement. Family, again like
social order, is a social institution (a product of
convention) which nonetheless
"partakes" of the natural
Defenses of "tfce" family as natural are typically
conservative in their import. From the point of view of
discordance, however, it is possible to see a radical
moment in the defense of families as rooted partly in what
is naturally the human condition. To state this in the
form of a thesis, our character as embodied beings
requiring completion (always imperfect and subjugating)
through the formation of identities, makes plausible (if
contestable) the defense of the small, relatively intimate
and stable household as a component of a social form worth
having, at least under modern conditions.
I divide this thesis into two separate claims. First,
the institution of family plays a central role in the
construction of individuals as subjugated selves. Second,
we nonetheless ought to affirm, as deserving of our
allegiance, some limits and norms concerning the
demarcation of a relatively private realm and concerning
the upbringing of children. Specifically, I argue that
any sort of less normalizing and oppressive order which we
might be able to achieve will include something which is
like, but also different than, today's family.
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I elaborate on this dual thesis in the chapters ahead
but I will now briefly summarize each of its parts. The
idea is that, on the one hand, the political role of the
family, here meaning by this term an institution and a set
of ideas current in modern societies, is largely, although
ambiguously, that of a support for the forces of
normalization which keep most of us committed to the ends
around which our institutions are constructed. The family
as a principle around which most people's living
arrangements are organized is a site for the focus of
never to be realized hopes of concord and a fertile ground
for the application of a variety of normalizing
interventions. And as an ideal the family serves as a
model of concord which invites either a depoliticizing
sort of despair and grievance, a sense of satisfaction
based on the privatization of ends and the cultivation of
naivete regarding the historical course we are on, or a
revolutionary commitment to make the larger society over
into a more "familial" place, or some combination of all
three. Regardless of which of these positions people are
drawn to, the notion of family functions to prop up
concordance and so helps to sustain the dangerous growth
of the imperatives of social coordination which are so
conducive to normalization in the first place. And in the
meantime the interpretation of the nature and importance
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of kin ties through the lens of an ontology of concordance
acts to help sustain the still near universal second-class
status of women and women's activities relative to men and
men's activities.
On the other hand, it is also true that the institution
of family, meaning specifically the common practice
whereby a small and relatively stable and intimate group
of adults combine residence with the raising of children,
ought to be defended as a achievement which, however
precarious and dangerous, is nonetheless necessary to some
of the ends we rightfully prize. it is for example a
locus of much that people experience as worthwhile or even
deeply satisfying. I maintain, in other words, that there
is a way to defend the family from the point of view of
discordance, and I believe that this defense can provide a
beginning to a counter to the forces of normalization that
surround us, as well as to the assumptions of concord and
the institutions of growth that supports those forces.
The first part of my thesis, that the family normalizes,
is the subject of the next chapter. In chapter four I
discuss the family from the point of view of discordance,
drawing both genealogical and psychoanalytic perspectives.
In between, in chapter three, I review some of the much
and varied theoretical discourse on the western family, in
order to make the case that concordance is assumed by a
wide variety of points of view.
CHAPTER 3
THE CONTEMPORARY FAMILY:
OPPRESSION, NORMALIZATION, AND THE NATURAL
In this chapter I am concerned with deconstructing and
criticizing today's family, rather than with defending it.
I nonetheless end up doing some of both, as the power of
the family to do harm stems in part from the good that it
offers. This at any rate is the conclusion I reach after
addressing the following questions. What deleterious and
unjust features of our society (I mean the modern west and
especially the United States) does its institution of
family participate in? In other words, what harm does the
family do? Given this harm, what explains the tremendous
appeal and moral force of the image of "the family"? in
other words, how is the contemporary reality of family
(image and practice) constituted and enforced? I should
say at the outset that I do not provide here any kind of
adequate description or a documentation either of the harm
done by and through the family or of the technologies of
its enforcement. Instead I offer an account of them which
is consistent with the ontology of discordance.
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This means, of course, that my critique of the family
connects to the account of modernity I give in the
preceding chapter. I am concerned to make plausible the
idea that there is a link between our family institution
and today's lack, on the one hand, of "public" spaces of
action, accountability, and the expression of the
different and the unsettled, and, on the other hand, of
"private" spaces which allow for unmanaged, incompletely
enunciated, or non-hierachized differences to exist, on
the other hand, I want to make this case without denying
that families do to some degree (and in a changed world
could to a greater degree) operate in the opposite
direction, and help give life and value to some unrealized
public and private possibilities of our human existence.
The Contemporary Family
The institution of the private family is a central
figure in the structuring of modern, western societies; it
is central both in its capacity as an image that
circulates and its reality as the typical basis by which
people participate in economic and social life. 1 Ranya
See Michele Barrett and Mary Mcintosh, The Anti-social
Family (New Left Books, 1982), pp. 7-8. Barrett and
Mcintosh consider the family's reality as image to be "the
family as an ideology." To me this wording falsely
implies that such images would necessarily go away in a
society without class oppression.
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Rapp clarifies this dual aspect of fhot e meaning of "family"
by distinguishing between families and households.
w??h?n°
ldS
?
re the emP^ically measurable unitsit i people pool resources and perform certaintasks... They are residential units withiS wh?^
SSSffi.!- reS°UrCeS ^stribu?ed^d
W lCh
Family, on the other hand, is as Rapp points out a
normative model with which people are recruited into
households. "The family" refers first to the "nuclear-
kin relations which are held up as the proper model for
the formation of households (mom, dad, and the kids), and
second to the more extended ties which, while presumed to
be emotionally significant, people are permitted to
"activate selectively." 3 This normative model, finally,
includes a particular vision of sexuality and of gender.
The only sexuality in the normative household is legally
sanctioned heterosexual ity, and "mom" and "dad," as the
compatible and jointly required genders of parenthood,
each have their own special characteristics, so clearly
marked by the differences between mother's day and
father's day.
Some aspects of this model of the family are today being
called into question as never before, but the model is
2
•Family and Class in Contemporary America: Notes Toward
an Understanding of Ideology," Rethinking the Family: Some
Feminist Questions
. Barrie Thome with Marilyn Yalom, Eds.
(New York: Longman, 1982), p. 169-170.
3See Rapp, "Family and Class," p. 170.
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still very much alive and well. 4 There are now
television situation comedies which tell the story of an
alternative type of household - there are two "dads," or
maybe a mom and a teenage helper. On the one hand the
message is that these families are okay; there is love,
the children are well cared for. On the other hand, the
message is that the characters did not choose their
different way of life; they are simply making the best of
a regrettable situation. Thus the shows seem designed to
reassure us about the resiliency of old ways despite
social change. 5
The nature of the normative family model, as well as the
power behind it, is summed up beautifully in the results
of and the reaction to an attempt by the Chicago Housing
Authority to remove warring gangs from the 13 story
Rockwell Gardens housing development. The authorities
began to enforce Federal guidelines that only allow
"families" to lease units. Specifically, all men living
It has recently been challenged in a revolutionary
decision by the New York State Court of Appeals, to the
effect that, when it comes to rent control laws, any group
characterized by a long-term exclusive commitment and the
pooling of economic resources can legally be considered a
"family." See The New York Times . July 7, 1989: Al and
B16.
5Two such shows are "My Two Dads" and "Charles in Charge."
A notable exception to this trend is "The Tracey Ullman
Show," which has regular skits about a gay couple and
their daughter.
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with a woman in her apartment without being married to her
stood to be evicted. The result has been, on the one
hand, control of gangs. On the other hand, numerous
marriages suddenly took place. These marriages are, of
course, coerced. One man who has hid in the apartment he
lives in since the day of the raid said "it's been like
prison." Despite this remark, the article in The New Yn.v
Times which described these events is entirely upbeat, and
so is the Housing Authority, which plans to continue the
program elsewhere.
"It's exciting, isn't it?" a Chicago HousingAuthority spokeswoman, Katie Kelly, said today.Quite frankly, we hope the trend continues. "^
Thus while we may have reached the point where the
gender and marital status of the parents and caregivers is
a legitimate subject of public debate, an important degree
of orthodoxy does exist. According to this orthodoxy,
marriage and family are something to celebrate. Moreover,
in general "the family" is taken to mean a goods-
consuming, child producing, child rearing, resource
pooling, and property holding household which is based on
nuclear kin ties, is fairly strictly segregated from work
life and education, and is the center of privacy, love,
and stability. In short, the family is marked out as the
6The New York Times. October 18, 1988, sec. I, p. 18, col.
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only proper place where children and adults can live
together, as well as the most proper place for strong
affection, intimacy and personal commitment.
This idea has replaced an earlier medieval one, by which
the family referred more to the importance of "blood" ties
in locating individuals and arranging social and economic
life and less to a "home" where one could find privacy and
affection. Earlier than that, in the Greece of Plato and
Aristotle, "family" meant the producing and child-rearing
household; it was articulated as the realm of necessity,
without the normative status conferred by the medieval
concern with "honor" or the modern concern with familial
love. And, in societies further removed from us than our
own past, it is misleading to speak at all of "the
family." Thus, in some languages there is no word for the
unit of parents and children, even though the speakers are
clearly aware of which children are biologically related
to which adults, and in other societies there is no living
space common to the group of parents and children. 7
This is pointed out by Jane Collier, Michelle Z.Rosaldo, and Sylvia Yanagisako, "Is There a Family? NewAnthropological Views," Rethinking the Family ? SomeFeminist Questions, ed. by Barrie Thome with MarilynYalom (Longman, 1982), p. 33. Regarding the lack of aterm like our "family" in some languages, they refer to
H?
G
S?^, ofJEvon Z ' Vo*t' Zinacantan: A Mavan Community inthe Highlands of ch 1apag (Harvard University Press, 1969)
p. 39. Regarding the point about a "family space," they
'
refer to the work of Yolanda and Robert Murphy, Women ofthe Forest (Columbia University Press, 1974)
.
"Family" is, in part, a contrastive CQncept; ^ ^
meaning as much by what it supposedly - s ^ as by^ ^
supposedly is. The modern western family is situated
among, and posited as a contrast to, the otherwise
relatives contigent, often competitive and instrumental,
and usually temporary relations of modern capitalist
societies. "The family" is meant to contrast with the
private world of friendship, with the semi-public world of
"private- business and employment, and with the "public-
world of government, politics, media, and entertainment.
•
in contrast with the more voluntaristic and perhaps
interest-based relationships that supposedly characterize
these settings, the family refers to a group of special
persons among whom obtain more demanding norms of
accountability and responsibility, and among whom memories
are shared that make the mutual relations extra ordinarily
valuable and important. Relations in the family are
supposed to go beyond the instrumental and the contigent,
as well as beyond the level of sharing and commitment
considered normal in friendships.
The separation of the family from other realms of social
life such as work and politics is of course not just an
idea but also a reality. The modern family came fully
8 •Collier, Rosaldo, and Yanagisako, "Is There a Family?"
pp. 33-34. *'
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into its own in the last century, as a result of the
industrial revolution, and scholars widely agree on
certain of its features.* It could not exist in anything
like its present form if there had been no decline in the
amount of production and education carried out in the
home. 10 it is, as compared to the family of feudal times,
more isolated from non-nuclear kin, servants (if they
exist), and community knowledge and observation. U it has
changed internally, both with regard to at least the form
(if not necessarily the import) of power relations between
For the structural-functionalist position, see Talcott
£
arsons
'
Social Structure and Pgrs^aLifcy
.
New York- Free
l
r*s*> 1970), and Talcott Parsons and Robert F . BalesFamily, Socialization and interaction Process (New York-Free Press, 1955). The classic Marxist text is perhaps
'
Fnednch Engels, The Origin of the Family. PrivateProperty and the State (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr &Company Cooperative, 1902). Two excellent feminist texts(which also include good overviews of the family historyliterature) are Louise Tilly and Joan Scott, Women. Work
and Family (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978)
and Elizabeth H. Pleck, "Two Worlds in One: Work and
Family," Journal of Social History (December 1976): 178-
95. Other important works in the history of the family
are Phillipe Aries, Centuries of Childhood: A Social
History of Family T,i fp (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962)
and Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family (New'
York: Basic Books, 1975).
10A good account of this transition in its early stages
can be found in Aries, Centuries of Childhood .
See John Demos, Past. Present, and Personal: The Family
and the Life Course in American History (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), pp. 3-23. Regarding privacy in
New England, see Nancy F. Cott, "Eighteenth-Century Family
and Social Life Revealed in Massachusetts Divorce
Records", In A Heritage of Her Own: Towards a New Social
History of American Women
,
Nancy F. Cott and Elizabeth H.
Pleck, eds. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 113.
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-n and wo.e„, and with regard to its physical set.up 0nthe one hand one's gender is no longer iegaliy and
explicitly determinative of one's rights and ohligations
any more than one's membership in a particular family any
longer invokes a set of rules about carriage and
occupation. On the other hand, the household is now
marked by corridors, rooms with functions, and furniture
that stays in one place. 12 Along^ ^ ^ ^
privacy indicated by these changes, has come a new
attitude toward children, who are now thought to be
different than adults, even as better than adults, and as
deserving of a great deal of special attention so that
they develop properly. 13
These truths help to distinguish the modern family from
its western predecessor, but they leave many questions
unanswered. 14 what kind of autonomy, and what new forms
12Centuries of Ch ildhood
, pp . 394-403.
DrTvaov
iLAri6SI thGSiS in Centuries nf nhn,^ 0np i cy as a modern invention, see Hannah Arendt TheH^an_C^Mitipn (The University of Chicago Press,' Sf8
, ,
One
h
sLS?d ni?
0
-
lead
*
t0
*K
01l,e Seri°US Understandings.houl ot jump to the conclusion that history has
familv h^H G pro^essi°n fro* ^rge to small, or from a
(I sneak
material
^
oods to °ne based on sentimentp of this more in this next chapter). Peter
w^v ^hL
031
^ ^
iS/irSt idGa a "»Vthf" *nd points to theay t is myth blinds us to contemporary realities Welose sight of the important distinction between the family
anH^f k f ?f
the " c°-resident domestic group" (household)d the family understood as a network of kinship. Just
as we assume that the household was bigger and more
materialistic in the past, we tend to assume that todaythe household and the family have become the same. There
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of social regulation, come along with the apparently cleardelation of the family as a separate space? what
forces, for example, now Pennine Carriage choice" and
occupation, and how is the family complicit with^
forces? The modern family is as initiated
through voluntary romance and as separate and distinct
from the world outside, and these ideas are a real feature
of the institution, but this does not mean that they are
true. it remains to be said how the modern family is
regulated "from the outside." m my view the family is in
part a product of social forces and in that sense hardly
distinct from the "outside." To ask about social
regulation is to ask about the ways that rights,
obligations, and social expectations are established, if
not by the rules and laws of honor and blood. I argue,
following the lead of others, that they are established
with the help of the notion of "the family" as a locus
(and even as an ideal) of happiness. This occurs not in
spite of but rather because of the fact that most of us
don't live in "normative families." And, I also argue,
the fact that this occurs means a good deal of harm can be
*************
is a "modern family," but within its bounds there is
considerable variation. Laslett, "Introduction: TheHistory of the Family," Household and Family in Past Ti^
ed. by Peter Laslett with the assistance of Richard Wall(Cambridge at the University Press, 1972) p. l.
done to people that might otherwise not be done. I( like
Rapp, understand the modern family as complicit with the
propogation of norms which have a heavy cost for many.
The Price of the rnn«-»TOOrarv Pa„ ;iy
Because of the role played by the modern family in the
secondary status of women, powerful descriptions of these
costs can be found in feminist scholarship, m fact were
it not for feminism, it is doubtful that there would be
much at all by way of analysis and criticism of the modern
family. Socialist feminists have been particularly
insightful, although (as we shall see) these insights are
often combined with some problematic assumptions typical
to socialism.
On the insightful side, Rapp explains how the family
operates as a norm of loving, worthwhile, voluntary
relations in the context of a system of households which
are differentiated by class. The result is the
perpetuation of a variety of illusions central to both the
continued acceptance of economies of private accumulation
and the continuation of the hurt, disappointment, and
suffering faced so often by people in their pursuit of
worthwhile, voluntary relations.
To achieve a normative family is something many
categories of Americans are prevented from doing
because of the ways that their households plug into
tenuous resource bases. And when normative families
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Of particular force is Rapp's discussion of the way the
family/household system l inlcs the pursuit Qf autonomy
love to the reproduction of dependence and class and
gender inequality, working class men and women typically
look forward to the formation of their own family as
somehow liberating
- "Founding a family is what people do
for personal gratification, for love, and for autonomy.""
What people get instead is recruited as a member of a
particular gender into a household situated in a
particular class. They then need to do their required
part in the family just to keep it going.
The norm of the family based household is, in other
words, clung to as the only (and the approved) locus of
the achievement of satisfying and meaningful personal
relations. There is enough truth to this idea to keep it
going, even as it has some terrible effects. 17 As Rapp
15
"Family and Class," p. 180.
""Family and Class," p. 173.
17These effects are racist and sexist, as well as
classist. I agree with Michael Harrington that teenagepregnancy among the poor (in some places occurring at
epidemic levels) cannot be entirely explained byignorance, lack of access to birth control, or even by the
refusal of men to use birth control (certainly a factor)
.
To refuse to countenance the possibility that young women
sometimes allow themselves to get pregnant to try and
court love and family autonomy is to give them too little
credit. Poor teenage women are not stupid. They simply
are in a much worse position than others when to comes to
their chances of getting the romance and independence all
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puts it, ties of family are often »ti t i , a least among the poor
and the near poor. ,nifeii«M *.»., lifelines that simultaneously hold
together and sustain individuals. »«
On the other hand, real family experiences all too often
belie the norm of loving, sharing, and protection,
exploding instead with tension, rage and violence, while
few families actually correspond to the norm of the secure
and harmonious group of thoughtful yet apolitical
heterosexuals who are concerned primarily „ith continued
security, self
-development and recreation, this gap
between norm and reality leads usually to reflection on
one's own inadequacies rather than on the inadequacies of
the norm itself and its social and economic context." m
*************
of us are encouraged to pursue. Teenage pregnancy helosto firm up differences of social class because it
P
reinforces stereotypes of the poor, while often keeoina or
s?n^g^
PSCifiC individuals Poor and dependent? Moreoverince it is women who get pregnant, and because a
G°V
'
disproportionate number of racial minorities are among thepoor teenage pregnancy has both racist and sexist
throughiut"
3^111^011
'
The Ne* American Poverty, p. 196 and
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t0 workln9 class survival and resistance.e Working-Class Family: A Marxist Perspective » TheFamily in Political Thought
, ed. by Jean Bethke Elshtlin
'
Mass * : The University of Massachusetts Press,1982 ) •
19Even as of 1978 both parents worked in 50% of the two-parent families. And one out of six children at that timelived in a single-parent family. Boston Women's HealthBook Collective, Ourselves and Our Children: A Book By anri
For Parents (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 160.
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the (somewhat stilted) language of Jurgen Habermas,
"familial-vocational privatism" is an important cultural
bulwark of late capitalism. 20
Michele Barrett and Mary Mcintosh, authors of The_Antiz
social Famil y., discuss these several points quite
succinctly. They point out that, when it comes to the
maintenance of economic exploitation, families contribute
directly as the basis of inheritance; they pass on not
only resources, but "advantage and disadvantage in the
chances of educational success. "21 The fact that people
live in families also provides support for the myth that
individualist and market forms of economic organization
can adequately provide for all. This lie is sold, say
Barrett and Mcintosh, primarily by means of the equation
of individualism and familism. The self-sufficient
"individual" of mainstream economic thought is, for
example, really a "provider" for a family, and the talk of
society as composed of such individuals helps cover up the
fact that many members of society cannot contribute to
production and the wage system cannot actually meet the
needs of all. 22
Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 75.
The Anti-social Family
,
p. 45.
The Anti-social Family
, pp. 47-50.
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This elation of individualism and faBilisB operates
For example the concept works hand-in-hand with the
structure of work - the - fa»ily wage ,„ gender^
disparities, and gender baSed occupationa i distinctions -
to make it likely that women will be the ones to give up
work and career and stay home to care for children 23
Men, on the other hand, often have little choice but to
spend little ti»e with their children. Families simply
cannot afford to do it another way. 2"
The family is also currently implicated in the fact that
women are more subject than men to isolation, risk of
mental illness, mental anguish and physical abuse. This
is because the ideal of family, along with the myriad of
social expectations, laws, policies, and economic
realities that support it, places women and men in
different relations to public and private life. Barrett
and Mcintosh point out for example that men,
-more fully
located in the public sphere," are more likely to be
convicted of a crime, while women, trapped in solitary and
unrelieved household responsibilities, are more likely to
be diagnosed as mentally ill. 25
Harrington, The New American Poverty
, pp. 196-197.
Ourselves and Our Children , pp. 190-191.
The Anti-socia l Family
, pp. 58-59.
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The contemporary family also helps tQ enfQrce
limitations and impose expectations with regard to
people's sexual identity and activities. This is
Particularly hard on women, despite many changes for the
better in the recent past. 26 The bulk Qf ^
divided into married couples, and this gives a tangible
basis to the pressure the family ideal exerts on everyone
to be married. Marriage of course is typically an
economic arrangement as well as a sexual and a romantic
one, with women being in a more financially dependent
situation. 27 what this adds up to is obstacles to
alternative arrangements of sexual, intimate, and
financial life, as well as the reinforcement of the
pressure on women to be adequate sexual objects for men. 28
The costs of our family system are, of course, also born
by children, one book reviewer, after speaking of the
2°^ 5sy7afw sex reform nove»ent "
27The Anti-social Family
, pp. 54-55. Following Engels
seofraLd
n
?
McIntosh conclu^ that sex-love must bT 'parate from economic ties and "allowed to flourish inits own right." As I have already indicated, I?m not sure
sociai
e
£mnvy " in7 jtS °T right " exists ' s4e The Ant?-
"6
X
l f?
mi1 y > ,P- 5 > and Friedrich Engels, TheOrigin ofthe Family, Private Propprtv and the, Stajbe (
^^°"q "
Charles H. Kerr & Co., Cooperative, 1902), pp. 91-92.28Barrett and Mcintosh say that sex still takes placeprimarily .'on men's terms,- and this in indeed one way toput it, although I am uncomfortable with the way this
Phras
^
reifies ..men" and their "terms" (The Anti-snn^i
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widespread sexual abuse of children, often by family
members, added that
-Countless children are beaten,
starved, isolated and treated abominably by family members
and caretakers."" ^^^ ^ ^ ^
as the hills, it was not conceptualized as a problem (i„
the united states) until after the "Mary Ellen case" of
1874.30 since then . t has^ iar^^ ^ ^
issue of individual pathology and medical deviance. While
it has, in the words of Barbara j. Nelson, been
"vigorously portrayed as a non-controversial issue," thus
turning "policy makers away from considering the social-
structural and social-psychological underpinnings of abuse
and neglect," abuse is in fact "often intimately connected
with poverty, racism, and patriarchy. "31 it is, in other
words, connected to the institution of family which is
itself so wrapped up in problems of poverty, of race and
of women.
loon
G\*°rer ' The New York Times RnoV p^-i^, July 161989 p. 21. Forer reviews America's Courts and TheirTreatment of Sexually Abused children , by Billie WriqhtDziech and Charles B. Schudson (Boston: Beacon Press,1989 ) .
3 0Barbara J. Nelson, Making an Issue of chil Abuse:
Political Agenda Setting for Social Problems (The
University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 5
31see Making an Issue of child Abuse
, p. 4, p. 3, and pp.89-90, for each of these respective quotations.
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Barrett d MCIntosh sum up the costs of
in their claim that it is »* n+iA J-s
"anti-social »• tk«A<iX
* The family, thevsay,
"arrogates* important SQcial yaiues ^ ^ y
"altruism, feeling
. commitment,
and individual autonomy, -.32^ ^ ^^^^
stxne ana distort their
and loving would be more widesprea(J if ^^ ^ ^
claim them for its own .„33 It . s w . th th . s pQint
that Barrett and Mcintosh are at their weakest
It is certainly true that the selling of these important
ideals as
-family values „ helps ^^ ^^immune from criticise, as it adds power to what Barrett
and Mcintosh call the widespread
"imagery of idealized
family life... And it is likewise^^ ^
provides more than public relations support for the
family. 34 „ a<JtuaUy^^ ^ ^ ^
divisions of responsibility and authority assumed to be
ideal in the family appear in the occupational structure,
in residential and non-residential institutions, and
33The Anti
-social Family
, p. 80. See also p. 42.
The Ant i
-social Family, p> 2 9.
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elsewhere- Thus faBily.Uke arrangemenfcs
business also sunnnrfe *-wppo ts the assumption that people live inor should live in, families m ^
,
nes, turn many social
institutions are organized on the ^
do get their caring in faniUes
. ^ ^ ^
conventional family, everything else^ ^
is, "pale and unsatisfactory.
»
3 6
on the other hand
,
the oritique of today's family as
••anti-social" misses the mark on several points; it
overlooks important aspeots of our families and it is
based on a naivete concerning "the social." Barrett and
Mcintosh are critical of the family but, like nany of
their opponents who celebrate the family, they make (or at
least fail to question) the problematic assumption of the
reality or possibility of an authentic self. They
participate, in other words, in a philosophy of
concordance. As a result their account of the costs of
the family is inadequate and their recommendations are
problematic.
I discuss this at length in the next chapter. Consider
for now Barrett and Mcintosh's call for "increased social
responsibility" in the care of children and for justice
3 5The Anti-social Family
, pp. 29-30.
36The Anti-social Family
, p. 77 (and pp. 76-80).
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based on
-genuinely social control." These
.
in ideas are not
explained. The word "social" appears throughout theirt-t as a kind of undefended grant of legitimacy. They
seem to take for granted •>,=,<. «...that the proper commitment for
people to have is to "society " rat-he,. ^"ety, t r than more narrowly
to their "own" family, and the proper locus of the
formation of such commitment is a more "social" world
This leads them to conclude that the strengthening of
community requires the weakening of family ties. " They
put it another way when they say that we need "social and
political change so that
...[legitimate] needs and desires
can be met in a more genuinely social context. "38
Specifically, while cutest increases in social control
are correctly understood as intervention by unaccountable
and/or pernicious bureaucracies, Barrett and Mcintosh say
that we must nonetheless "work towards greater social care
and support for children, and greater social, rather than
individual, control." 39
Barrett and Mcintosh say little about what such
collectivism would look like, but we do know about one
feature
- the "total eradication of all familial ideology
from the media and all public discourse ..."40 We should/
3 7The Anti
-social Family, p. 53i
3 8The Ant i-social Family
r p. 133
3 9The Anti
-social Family
, p. 134
40The Anti-social Family
, p. 8.
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77 words - dispense — about whatfaniiy ought to be
-
41
«-* i£
,
ho„ever
, the cause ofe^lity for women requires fche ^ ^ideals of fa„ily
, or , as i argue in ^ chapters
that the notion of family become more contestable without
^appearing aitogether? To my mind
, the ^
notions of
-the family as ., ideology „ ^ ^
itself as "anti-social" covPr ^1 e up some important
ambiguities and possibility a«P sioint es. An unqualified endorsement
of "the social" first- nf anrst o all merely replicates the image
of the "family" at the level of the social annm d so amounts
to an uncritical acceptance of today's family ideal of
h.nnonious togetherness. 42 Secondly the contemporary
tradition; for then, the birth of a society If liberated
S^i%S"JS the unlinki"g of "truth" fro™ power itmeans the transformation of imposed beliefs into
fo™
r
of
lng trUth
- "
meanS the lining of a sophisticatedrm repression, it means the end of all ideoloov noiDust family ideology. And this liberated society if'
society? ^
Barrett and MClnt°sh to be a more "social"
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«~iy
- » ,act both -anti.social „ in some^
very basis of our ^^ ^
-Plicated hoth in the creation ^ in ^ arrogatiQn ^
caring, sharing and loving."
we should ask, follotfing the lead of poucauit;
the commitment to the social be in fact evidence Qf ^
i»age „e turn to, the condition we imagine, the thing we
speak of, when we witness systenatic injustioe?
It is on the basis of this cedent that many different
Power relationships, many different interventions, are
established. This possibility appears when the situation
is considered from a genealogical point of view. Any such
approach must draw heavily upon critical views ^^
of Barrett and Mcintosh — indeed itmueea would amount to
nothing without them - but its aim is to recast their
criticism in the light (or darkness?) of discordance.
From the point of view of discordance, any views of family
which fail to challenge concordance necessarily miss
something and are part of the prohlem. The modern family
exacts a cost through its contrihution to normalization,
and it does so precisely hecause of the way it huttresses
assumptions to the effect that there is one true or proper
or most free way to live. In the next chapter I show that
Barrett and Mcintosh share this problematic assumption
with a host of others mS
*
In the maritime I turn to a
genealogical account of the family^ role in
normalization.
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Here , rely especially ^
°f a^iiB^flr^Miu^. as well as on Foucauit , s
various more limited remarks on ^
^ves us a kind of map of ^ connect between ^
factioity of fa.iUes ana the variety of forces that have
shaped that reality, while Foucault speaks more to the
question of the kinds of identities forged by Beans of
among other things, the modem family. Taken together
they suggest that the process of social management which
involves the family depends on (even as it helps to
sustain) a vision of concordance, both social and
familial, when I look beyond what Donzelot and Foucault
say to consider what they imply, x see a theory which
Places the constitution of the modern family at the heart
of the transition to modern forms of self, modern forms of
power, and modern ideas of concord.
Donzelot follows many others in emphasizing the role of
reform-minded "experts" such as doctors, juvenile courts,
4 3
19™?
T
an/gjLinin?.°fJ!a '''nips (New York: Pantheon Books,
lOkrSuctS? ' The "f*>T of duality: Vo,,,,. , '
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bureaucrats, counselors, and psychiatrists i„ theNation of today's easily, which is conceived ^ ^
»°ving resultant
, an uncertain fonn whQse inteiiigiMi
can oniy come frc studying the system of reiations it
maintains with the sociopolitical level..-44 The
construction of this uncertain for, has heen effected
-inly through the propagation of new norms of family
life, a process which he says began with the work of
Physicians in the last part of the eighteenth century
Specifically, Donzelot documents how the family in France
changed because of "the propagation within it of medical
educative and relational norms whose over-all aim was to
preserve children fro* the old custom, "45 custoffls^
had come to be seen as constraints to the proper and cost-
efficient development of the population. 4 6
agfi^'o^,^. W^jE" «1 ««nto.h
unity rather than a term 'on whose real refIrtT*™***we can aaree » The >nfi . , . 31 erent or meaning
1982) d It' ^ *nti-social Fsmllv (New^ Book g
Solrl1"?^^^Tl^L^ sfe
and CtvUlzaHon: A Using* 4 Tnllldy^^'"jjM"
45Policing, p. xx.
46Pglicing, p. 13.
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Donselot shows that the customs aimed at
, and SQ
XiKewise the remedies i»posed
, varie<J fay^
well-off the problem was seen by ^ ^ ^ ^influence ana dangerous practices Qf
which meant physical danger as well as
"promiscuity „
'
Among the poor concern was directed at the use of wet-
nurses (and later foundling hospitals,, the vagabondage
and indigence of those who did not succeed in the system
of alliances that was used to form families, and the
brothels that were part of the separation of sexuality and
family required by this same system. Reformers saw these
practices as dangerous and inefficient, and as breeding
grounds for revolution. Too many potential contributors
to society were lost; too many troublemakers were created.
The older regime of family which was under attack is
called
-the system of alliance" and the "ancien r*n... by
Donzelot. Eventually superceded by today's "advanced
liberal family," the system of alliance had as its point
the determining of those—male and female—on whomwould devolve the perpetuation of the patrimony; ?hepossibility alone for them to marry, the otherremaining in their charge; the discrimination betweenthe legitimate offspring of sexual unions and theillegitimate offspring.* 7
47P2ilcina, p. 24. On the "advanced liberal family" seep • 2 2 8 •
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Foucault understands the late ™»h< ,
kin in
-edieval organization of
a similar fashion; the regime of .iny -un alliance is » asystem of marriaqe of fi v=4--
ties of t
deVel°P»ent of kinship-s, transmission of names and possessions. -48 It
as one of its chief obj ectives to reproduce theinterplay of relations and maintain the law that a
them . .49 "
3 gOVerns
Ocelot is guite specific ahout the problems that cameto he posed for order by alliance, and he descrihes the
failure of attempts to ameliorate them while preserving
the old system.
From the standpoint of the stat-*were rejected by the Lw nf ln ' individuals who
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"Estate? '-"i" — the interest
the moralization ****** through*
1
force of the state thronoh li ?
d to consolidate theinevitable casualties of
9
?hi=%tr -?tment of theunmarried men and women aS ?h ily re^ i,»e = theo nd the abandoned children. 50
The type of families involved in this attempt at
compromise were patriarchal in the strict sense of the
term
- they were small political organizations m-
theory by the father and directly accountable and linked
to the state. The big concern of this type of fa„ily(certainly of the father, its public representative, was
"honor." But these patriarchal families found it harder
to contain their members by ensuring their upkeep, and
they "abused" the system in order to reduce their own
costs. 51
The resultant vagabondage and abandonment came more and
more to be seen as a "problem" as the nineteenth century
wore on, not simply because there was some misery and
poverty involved, but also because, first, such misery
played into the hands of the socialists and neo-
Malthusians who opposed both the old order and the
50 .
"Policing, p. 24.
51For example, the foundling hospitals failed as an
"re SSSSfifi? ^^^SS^TTST^
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reformers bent simply on updating it an*v <^ , d, second, because
economic change meant thai- ~ * ^.at the productivity of bodies hadto be maximized. This finfln a(i 4.v.Spelled the decli« and mutation ofthe old system of alliance. In Foucault's words
"economic processes and political structures could no
longer rely on it as an adequate instrument or sufficient
Donzelot, by the onset of the twentieth century, as
reformers successfully championed, first, a mild version
of feminism (more or less co-opted by the forces of
Philanthropy)
,
second, compulsory and unified schooling,
as called for by the logic of the liberal state, and,
third, a series of remedies for the old customs. 53
These remedies, like the prior attempts at compromise,
varied along class lines. The bourgeois classes were
advised to construct liberal education around children and
"The History of s.v^i jtv, vm n p- 106-
"Like Foucault, Donzelot views social order as »
il \J ' 5°r examPle ' are understood to exist butt is not assumed that they are united in interest or thattheir strategies always work. Similarly while the Lh^is thought of as a "structure," inso?ar4s i£ Ices exert
^!^,UreS on behavior and limits on the possible? thesepressures are neither thought of as all in one consistentdirection nor assumed to be "contradictions" whicS arepressing for resolution. For an explanation of this ideasee Foucault "Truth and Power," Power/KnQw?.°L . ^
Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 109-133.
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have been inundate* by ,.medical „^ ^
classes were sheeted to a host of new regulations and
surveillance „nich aimed to compel them to „a*e children
the center of Xife, to provide the
-supervised freedom"
consistent with the fa.ily . s function
. ^^^
Donzelot calls the system of "santast,* „hich
"corresponds to an accelerated liberalization of
relations, both within and outside the family." The
latter process is the system of "tutelage,.. by which
families and family members who are "unsuitable" for or
resist middle class norms are "stripped of all effective
rights and brought into a relation of dependence vis-a-vi.
welfare and educative agents." 54
Donzelot argues that an important technique in the
process of contract has been the use, by medical and
teaching professionals, of women to disseminate new norms.
A "privileged alliance between doctor and mother" 55 helped
increase the domestic power of women vis-a-vis men while
at the same time resulted in the "domestic
instrumentalization of their persons" and the destruction
of mid-wives and mid-wivery
.
5 * This alliance of women
with philanthropy served, says Donzelot, as "a point of
54Policing, p. xxi.
55Policing
r p. is.
56PoUcing
.
See p. 18 and p. xxii for reference to the
respective quotations.
wren's rights novements Q£ the nineteenth
early twentieth centuries. 57
For the working class
.other, this meant tutelage; she
was confronted by an array of programs of aid and
surveillance, from family allowances to societies for the
protection of children. These programs, says Donselot
were based on an emphasis on her importance and a
suspicion about her competence; they aimed to transform
her into a
-state approved nurse, -58 meaning^ their
job was to be vigilant against the temptations of the
cabaret and the street. 59 The bourgeois WOBan> on ^
other hand, was supposed to guard against the influence of
domestic servants and participate as a missionary in the
spread of new norms. «° she was granted a more
"professional" role, consistent with her mission within
the family.
The two tracks of the transformation of the family have,
says Donzelot, proceeded by means of forms of power which
are neither strictly public nor private. They include
both the "soft" inciting interventions called for by "psy»
57
58
59
60
Policing , p. 21.
Policing, pp. 29-31.
Policing , p. 45.
Policing
,
p. 46.
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eas Udeas derived f^ psychoanalytic discourse)> such
as the preferring of advice> an<J ^
regulation of welfare policy and juvenile and
courts. Donzelot characterizes whafc aeveiopea ^ aflexible attitude of social management, one guided by
"Keynesian" counterparts in the economic real* operate
without appearing to violate the autonomy of the objects
of intervention." The modus operand . ^ a^ ^ ^
"adjustment," which means encouragement and creation as
nuch as prohibition, what is adjusted are the norms of
behavior and the cedents of individuals, what we have
here, to use Foucault's phrase, is "bio-power .
»
According to Donzelot the key to this bio-po„er is an
idea made available by psychoanalysis. While psychiatry,
by classifying children once and for all as good or bad/
had affronted the family and denied as well the school <1
right to do its own categorizing, psychoanalysis asks both
the family, the school, and the juvenile and family courts
to do the "right thing" to improve the child's behavior,
appealing to the family's desire for success and giving
others a "scientific" basis for interventions. The "psy
idea" which Donzelot says is at work here holds that
family roles are important norms that cannot be lived up
Policing, p. xvi.
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to, rather than positions of power and function
Psychoanalysis defends the importance of the family but
it justifies always the discovery that the family has done
its 3 ob poorly. This na)ces intervention ^^ ^.^
so they go more smoothly seem benign; it even has the
effect of encouraging the revolt of and the demand for
adjustments by individual family members. m Donzelot's
words,
The disposition thus produced with reaard tn fh.family was an admirable one for it- >l he .to avoid the real danolr. li Zu I made xt Possible
while f»nfiT^.J?i ge s of the family's autonomy
attaching their dreams and ambitions to it."
To summarize, according to Donzelot the advanced liberal
family propogates norms that are "admirable" from the
point of view of social regulation. « This ±m effected
62Policing, p. 233.
63
h^n^o? ^
ading
°? Donzelot that somehow misses the ironicbent of the use of the word "admirable" here see Paul
?hr~' tl^r*313 ° f thS Social ' M Politick,nfp^.T ree (Routledge & Kegan Paul), pp. 67-82. Hirst reads
80?
Z £ ?h approving of "^e modern educative family" ( pe
2 g
°eS
°n to argue that the ^ght of middleclass women for equality which was appropriated
regulate the family should be universalized so as to re-educate the working classes away from their materialismand make possible a non-inflationary "incomes-policy "Aside from its arrogant imputation and then rejection ofworking-class materialism," this reading ignoresDonzelot's argument that the "autonomy" of middle classfamilies facilitates social regulation. Hirst also is
rightly accused, by Fran Bennett, Beatrix Campbell andRosalind Coward, of thoroughly misunderstanding both the
aims and arguments of a good deal of feminism, as he seesits proper task as bringing a companionate and culturedfamily to the working class. "Feminists — Degenerates ofthe Social," Politics and Power: Three , pp. 83-92. Hirst
97™pally through the offering Qf assista^
and protective intervention, although sanctions also _involved. Don2elot points out that advice is today an
especially useful for* of social control because it is
consistent with the legitimation needs of the l iberal
state, which must avoid both socialism and statism. And
the modern family is . useful vehicle ^^ ^
it offers a set of problem which are bound to be
endlessly recreated and "solved."
Normalization ,„ rt tha pam{1y m m^
While Donzelot never provides a summary of the norms
propogated through the family, it is certain^ . f he
did he would include the cultivation of an apolitical Kind
of commitment to "family values." A more complete list
would include educational, relational, hygienic and sexual
norms; the prevalent idea is that behavior should be
cooperative, obedient, healthy (not "weird" or "ugly"),
ambitious in an understated way, expressive and creative
along as an acceptable career is either enhanced or left
*************
in his "Reply" (pp. 93-95), in turn rightly accuses his
^eir
e
debaL
attaCking
,
him f°r thin*s h* does not ^
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S!if- ?bate is a good example of a male socialist and
each othe?
lniS
n%H
alkingJaSt °ne an°ther rather than to
understood'
meantime, Donzelot is not well
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jeopardized. heterosexual or invisibiy
h6rWiSe
'
aCC6Pti"g « «- «*- that lower class Ufetends to produce
"misfits » anrt i„
'
d ln accordance with the
notion that the "social welfare" ;=
t
is an unambiguously good
Part of what Donzelot is claiming is familiar; our
arrangements typically turn our concern - our etforts and
our blame for problems - towards ourselves and _
families, we are typicaliy caught up in trying to shore
up, escape from, found anew, or get help for, our
families. This part of his ^ ^
the critigue of Barrett and Mcintosh, Rapp, and Habermas
°n the other hand Donzelot is also pointing out that a
»°re "public" outloo* can be just as
.political as a more
"private" one, if the public activity and concern that
comes along with it accepts "social welfare" as an
unproblematic goal. The pursuit of concordance is
apolitical however it is directed. This part of his
thesis is not so familiar, but it is at the heart of his
idea of how social control proceeds. The reality which we
should be questioning is, as he puts it, "the triumph of
the social."
Donzelot understands the social as simultaneously an
image and a set of institutions and qualified personnel
around which and by which people are normalized. The
99
social refers to social workproe s, social programs and theidea of social welfare 6 * tk-^re. The concept of the social once
operated, says Donzelni- •Y u elot, to indicate
-the problem of
Poverty, the problem of others,- but has come tQ_
general solidarity and the production of a lifestyle -
something with which all are concerned, which all should
Bee*. ^d, he claims, the emergence of the contemporary
liberalized family form is intelligible Qnly by ^
problematic the rise nf *-k-s«n o this new "reality principle of our
societies.
"
66
Donzelot, in his cryptic way, is getting at the
following idea: in modern western societies we tend to
posit the social and the political as opposites, or at any
rate as fundamentally different. The political is
sometimes seen as an agonistic realm which stands (either
as a path or an obstacle) between current reality and the
possibility of a more truly social existence. The proper
goal of political activity is, by this view, to make
Vifi^ S°Cial isl the set of mea"s which allow social
uncertain??*!! ?h
tSri
^ P
ressu"s and politico-moral
are flexible enough, and internal srakes SLt areconvincing enough, to avert the dislocations that
PoITc?na
Ce
n
°f
^terests beliefs wouJS en£S.li i g, p. xxvi.
65Policing, p. xxvii.
66Policing
r p. xxvi.
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tself obeolete through it. it
to replace relations o f power ana difference witn „ social „
relations (Marx is perhaps the mQst^ ^ ^
proponents of this view)
.
The most successful opponent of this position is the
classic liberalism championed by amona ««,g others, Hobbes and
Locke. By their view, the political is • *l i l an inherent limit
on the social. People and groups are understood by
liberalism to be "social" (or anti-social, each in their
own way. Sociality is, then, for like-minded people, and
differences between individuals and groups create the
conflicts of politics.
By either of these views the arena of the social is
postulated as exterior to politics,- it is postulated as
the proper, or empirical, locus of concordance, it is
where people get along, or where they realize their
essence. Donzelot, on the other hand, rather than
positing an opposition by nature between the political and
the social, views the latter as a construction with
particular political ramifications; rather than ask how
can we achieve the truly social life, he wants to know
how, and by virtue of what discourse, it is that we come
to take for granted the primacy of the social.
While Donzelot, as a conclusion of his work, asks this
question only to leave it unanswered, he does offer some
101
thoughts regarding how tMs primacy is connecfced ^
Practices of social regulation. His^^ ^ ^that the goa i of social harmony finds its prinary
expression in the ideal of the harmonious middle-class
family; this ideai then provides the rationale for
interventions and the preferring of advice that differ by
class and which denigrate, depoliticize, and even
disassemble alternative groups and families. Psy ideas
welfare rules, and family court ^lings ^ ^
'
virtues of harmony as they move to enable and enforce
individual adjustments and smooth over differences. The
ideal of the modern family is thus both dependent on and
valorized by a depoliticizing arrangement of
interventions. I„ Donzelot's words, the family is
inscribed
-within a new for. of sociality, of which it
appears to be both gueen and prisoner. "" By his view,
then, the "advanced liberal family" is anti-political
precisely because it is anything but "anti-social."
Clearly then, Donzelot and Barrett and Mcintosh are at
odds in some respects. The latter thinkers, like many in
the critical tradition, are likely to refer to the effects
of the contemporary family as "oppressive." The concern
is with denial and repression. Genealogy, on the other
hand, refers to them as "normalizing," and the concern is
Policing, p. xxii and p. 7.
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with the production and privUeging Qf certain ^
-in*. By virtue of this concern> is ^
of critical theory for its tendency ^
^
particular form of self or way of life Thiaj x r . s opposition
should not, however, be overdrawn. Critical and
genealogical thinking can and should he combined in the
analysis of the contemporary family. This is because
oppression and normalization co-exist in modern societies
Many are kept from, or denied, what they want and need
and certain identities and outlooks are imposed and
privileged without adequate justification. The
contemporary family is implicated in both these processes.
I turn now to compare a critical and a genealogical
explanation of the tremendous power (popularity, of the
family idea. The harm done by today's family is not,
after all, fully accounted for unless this power is
explained somehow. On this question both the critical and
genealogical approach have something to offer. On the
other hand even together they are inadequate to the task.
Affirmation is needed as well. This is because, first,
the contemporary family cannot be reduced to a mere
guardian of order; it has roots in aspects of ourselves
that predate the modern era and which will be presumably
be here long after it is gone. Second, neither oppression
nor normalization can be explained without reference to
what besides them the family is.
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The p°v»- a; -hr EaBU3i 1ih
|
°on2elot raises the westion Qf the pQwer Qf ^
idea when he accuses psychoanalysis of helping to "refer"
individual frustration and "attach- indivi.ual dreams ana
ambitions to the family. „e does not say^
about what accounts for the possibility of this referral
and this attachment, why is ^ fafflUy sQ usefui ^
_
site for this power? what is the appeal of the particular
dreams involved? These questions point to the self; they
ask us to consider what it is about the self that enables
today's
-the family" and "the social" to be produced.
Foucault provides a genealogical answer to this question
by speaking of the ways in which the self is, itself, a
production. I turn first, however, to an answer rooted in
the critical tradition.
Barrett and Mcintosh take note of the lack of an
explanation for the "appeal" of the family in Donzelot's
work, and they blame this failure on his method. The
deconstructive approach can, they say, only point to the
strategic value or function (for a set of persons or an
order of relations) of the creation of a want, need,
feeling, or commitment. By definition, then, Donzelot can
say nothing about what in people's nature would make them
amenable to be "constructed" this way or that.
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Barrett and McIntosh counter fay ^ ^
»°dern family (inadequately)^ ^ ^
accords with widespread (but mistaken) beliefs. 68 They
first point out something I have already mentioned - that
people sometimes have rights and obligations among fa»ily
-mbers that provide for a level of economic and emotional
security not found elsewhere in our societies. The family
xs More or less the only place to turn ^ ^^ ^
inadequately meets these needs, and at times turns the
search for security into isolation, loneliness, mental
anguish, and physical abuse, especially for women. Their
second, third and fourth points are equally valid.
Families sometimes provide a place where people can more
openly express emotional need, the family operates to
provide marks of "similarity, familiarity and belonging,"
and the married couple tvoicaiiv hac^ yp lly s more resources than a
single parent to financially provide for children.
Barrett and Mcintosh also point to three beliefs which
support the family and which they clearly consider flawed
or mistaken (although they don't provide much by way of
refutation or discussion). First, it is strongly believed
This is only partly in keeping with their commendablecommitment to follow »a theory of ideology that cas?s
?hfPi\- S Participants rather than as passive consumers."T e Anti
-social Fami1 Y f p . 2 1.
69The Anti-social Family
, p. 23.
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that children need two differently sexed
..parents"
(natural or surrogate) — nth - ,„., .e e family ls seen as naturally
given and as socially and Morally desirable. -70 Second
the family is typically seen as rooted in our deepest
biological urges. And
, third, the family is thougnt tQ fce
a locus for and a creator of important
"pre-capitalist"
values such as the capacity to love.
in sum, Barrett and Mcintosh point out that the model of
family promoted today is based on a
-id-nineteenth century
ideal according to which maternal tenderness is
complemented by fatherly independence. This model is
popular, they say, because for most people its the only
aeans available to pursue some deeply important goals, in
particular the satisfactory and fulfilling raising of
children.
suf?ic^nt?'i
and SeCUre
'
Stable «* self!
This position is certainly on the mark with regards to
the way the family is understood today and what is asked
of it. By referring to the various needs monopolized but
inadequately served by the family, Barrett and Mcintosh do
The Anti-social family
, p . 2 6.
The Anti
-social Family
, p . 2 9.
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two important things. They point to ^ ^ ^
alternatives to the fanily
, and they^ fay ^
to need, the issue of the self and its nature, its
impossible to explain the appeal of the family without
some reference to need. They have not, however, provided
either an explanation of their own or much of a critique
of Donzelot. On the latter count, none of the claims in
their list of reasons for family appeal contradict
Donzelot's theory, only the claim that today's ideal
family form is the most "plausible- means, in contemporary
conditions, of raising
"self-sufficient" children appears
to be prohibited to Donzelot, given his commitment to
avoid attributing properties to subjects. Donzelot does
not, however, assert that subjects have no properties, and
so he would not be contradicting himself if he believed
that this claim is or might be the case.
As for Barrett and Mcintosh's own stab at explanation,
it does not go far enough. Even if powerful interests are
supported by the acceptance of today's family ideal (as
they are)
,
this does not by itself explain this
acceptance. Nor is it enough to show that family ideals
are widely promoted in our cultural media; it remains to
ask why this promotion is possible and why it is
successful. What, again, is its point of application?
Their discussion of the need for "belonging" is fairly
107
vague and mostly assertive ^^^ ^^the family is .-seen.. as naturally^ ^^
that it is really only a more generally need for
belonging that is appropriated by the family. 72 „^
would only reluctantly endorse the family, for laok o£
alternatives.
Barrett and Mcintosh are in this case governed, and
havered, by their undefended assumption of the benign and
essential nature of the social. People's desire for
belonging is thought to be both natural and properly
expressed (automatically flowering?, in a
..social-
context; the existence of the family and family ideology
are then attacked as "anti-social., because they maxe the
political implications of this desire negative.
The needs and satisfactions to which we refer -affection security, intimacy, sexual loveparenthood and so on - are not artificial fouri
V demonstrate the need for social and
be m»i ?i
hange S
° that such needs and desireset in a more genuinely social context."
can
This fails to consider what is implied by Donzelot and
said by Foucault, that the political power of the family
ideal stems in part from the way it is used to amplify,
promote, incite, and problematize the need for belonging.
The Anti-social Family
, pp. 26-29.
The Anti
-social Family
, p . 133#
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Say tMs is not to «*• * «- reality of any such
—
. it is rather to shw^ ^ „poiicingii ^ ^^^^
evolves the paction of £amily appeal
, ^^ fe
channeling. And the dreams and editions so produced arein an important way like the ideal Qf
Barrett and Mcintosh ^„n ln them harmony and belonging arejoined seamlessly to sel f
-expression
( sel f
-develop»ent and
autonomy.™ By Donzelot's reading, then, Barrett and
Mcintosh's critique of the idealized family can act only
to reinforce that which gives the ideal its power, which
is this larger ideal of freedom. Barrett and Mcintosh
reject the family for the sake of the social; Donzelot
tells us that this cannot work. This is because it is
precisely the commitment to harmony and to the end of
contradiction (the social) that makes
-the family- so
important and so difficult a reality for us. And the
ideal of the family, in turn, helps propagate this
commitment. The contemporary family is complicit with
normalization.
Donzelot, then, is concerned to deconstruct an ideal of
harmony, rather than to counter the family ideal with
7 4See for example their assert
social, rather than individual
children. The issue of social
interventions is dealt with as
these interventions "currently
Family
, p. 134.
ion of the need for "greater
,
control" in the care of
control through
a mere problem of the form
take . " The Anti-social
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another. „e does not
,
COmnitment t0 tMs^ "exible "psy» techniques
cannot by themselves be enough to enable norns to ,. float „
and the "social., to emerge as the unquestioned value
around which systems of power are constructed. The
subjectification of the self to modem disciplines
requires a point of application as well as a method. This
point of application is the human being.
An advocate of genealogy might weu interject at this
point: isn't it possible, and indeed plausible, that
-odern disciplines create a for* of self „hich then serves
as that needy being which comes to value the social so
highly? couldn't psy techniques work in concert with
other mechanisms to create their own point of application?
Foucault makes this kind of an argument when he describes
the contemporary family as based in, and abetting in, the
"deployment of sexuality."
Sexuality «nH the Family
I drew attention, in the last chapter, to Foucault's
argument that sexuality is a modern construct, rather than
an underlying essence or drive. Consistent with this,
Foucault says that the modern family is neither the site
of a new liberation of sexuality, nor of a new repression
of the same, "on the contrary, its role is to anchor
110
sexuality and provide it with a permanent support "75 ftis sexuality's
"privileged point of development . "76
Originally perilous for the rule-concerned system of
alliance, the deployment of sexuality gradually
transformed it and preserved it, as the relations of
alliance become medical concerns; doctors, educators, and
psychiatrists helped reconcile "the unfortunate conflicts
between sexuality and alliance.
"
7 ?
What does this have to with the power of the family
ideal? By Foucault's reading it is this transition which
has provided the basis for the constitution of the family
as a site of intense frustrations, dreams, and
ambitions. 78 Foucault argues that the family can be
constructed as it is - as a place of such great
importance
— because of the prior fixing of the
individual as a site of sexuality. The family is what it
is because of the concern for sexuality which it helps to
maintain. The family is, then, a social construction that
helps to create its own point of application. The
sexualized subject is typically heavily invested in family
ties
— both negatively and positively. The "affective
5The History of Seviialitv. vm . i
, p . 108 .
6The History of Sexuality. Vol
.
i
, p . 108 .
7The History of Sexuality, Vol . i
, p . m,
8The History of Sevualitv. Vol. i
r pp . loe-lio.
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intensification o£ the fanUy spaceB is cQnnecte^ ^
-Us us, to the fact that tQday , s faniiy functions ^
hotbed of constant sexual incitement.""
The shift toward the positive production of sexuality
says Foucault, created both problems and possibilities
'
from the point of view of order. The maintenance of
'
sexual incitement, as well as the putting of its results
into use to the ends of social management, had to be
reconciled with the threats it posed to the system of
alliance, which functions through the strict control of
sexual engagements, or this at least had to be done if
the two systems were to be made to function together.
This is the reason, Foucault tells us, for the particular
concern of our cultures with the problem of incest.
such°a sSong^nteresfM^V?? displa*edif more or less by common accordlr ° f inCSSt '
fo,m<q Jz w
^uxuuxre
/ pernaps this was because it wa«?
l^TstuluTalsTrT^l aga^nst^
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implications of tnislepfoyment'of sSuallry which"
6
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eVP ' but which < a»°"g "s many benefits
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g
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How does this deployment of sexuality operate? As a
form of bio-power, it is (as I said in the last chapter)
The History of Sgyi^i jtv. vni
,
i
, p . 109 .
°The History of finality, vni
,
t
, p . 109 .
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concerned not so much with rules as with knowledge. Four
domains of knowledge nave, according to Foucauit, been
strategically central. First, there was a
"hysterization
of women's bodies " wr>™<*«/„ i_ ^.W°»en's bodies were made into objects
of knowledge; and these objects were made to speak. They
were analyzed as "thoroughly saturated with sexuality,"
intrinsically pathological, and responsible for the
"regulated fecundity" of the social body" and "the life of
children." Second, there was a "pedagogization of
children's sex." children were seen to be the locus of a
"precious and perilous
...sexual potential." Third, there
was a "socialization of procreative behavior." a concern
with "population" called for the making of the fertile
couple into an object of regulation and knowledge. Fourth
(least important according to Foucauit) was the
"psychiatrization of perverse pleasure." The "sexual
instinct," in this case as it operated in adults, was made
the focus of investigation and correction. 81
I am certainly not qualified to make a final evaluation
of Foucauit 's provocative thesis, and I am not sure if
anyone is. It is not easy to know to what extent the
unities inside ourselves which we seem to "find" are
actually our own productions or are instead revealing of
something more "essential." I can, however, say the
The History of Sgvualitv. Vnl. 1 p . i04 .
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following First. 1 accept ^ ^
actions concerned with the parents/children relation and
the husband/wife relation have played a big part in giving
the modern family lts particular ^ ^ ^ ^^
of Donzelot. He and Foucault agree that this social
regulation has proceeded partly by means of the
constitution of domains of knowledge, as the modern
"sciences" of the self proceed partly by getting patients
and clients to speak the "truth- about themselves. 82
Second, I think that Foucault and Donselot are on the
mark in the ways that they amend (and draw upon) various
feminist and Marxist analyses of the construction of the
modern family. They both point out that the regulatory
actions involved were first of all not concerned with
maintaining patriarchy so much as transforming it for the
sake of better population management, and second of all
varied considerably by social class. 83 "There was no
vJr, SB° Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own r.„^. 150
eXDerts
f
anS%r^ert " l^ r" tn Vnnrn - on the "le ofxp d elites in the formation of the modern family.
th^tSS
1™^"18?' cha"cteristically, includes the claimhat the construction of the modern family (like all
oPpatriarcnv
1^01^ H concerned ""h^he maintenance
\,Pl
tria hy (the rule of men over women). Donzelot'sand Foucault '. histories suggest a distinction made
L y Jean Elshtain; "male dominance and patriarchyare not the same thing, though the one may be a
concomitant of the other." See her discussion of radicalfeminism in Public Ma n. Privat-g Ur,mar, p . 2 15.
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unitary sexual politics .„ 84 ^ ^ployed, as a technique of maximization rather^
repression,
"by the hrm>-„« • •n bourgeoisie with respect to
themselves; Ulce the „symbolics Qf biooaB Q£ ^ sygten
alliance, the
-a„alytica of sexuality-
-has to be see„ asthe self-affirmation of onfi^^^ ^
enslavement of another." 85
Most importantly for the question at hand, x cannot
has today is connected to a modern sexualization of the
body. It seems to me to be highly plausible that people
have come to have more invested in family relations
whether this means the centrality fa»ily ..success „ has fQr
the*, the psychological devastation of family disaster
,
the power of the desire to escape one's family, or the
power of a desire to found a family - because they have
come to have a concern in discovering their own sexual
truth. The question of one's sexual truth seems so
important because of the way it has been bound up with the
question of one's personal truth - of one's identity, m
other words, it seems to me quite possible that more in
our lives turns on our private, personal family relations
84The History of Sgvnality. Vni i p . 122 .8 5r
12rand
1!^ °f SeXUa1l,tY ' 2a I ' P- 123- See pp. 122-
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than might otherwise dQ sQ u we^ ^ sq ^
exploring the Ration of who and what „e ^
are.
And we are so directed
. We are pressured> through ^
variety of mechanisms, to form a coherent, unified, and
sensible unity - an identity^ gn ^^ ^
Purpose, a sexual preference, etc. We moderns are not
only heavily
"sexualized,
-
but quite self-conscious and
very homesick. And we are situated in a „eb of
interventions and a conplex of institutions which
a particular set of familial practices and which privilege
one particular for. of "the family- both as an ideal and
as the most pragmatic way to survive. We make our way,
then, as homesick subjects in a world governed by tightly
drawn institutional imperatives of growth. I„ these
conditions the modern family normalizes and oppresses, it
is implicated in the same privatized pursuit of affluence
that makes it such a compelling (but inadequate)
alternative to the harsh realities of that pursuit.
Family Appeal: Kin Tjes and the Natural
But is this really the whole story? The tracing out of
the deployment of sexuality does not, in my view, suffice
to account for the power of the family idea, any more than
it is enough to point to political advantage (such as male
advantage) and media influence »*
^ires reference to JZ2
< \ ^
eXPlanaU°n
attri. h ,
nature!" (not merely produced)butes of human beings. This is b.l ei=ause, for onething,
"production- can only take oi a,n K pl ce on the basis ofsome raw material ^,l
' Secondly, such "t-=.w _ 4.*' n raw material" doesexist. Humans are natural beings, and, as such
, havecertam features. while they m^
to be) within particular- ^™
°f SOCial °rt-r. the range
°' P°SSlb—s
»<* finite. This idea is
'
=onsltent with a philosophy of discordance, which, ratherthan dispute the existence of the natural, only asks usto first, recognize that humans are never simply natural,
and, second, suspend the idea that the
"naturalness" of
something is automatically a claim to legitimacy. 86
This last point is especially important given the
conservative twist usually given to the association of the
family and the natural. The import of the natural is in
immuJe°from
C
crItIcL
S
m?
re
our ITulTllcomplete our own nature fwith?n tlY I reflect on and
historical circumstances gives rfS. ?T* our Pa"icular
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fact inherently contestahi- kj i ble because, while th* k
-
»• «
-« ... * „. uu_
-
application" for the production of self, culture andloentrty, the body it^ can never be
for am . finally (once andll) or objectively explained. Actual hu
a_„
a mans bodies
«»*. then, is the point of sayi„g that . practicePa^es of the natural, while the guestion of human
nature is inherently contestable, this does not mean
either that it can be avoided or^ ^ ^ ^ ^issue is merely relative. The human conditiQn^
with the possibility of making useful and important
statements about what it is that we - as historical
finite beings
- recognize as central to ourselves.
call something natural is to make the (contestable, claim
that something of importance - something good or
necessary - is Bade possible fay^
of the bad or the unnecessary is also made possible. It
is to caution us that something good may be threatened or
lost if that aspect of human life is forsaken, denied,
minimized, or substituted for.
How, then, is the modern family form linked to the
natural? I begin with the proposition that to be human is
to be embodied, finite, reflective (in various ways and
118
ern
-grees)
, dependent for existence on sone _ Qf
soclal relations
, and foraed as a seif ^
participation in some set of moral° 1
'
rather than merely
'
allegiances
' ——in puts lt wall when
others "in relations of concrete particular^icularity," and (2)bound by "an imperative e„ „
•
...to discover, to understand andto create meaning.^ To^ ^ ^
existence discordance adds a third which has already been
mentioned.
Humans are not desian^rj ^-^
form, and since no SEl So™ h?*"^* int° anV s°c"lmesh with every drive and been Predesigned to
every particular form of comnfi"9 "lthln the sel f-through social for^suM,^? °n [ ° f humans
violence to S^SS^A*"
TO say that these are universal characteristics of the
human condition is of course to leave plenty of roon for ,
tremendous variety of human ways of life and worlds of
waning. It is not
, however< tQ leave .^.^
When Eli Zaretsky speaks of the family, he makes an
important distinction along these lines. "Ties of
87Public Man. Pri^te Woman p . 318 .88Connolly, Politico a nd Amhignit-y p . 13 .
To put it as Martha Nussbaum might, we are natumi»concerned with questions of the good but there is nJsingle good life. The good for humans is multiplefragile and dilemma-bound. See, for example her'commments on Aristotle '<s view *e *>, c-*<?™pi , n
Fraaini-v ^ j^SSj? p. 370 * W°men ' ^
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sexuality, kinship, and bi
-Logical and psychologicaldependence are inevitable- self „
-
'
-s^PPorting nuclearfamil les are not. "90 Ties of? ,dependence are apparently Buniversal resDonCO . fiwenti a6Sp se to universal features ^ k
Mnra . . of human life .7—— »—.— to invariably use the
the bioiogicai
i—
--—
-
distinctions regarding their ^^
Moreover, xi„ distinctions (MU ^
^
^
'
typi-.ll, used to posit specific obUgations ^
specific shared Tories and experiences.
There are, not surprisingly, so»e good reasons for this
Aristotle recognized, provide a framework for the
construction or an
-ethical- reality; and, as he also
knew, this framevorx is not easily replaced by some other
human institution, practice, or experience. This is
because humans need the recognition and experience of
involuntary ties to the past and the future as a means to
"ground" (maxe PoSsibie) their formation as ethical
selves. Stanley Hauerwas has put this in terms of
developing an understanding about love
120
»ave not chosen b^tl\fi J-g-j. „£ ?e
« Noddings understands this^ ^
eve, of ,.ethical caring o92 wherej
an aspect of identity rather^ the result ^
Particular concordance of feelings or interest. Li*e
Hauerwas, she thinKs that this develops depends on
reciprocal relations with specific others. Ethical Ufe
^gins, says Noddings, with
-natural caring,- the acting
on behalf of another done simply out of desire
Conversely,
-ethical caring- is caring motivated by a
sense of duty, or an experience of an
-I »ust .„ By
Noddings
•
account we come to experience this -j must"
through the memories we have of our experiences of natural
caring and the feelings that were part of it." Tnese
»emories for most people stem from the relationships to
adults that they had as children, and Noddings implies
what Hauerwas says outright: that the family plays a
mo?? p?"35Meanin9 °f thS Fami1^" Commonweal (1 August,
H
J°Seph L
-
^tls (P^er lang, lisJ* p£ 333^1? ^
"An Ethic of Caring, " p. 339.
epical le in the fQrging Qf huaans ^
beings. 94
I more cautiously conclude only thai- h° i at humans must findthemselves cared for and able to care in return in- . Xil some
rasnion or another-her, not necessarily in a "family,* in
at more length in the final chapter,
. Tnis is
,^
-n in these thin terms e„ough of a claim to help explainthe powers appeal of the family. Humans_ „
use, the ozonation o f
.-biological" in £orging links Qf
obligation because it stands for that which cannot he
chosen, to see seething as intrinsic, rather than as
chosen (and dispensable,
, is to marK it as more deeply a
part of the self. By marKing Kin ties people bring others
into a relation with themselves at the level of identity
and this is part of having an ident . ty as Hauerwas
the fact of Kin ties gives us each a story, and it is by
her Point stands
f
re:ard^K-
C
rne
e
riCal 5el3ti°nS With ~
SFssySMJ? ^^c^iiroXrr °Th"ncdrete - cari^
elthe^f^ W^^-SM'SfSl^ither to form such attachments or to live anv H„i „ilife without them. Public M,n DrilVSZL™V
TT
inq of ourselves as a part
°
f a
— that weeach come to see ourselves as ,„ • ,
>8
38 a
" dividual, historic
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The modern family serves a *-ur°le
'
then
'
in ^e fashioning
of human identity. To sav fhi« uY thlS
'
however, is not to positthe modern family form as a universal- it i"" a i, is only toindicate one if its most i 1Dort-»nfmp°rta t s°«rces of sustenance.
The modern family has appeal „ot Qnly ^
society disallows or disables alternatives, not only
because it allows some people to compare themselves
autonomy and responsibility, and not only because people
are pressured to concern themselves with the truth of
their being, but also because it speaks to certain
imperatives of human nature and the human condition. The
contemporary family is
, then, an ambiguous achievement.
At one level this ambiguitv Doint-c =»y
' p nts to a general truth.
There is no way of creating human identity that is
entirely benign. Just as a sense of identity can give us
the resources to take a stand against prevailing ways or
some of our own commitments, it also involves the
imposition of uniformity on ourselves and makes us
Hauerwas, "The Moral Meaning of the Family," p. 435.
vulnerable to nreSc„ror. cp ssu es of normalization. siaitie, enable and constrain. Today , s faal]
*'
**
to delimit and control 7
MUy
— not omy
us to find and make it. This »„k- .
explain how it is that th fc .
^ ambl^ty he ips to
e having of children can be todayboth a means to tie n»r.,f ym°re finnly t0 the status moand also a representation of a person,, *
..
P ° al step beyond itsdictates. The "natural" anneal
. .
Pp of the modern form offamily cuts at least two ways - it is able ,^ l to serve bothas a means of normalization and as . «-33 a means of empowerment,
sustenance, and resistance.
At another level this ambiguity points to a specific
criticism and to a specific political position. The
criticism is as follows. Today , s family ig ^
bound up with a kind of enablina •rumg that is particularly
*iSahUm^ ** «~ * P°"tical change, on the one
hand this is simply a feature of tangible ties with
others, to maintain and renew such ties (for example by
having children, is to express a faith in the future and
therefore to some extent to the sp^cifis future that one , s
civilization is pointed towards. Our family ties
therefore put pressure on us to endorse this future. This
cannot be the whole story, however, as tangible ties with
others are also a precondition for a politics carried out
by caring selves, it is possible to be a self and be
Political, if not about everyth .
family reality is hn„
Weste"
Y 1S
'
°»ever, depolitioizing and «.<because o£ the specific features
* « *i. is
it repeats and reinforcesS
*
Modern western civilian
=u
-ran, anti-political (certainiy
» „
- - institutionally bullt around ^
' ^amuence. and concordance
. ^ ^ ^
-«,
The amhiguity here points tQ a political
'
.
" fami1-
. .
fwxA i position. The
-c s, of the contemporary fafflily for
-
normalization and oppression^ ^
rrr°
n that
-^ -—g Uke it if we areto st ive towards a less no™ i • •normalizing and oppressive orderir, m other words, we arP ^
,
e to develop individual
empowerment, slack in the order, space for difference, and(a condition of many other goals) a oolitic,p tical movement totame growth imperatives.
What should he changed and what should he retained* idiscuss this further in the final chapter. To put it in a
what counts as family, and to make explicit the amhiguity
of worth
- the good and the had - of any organization of
relations along lines of kin; we need in other words, to
politicize the concept of family. o„ the other hand we
should recognize the profound and legitimate importance
that kin ties have for people when we consider the proper
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t
bOUndS
" ^ •
- consider the need
- ground and begin efchical cQmnitment
—
specific ethers. We should
, finallv , .
'
rl Hy, insist on the
—tence of . link
, at^ ^^
the considerable coordination Qf ^ ^
self
-ccnscious participants, between space for difference
and the preservation o f some Kind o£ distincfcion
the public and the private. In the final chapter t
^borate on and defend this vision of a politicized andyet continuing public/private spiit. This means l wiu
^ °f ^ tW° " that child rearingm small households with some Kind of private status is
now, and win continue to be, desirable.
But what of the other side of „y thesis? ! also argue
that the very idea of the value of private households as
families will continue to be undesirably and unnecessarily
depoliticizing, normalizing and oppressing as long as it
is bound up with the affirmation of concordance. Much of
today's critique and celebr.tion of family is bounded> and
hampered, by its assumptions of concord. I turn next to
this subject.
CHAPTER 4
THEORY OF THE CONTEMPORARY FAMILY'
ASSUMPTIONS OF CONCORDANCE AND DISCORDANCE
To summarize my argument so ^ ^^.^ ^
concordance embedded in our faniUal^
Practice play a role in the exercise of power, and
especially in processes of ^^
_
see, to realize an authentic self is to endorse without
adequate reservations some mode of imposing form upon the
body. And this is particularly a problem because our
wcrld is increasingly a single order reguiring extensive
social management and governed by deeding imperatives
in this situation, the aggressive guest for legitimacy all
too easily turns inward; people tend to define themselves
so they can see themselves as free (and the order as
legitimate) within the existing constraints. The
conventions reguired for the order to function become
norms, and room for the unpredictable, the eccentric, the
new, the reborn, the rebellious, or simply the different
is squeezed away.
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The prevailing vision of the fa™nn mily invokes just s»„k
r
iti°ai
—
- *~
- u:u r
a
amless han"°ny aB°<" «-
"embers, a shared
commitment to the polite and subdue(j pursuu ^ niMie
class success, and a shared cQncern
a
-moment to,
-one. own,. which means ^
" Fa"ily
" "
— as an adj ective to
re£6r WhiCh 13
- *~ (Whoxeso^
, as in the
nuch touted » fanily values/. and in this ^
thing that is indicated is a cogent to political
action or the experience or expression Qf
This vision of family is integral to various techniques
of power at the same tiae as it u Qne Qf ^ ^
that power. As Donzelot points out, the modern private
family is produced through the two-tiered techniques of
tutelage and contract, a result is the attachment of
dreams and ambitions to the private family and the
production of sexualitv so a« t-ny s to promote privatized goals,
homesickness, and the pursuit of concord.
I am claiming, then, that both as idea and practice the
contemporary family normalizes through the notions of
concordance that it invokes and enforces.
As a wary reader might point out, I have not yet done
much to demonstrate the validity of this thesis. Perhaps,
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is as natural as the
valorization of kin, and not even a sickness besidesPerhaps it has nothing to do with ,the f .
lat!t„ .
family," and thet er is neither an imposed construct nor imDl .p icated inany other kind of imposition. Perhaps th
.
,
wnaps, en, Donzelot'sinterpretation takes a reality that has k
or «fi «. 6611 freely chosenreflects the rational dictates „f
anH •
state o a productive economyd misunderstands it as the result of an .1 kr elaborate andMultilevel »discipi ining .. of selves
.
Empirical tools of demonstration are of l inited use
here. Measurers and survey research might help to
refine or refute specific claims about what should count
as
..normal... They might also warn us of serious
dissatisfactions brewing within the populace. We might
even notice that deviance persists no m,*-* „P atter how norms are
understood. At best, empirical work could follow
Donzelot's lead and continue to trace the differential
methods that the state and experts use to deal with
families, to encourage and promote and enforce certain
ideas of families, to get people to speak of themselves
and their families, etc. But no such method can ever tell
us for certain what the important
-facts-- are or which
interpretation makes the best sense of them. And when it
comes to the questions of what about ourselves could be
otherwise and which actions should count as chosen instead
;f s
;
tiy iBp°sed
'—
-
-hniques are cleariy at7disadvantage. Y a
To some extent, then, this
"evidence" problem , .
a feature of this tvn» ,
S1,°Ply
are int. t <=laims
m the sense thev m*w>"l Y axe of experience m„ .F - MY account offamily appeal should, if it i« =
„, , „
' **
13 any good
<
help make sense(and perhaps give rise to, experiences of ambiguity
families and the expectations and aspirationsT famiUeS inV°1Ve - * Sh°Uld alS°^— -nse ofthe persistence of the legitimacy enjoyed by the order of
modernity. Concordance promotes the family and vice-
versa; and in a anti-political culture of concordance it
-
especially hard call into guestion that which one's
identity is already invested in.
This argument is, I suspect, likely to make sense to
(and appeal to) those who already wonder at the legitimacy
enjoyed by modern orders, and who have perhaps thus far
dealt with this problem by expressing disappointment in
the working class, crediting
"ideological" machinery as
too powerful, seeing structural obstacles to change as
all-encompassing, or placing their hopes in an impending
immiseration and collapse of legitimacy.
There is, fortunately, evidence of a sort which I can
offer to better make the case that the explanation of
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r iegitimacy °ffered here - ««*
~
ring zan cont.nue to^ lfc ^^ ^
can show that assumptions of concordance and no
r— «
—
b
- into
_ 0;i;
;
lzing
ter task, as x nave said that critical and celebratory
-ews of the family tend to concur in assuming or
endorsing concordance, m fact a »~ <-in t great deal of our talk
concerning family does this- it *Y lS
'
xt Spends on the notion
that, beneath the self as heteronomous social product
there lies some Kind of authentio or true self the
realization of which constitutes freedom.
„hile
ccncordance is not disproved by showing that it is
everywhere (to the contrary, neither is u^ fcy
virtue of its being widely assumed. And I can show not
only that concordance is widely assumed in the theoretical
discourse on the family, not only that in this context
such an assumption can be seen to overlook or abet
normalization, but also that by its lights the
essentiality, the arbitrariness, and the ambiguity of the
modern family and its effects are not well accounted for.
In this chapter I review a number of perspectives on the
family in order to make this case.
The story of concordance and ^ contempQrary
eMrgenCe
" ^ ~~» Sieging of the choosing
:
e
r
ctive
' self
- Generaiiy speakin
- what is
—atoday is the validity Qf a ^^^^ choQsing ^ ^
an active being that is capable either of making or
clearly seeing an underlying harmony in themselves and the
universe. Compared to this notion, the idea a f«/ un a o a concord
.uaranteed by God , but always Qnly
nis reflective hut finite and mortal creations, has taken
a back seat.
on the other hand this same story can also he said to
begin with the thought of classical Greece, which
anticipated
- and so laid groundwork for - so much of
this modern understanding. The debate between Plato and
Aristotle foreshadowed much of today's argument. Plato
attacked the private family for its promotion of private
loyalties, divisiveness and maldevelopment of the self.l
Aristotle praised the private family as a building block
of virtue in the soul and in the community. Plato wanted
the bonds and loyalties of family to be transferred into
loyalties to the whole community, and this led him as far
*See "The Republic," The Great Dialogues of PlatobyW.H.D. Rouse (The New American E&fif^'BoSk^iv
him,
»« to challenge even the Greek sexual A I
Aristotle
division of labor.
2
, conversely, defended this division
. For
P. sharing, and Pol itical^ ._
-
each of whom has an independent hase in .^ "
"
-seho women
, slaves i£ pQssibiei ^
property. 3
Plato and Aristotle not o„ly mirror some Qf
disagreements
— thev iiva «n y, lke many modern thinker£^ share
common assumption of concordance. 4 Elshtain has pointed
out how Plato's positions on family reveal his
thoroughgoing cogent to the virtue o f an abstract soul
and the achievement of an ahistorical truth. = In the
Pursuit of the virtuous unity of the whole society, Plato
«as willing to countenance the complete coorcUnation of
social activity, including a complex system of social
^"The Republic," Book V See a i cn c
"Philosopher Queens and Private SivS-^i??11" 0kin 'the Family," The Familv i« nl??*" f Plato on Women and
Bethke Elshtain^Wefsif^ ed « bY ***n
p. 41.
u iversity of Massachusetts Press, 1982),
B^H!fMafteLra^. bY T - A - SinClair < Pe"9uin, 1962),
ol^^T^nt^Zrli tSa°ctt!yf^
5Public Man. Priv.fo
^mrin, pp. 20-41.
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engineering
****** entirely by an
unaccountable wise fe„. ^ ^ ^
assumed by Piat-n u .y lato to be i„ the end the same as the
°f °ne
" -son or group,
M
e
:
Uty
" "— « -— -ass only in so fah6y
'
th6ir
»ale
—.parts, transcend enfcirelytheir particular histories and their individual
^entities.* on the other hand, he backs off his
cogent to egnality for women without aPology or regret
when he decides that it wouldn't go over in a real state
The best p^ssibl, state
, he says ^
private marriage and family , complete with its traditional
Greek inequalities.? In each case ^ Qf ^
state, and that of the best possible state) Plato assumes
that what the good requires can only be good, and so he
does not speak of the high human cost of his plans. This
assumption, of the impossibility of justice doing harm or
of good doing bad, is affirmed throughout Plato's The
Republic.
6Public Man. Priv^a Wgfflan, pp. 35-41.
22HS?'sS2!i S ^erar (^ngUi"' 197 °''Women and the Family,'- p. ° °kln ' Plat° on
l«st°tLTV^
r2e £f «- -„ unjust by
ircnos
-
NO/ impossible." 8
While Aristotle is i-ir^i
to a „ .
PraiSed f°r h
- contribution
participatory ideal of political lif. k
±.w •
P e, his version ofthis ideal suffers Sane aSS«0" of concordance
^ Plat°' hiS counterpart. Thus
Aristotle is able to defend the slavery o£ wonen and
others as (at least in principle) . just foundation ^
^ State
-
B°th SlaV^ - cree, sexual division oflabor nUst. he said, have a foundation ^^^
can in principle be entirely iust^ for- ^y Ilu :) r tne simple reason
that they are necessary. »There can be no ^
principle to the nere fact that one should co^and and
another obey; that is both necessary and expedient. -9
Just as
-it is a function of nature to provide food for
whatever is brought to birth," so nature must have
provided the different types of people needed to Bake a
just order. 10 Nature has „ its own ^.^.^ q£^
sufficiency. h11
Jhe Republir, Book I, p. 134 (Standard Greek
9The Politics, Book I, Chapter 5.
1QThe Politics, Book I, Chapter 11.
1:LThe Politics, Book I, Chapter 9.
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While the arguments of Plato ann aF d Aristotle mirror inmany ways today's debai-o k
tho k
th°Se Wh
° *tta<* andse who defenriend the prrvate fa-lly and Rouse
concordance i <? i n „ ' tneirin some ways very different
7
"eStern thinking
-
There is
-
the low
appropriately out-of-sight activities ^
opposed to that which is »public„ (those „
"honorable,. and ffiore tha„ Berely ^
are appropriate!, shared and openly^ ^^the
-entire community. Tnus AristQtle ^
Private househoid, but he in no way endorsed anything
all the difference between the classical assumption of a
harmonious and meaningful ordering of the universe and the
modern idea of concord as the creation „*" o of a meaningful
order by means of the activity of h„.a »"c
'
t um n selves. The rise
of the modern ideal of tho f..i,„ •r ne family is connected to this
modern privileging of the self »„h „ «.y . And, not surprisingly we
are typically concerned not so much with the ways our
families aid and obstruct us in the creation of some
authentic public life (although this concern is not
absent) as with the balancing of our desire for family
with our wish to enjoy other less binding forms of what is
thought to be
"private- (personal i„<
need ox public articulat n
without
xc i ion) experience. !2
Hegel can serve to remind us both Qf
classical Greece and „.
^stance from
of the remaining relevance of that
-e and its discourse,
.cording to Hegel, modern
: 7 °ne"Sided - - comply nature
' °
b36CtlVe
—
as Plato,
(very CreeK) understanding of family and household as .
»eans reflects another one-sided view." This „ „.xcw. n
"objectivefreedom," also called
"ethical life »L t , is, says Hegel, the
The modern familv i<5 r,^
with both privacy and freedom
rse
T
afflbl3ilously associated
is used both to refer to a condition "
freed°»" can andlife is allowed and enabled ^^
W
?
ere one ' s fa»ily
ability to escape from oneVfaml?^ 1^ a"d also to the
"privacy- is used to mean botn a JL^V*3 de»ands. sorest from the sort of relationsth,? °f Protection andprevail in the family and thoL , are suPP°sed tothemselves. This muliipnci?v relati°nsonly the result of the fact S»? "lng is ' 1 thin*. not
relative — it attrihnt-f
3
I
at th<
r
word
"Private" is
closure, autonomy' and/or hidd2!f
hing
? de^ree °'£3?- cLr-piy
Modern^^T^^^^-^^
ambiguous, and mumble nature°of 'an** Problematic,life. pl y conceivable good
SieSerrr-Hegei's ^K^/^1^ see Rud°" J-
Origin
of ^flSS&SL^^ The
193-194.
verene (Humanities Press, 1980), pp.
state of affairs£ that constitutes our
-ompiete
n
V p
x trip that is
— in «-«*. reach this
ri Each step °f the way supp°sediy - *» the interactive (dialectical,
consciousness and institutions^ ^ ^
"
UltlB3te in™ > and collectively
situated individuality." As it ig fQr piatQ ^
us
-
what is jUst is assumed to be possible, at least in
principle.
Hegel's m~~rf nf th„ Pa„. 1y
The modern underestimation of the public and the ethical
is connected
,
says Hegel, to the enlightenment
understand ing of freedom as radica i autonomy. „e calls
the latter "subjective freedom, " meaning retreat from
commitment in the name of freedom and self-development.
To Hegel the development of subjective freedom as an aim
represents an emancipation from eariier modes of
consciousness, but is itself an unstable achievement, in
contraction with itself, ultimately unsatisfying and
find" in
g
fi'thr,;mlitmrt !° mod«nity, and his attempt tor nd it e ingredients for a life "at home " ssi
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gating, and in need q£ ^
objective freedom 15
Active freedo» is ^
_J Q J — of
realization of individuality based Qn g „sacrifice „
(transcendence, of "personality- (the wiu as
need, impulse, and casual whim"). 16
If this transcendence of mere contract relations is totaKe place to any degree in society as a whole, in
People's everyday interactions of need and interest, and
in the family. The family< properly ^ ^
transcendence,
"with the result that one is in it not as
an independent person but as a member...17 The family is
thus a real social community; it is that form of community
(ethical life, based on love, based on, in other words
,
feeling for actual living individuals" or "mind's feeling
of its own unity." 18
it'recogntzes^hfright"?S.
1
?
an
-"evement because
himself or herself sa??=f?L • subJect to find
He credits Christianity for makin^thf
her P^ticularity
.
"
of the western world lnto a Principle
Marriage and ramUyf" p m"**"'
""^el's Concept of
<-y t-ress, 1967), Paragraph 37. See para. 36-38.
Hegel's Philosophy „f p< 7ht
,
para. 158
£S? SSf ^e^econri^rofpara? l^.^ ' " f
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U,ve when fully developed
desire- it i. '
UCh nore than
*». s «clprocal recognition.
achieved through shared activity is in t
th» , urn essential fore develops of self-consciousness." Freed
self-consciousness and ,
om requires
usness, so requires the dependence of
ove Th is is not . contradiotion> ^ ^
won realization of the telos of the self (and it is
this sense that it is "objective") . 20
Hegel's vision of ethical life includes as a central
exponent not only the valorization hut also the regular
transcendence of private fa»ily Ufe, the family exists
only as a .cent in . larger whole consisting^ ^
civil society (the roa i ™ ^«7 e lm of economic and social relations)
and the stated objective freedom requires membership in
families, the leaving of and break-up of families, and the
F. "Hegelf ESoffiPfeg »' ?»»• 158*- See also O.W
T.M. Knoi (Srsf" of PennsvlCaniTV ' ' tr3nS - **304-30*; ^ Zt * 7 ^ Y-Lvania Press, 1948) dd
echical-love " seeliebert V*?}'" n°tion ° f "h°nest,
and Familyy"'pp? Io^!o4 '
Hegel ' s ConcePt of Marriage
situa^H
n
,^
nde
? PUtS for Heael "the family is
g*55 (University of Massachusetts Press? 5S5)? p.
21Heqel's Philosophy of R i aht- para
. 157
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°Undln9
" ^ *- it exists as an
ethxcaz community the individuai faaiiy anows ^
7e b°UndS « -ual substantive Ufein the state, in learning, and so forth as wel,11 ' l as inlabour and struggle with the external world...23
Hegel would not be surprised fcy or ^
unimportant the misgivings we have about our own familiesbut would criticize them as often one-sided. In . fully
'
realized authentic existence we would come to understand
how our misgivings are, in the overall scheme of things
unfounded. We would understand that the ethical life of
the family is necessary to, but ultimately inferior to
that which must be realized at the level of the state.
The former is immediate ethical life, and the latter is
self-conscious ethical life.
This position allows Hegel to achieve insight into the
ethical importance of the modern family. «e finds value
in the way the modern family, by virtue of its basis in
the exclusiveness of love, is based on a turning inwards.
He points out, following Aristotle, that
-inwardness" is
^ erson^^ of
Hegel's Ph iiOSQphY
y ra
^
1
^
s see
of children, see para. 177.' he educatlon
23Heqel's Philosophy of Right
,
para. 166.
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not necessarily opposed to
-outwardness, » ^ ^
need for concrete and particular
others.
relatl°"S "ith meaningfulW version o f concordance, in other words, does not
equate the good life with the acnievement Qf ^^ ^
He reminds us of the importance, especial ly in large-scaie
social systems where fairly impersonal relations
necessarily enter into evervdav 1
i
f» „c ya y li e, of some sort of
multiplicity of realms.
„e understands, for example, tne
importance of having both the more intimate and the less
intimate. m Elshtain's words, »„e are all ;w impoverished
if all of life falls under a single set of terms...24
Hegel also allows for the fact that the exclusiveness of
the modern family has a problematic side, situated as it
is in the midst of all the egoism and struggle of the
larger realm of civil society, the family comes to stand
as an ideal, as the locus of life that makes the daily
struggle worth it. The problem is that this ideal can
easily serve to rationalize and reproduce an unjust order.
Hegel, like Plato, understands this possibility, and he is
furthermore aware of some of modernity's particular
propensities to injustice, specifically the tendency of
civil society (and so market economies) to develop
Public Man. Privat e Woman p. 335.
conditions of oroat9 e P°verty and inequality, of
overproduction and sociai misery. 25
Hegel holds fast, however, to the idea that this order
of property is redeemable at least in principle, g iventhat it is hounded properly by the family and the
The key is that the latter a M i f, self-conscious ethical realm
which is based on law rafh^y ^t er than feeling, serve to
constitute society as a whole as an ethical realm. Then
the egoism of civil society is mediated, as it were, from
two sides.
Kc^iviK^^1"6 realization of free
antagonisms'berween
"Svlduals P»tgh?
P
?orm
9
th „ •of a genuine public community?" 9 ™ e basls
Hegel does this not because of any unwillingness to be
critical of his own times, but because of his commitment
to concordance
- because, in other words, of his
commitment to the idea that a fully redeemable order must
be possible and in the cards. Because of this belief, he
2 5Hegel's Philosophy of Bigkfc, para. 243-246.
^Landes, Hegel's Conception of the Family, p. 131.
Landes, "Hegel's Conception of a Family," p. 126 .
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does not give enough credit to many of the -.1 •"* °r
"misgivings"
People have about the modern family.
X have in mind two of the determining features of that
-titution: it is only reaped in heterosexual marriage
and it is based on the different ann „ ,I d complementary
functions of the father and the mother Hea.T «ie * gel endorsed
these retirements without gualification
, saying^ ^is the father who is to exercise all of the family right
over its individuals, just as it is tha^^ ^
enters civil society and represents the unity of the
family to others. The mother, on the other hand, "has her
substantive destiny in the family...28 « ^ criticai ^
Hegel's project that women remain on the plane of feeling
and the level of particularity, as this enables the family
to provide the essential counterbalance to the egoism of
civil society. 29
limited form of bourgeois subjectivity . 30
Hegel's position on women, in other words, is his
attempt to deal with the problem posed for ethical life by
28Hegel's Philosophy of ^ght, para. 166.
^
Hegel's Philosophy of Fight, para. 166, 166A, and 175A.
Landes, "Hegel's Conception of the Family, p. 134.
the property structure of ci„ fl
Pi.*
society. ^ „lato. entertains . vision of .^
wh
t7
a unity of
— - - parts is achi;ved
: :;: ::r
thout su~ -—
~
Because of this commitment to concordance, he, like
Aristotle, postulates a radical difference in naturebetween men and women.
Women may have happy ideas tl .tthey cannot attain to the idea? 'n^ ele9ance, butbetween men and women is li£ I* ^e differenceand plants. Men correspond to , 3 - b?tWeen ani»<alscorrespond to plants because rhe^dev V" 1* "°men
This claim is out of keeping with the rest of his theory
and undermines his own argument that the family is able to
Promote the development of self-consciousness and free
subjectivity. The ethical life of family is
, after all
supposed to require a love founded on reciprocal
recognition.
"The dialectic of love that Hegel outlines
presupposes a relationship between eouai, ,„v ci-wee q ls in a monogamous
love match. "32 v^t- u««-i •Yet Hegel is forced, if he is to postulate
the family as a moralizing agency and also save
concordance, to announce that men and women are anything
but equals, thus calling into question how any process of
mutual recognition could ever take place.
^
Hegel's Philosonhy „ f D^nt para
_ 16fiA
Landes, "Hegel's Conception of the Family," p. i37 .
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e"d
°
the exclusio
" «— his om realm ofactivity and achievement. He cert^mrtainly anticipated theagents of those ^
even they rejecte(j
«>e father was . God.given ^^^^ ^ of ^
the proper „odel for all forms Qf
-ale superiority and Bale prerogatiye ^^^
-re sophisticated evolutionary grounds.33 Johann ,
Bachofen, John Mc^nnan, John Lubbock
, ^ Henry
ana Herbert Spencer were aaong those who presented the
'
culni„ation
.
the glorious end-product of Man's whole
social, sexual, and noral evolution fro* savagery to
civilization.
"
34
iSStwSSS^^gSS inatnf f°Tlation * s-Henry Maine. See Elshtain 2uM?„nineteenth century by
102-108; Sir Robert Filler ^rjarch? ^ZTS°r!ss, ed. by Peter Laslett 'T f and ™"*""" ESliAisaJ
1949)
;
and sir Henry^er Maine vinfU *lackw^the East and We.t ffon^^
^^ff""" ' "
Anthropo!ogy
F
»
e
6uo's CoSc!
P°Uti°S
°f Viot°ria" Social
c^<-7«*-,, «
v-u., ih/u;, Lewis Henry Morqan. Ancient-
'
1877)
'
and Herbert Spencer, The Principle g£
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By co»parison
,
the traditional patriarchal theory of
authority suffered on many counts, it failed to
bastion of nurturance, tenderness, and morality in a world
increasingly dominated by predatory capitalist markets and
large organizations, it was contrary to new
anthropological evidence and contemporary evolutionary
thinking. Finally, it was under attack fro* a powerful
ween rights movement. 35 To sum up> ^ ^
theories, Uke the wort of Hegel, fit better with the
features of modernity I spoke of in the first two
chapters: the new primacy accorded the self, the decline
of the family as alliance, and the rise of industrial
capitalism.
*************
Sociology, works (Osnabriick: Otto Zeller, 1966).
The latter did not so much challenge the assignment ofwomen to motherhood as strive to garner equal Aspect and
™nth
UV°S mot!jers ' to b^ing women self-rSpect troughmo erhood, and to combine in one world a family lirewhere women could be mothers with a public life wherewomen could be citizens. See Linda Gordon, »WnyNineteenth-Century Feminists Did Not Support ' BirthControl' and Twentieth-Century Feminists Do: Feminism
F^nf^ I"* ^ Family'" Rethinking Th e FamiTvreminist Quest ions
,
ed. by Barrie Thorn with Marilyn Yalom(Longman, 1982), pp. 40-53, and especially pp. 45-46Opponents of this feminism welcomed the new evolutionarytheories, which seemed to meet the demands of women "half-way by glorifying motherhood, and the same time as theyjustified kepmg women in the home.
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Hegel, then, like these Qther _ participated
— he ldea of marriage ^^ ^ cQnsent
COmPUlS1°n
^ "~ ° f «- fMlly as . co„ty with
— Chil— -ese ideas should
not be reduced to just another means to maintain
over ween. Nor should tfe overlOQk ^ ^^
idea „ f the self iBplies
. critigue Qf ^
(and thus o£ the social construction o f gender)
, just as
"is ideal of tne family and the state as cQnmunity impues
a critigue of modern capitalist civil society. The point
is (my argument is, that Hegel suppressed these
possibilities, and failed to grant that women cQuid
to "the ideal- and participate in public life, because of
his commitment to concordance, and not simply because he
wanted women to be at home. Moreover, all who endorse
concordance, even if they reject Hegel's particular
version of it, are likewise going to overlook, endorse, or
provide the theoretical preconditions for various forms of
II o¥?
ofr^heTs^^
right does not extend to the subjective realm of w wonly has sway with regard to the^conective propertv onwhich the family depends for its necessary extlrna^existence
.Hegel's pm^^, ^ p^^f™ 1
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^eals of family that conpete^ ^
assume the reality Q£ Qr ^ possibiuty ^ a ^ ^they, like Hegel
, abet fQrces Qf normaiization
oppression.
I now turn to some more contemporary ideas of fa»ily
Rather than repeat the literature summaries of others i
take a selective approach and trace the assumptions of
concordance and the normally implications of a few
representative or notable positions^ ^ celebratory
ideals of the modern family compete today for
predominance: the family of free choice and the
"traditional" family of capitalism. I have chosen the
work of historian Edward Shorter as an example of the
former.
Shorter argues that the history of the family shows how
the west has undergone a transformation from a traditional
shown ^thTce^rat^ of r^mode^U^ ^
sociologists and psychologists of various schools
ffmnv
Ver th
K
benefits °f the validity of the modern
££l £j„ ^- Ch argUSS that these defenses of the familyhave aided in a gradual process of "the socialization ofthe means of production." See his Haven in ,
^Eld, esp. pp. 22-43. I comment on his view in the next
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are more highly valued and protected. 38 H1fin - ls account isfilled Wlth error and simplicity but- h±1C1T
-
o t he captures
beautifully the appearance and the allure of mod •*
, .
A t ernity; hedescribes perfectly how history has to b„
„, 14 „
^ e seen " order to
validate the liberal conception of the self as an
autonomous chooser, shorter in fact gives an organized
and scholarly voice to what is probably the most popular
view of todays family life
. As^ h& _^ ^an wrong. *es
, Bodern society praises ^
the basis of what interventions and given what forms of
surveillance, At „hat cost to ^^ ^ ^
this privacy, and at what cost to those who are not?
Shorter casts the onset of modernity as a revolution of
choice, both because personal choice has become a major
value and because the transformation was itself chosen.
3 8The Making of th* M^Qrn Familv _ , QShorter, the famiiv nf „I 'r^. 1 ^ ' P- 18 • According to
Piatt The Wish ?« Sf% I ? Weinstein and Gerald M.
with H.J. Locke (New York 1953). Jy '
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jor modern people
, ... the wish tQ be £ree ^
the demands for obedience and cQnforaity
He describes this triumph of individual ^
cutting of ties wit-hW t km, community, and past and future
generations. » was
, he says
, ^^^
this change, and it is for the sake of the family as a
domestic unit — »c .as a center of sentiment - that it was
done, on the other hand
, shorter concludes, the result
has been a victory for individuals rather than for
families fis . First one grQup Qf ^^.^^
to decide family matters for themselves on the basis of
••sentiment- and then a later group (including people
today) chose to leave families as often as they make them.
The modern family is "the result of replacing property
first with sentiment and then with sex as the bond between
man and wife." 40
While Shorter understands important elements of the
transition to modernity - the truisms of family history
-his happy story of the modern family has been easily
debunked by many. 41 it i* in k„j iu«ny 1T: 1s fact by no means clear tnat
"Shorter, The Making of the MoH.m Family, p. is.
The Modern Family
f p . 7.
forced
te
fnd h!^?Ce iS Weak ' his reasoning is sometimes
Jhf * claims are not entirely consistent. See
H^crn f
eV16W ° f Richard T. Vann (Journal of Fami 1 yistory l, no. 1, Autumn, 1976): 106-117, that ofChristopher Lasch, "What the Doctor Ordered," New York of
fiSfite, 11 (December, 1975): 53, and that of'joanV Icoll
,Signs: Journal of Women and Culture tn Society
. 2, no. 3(Spring, 1977): 693-696.
151
section has become popular only in fflodernity _
are entirely better Df,
WOmen
1 Det; o f than before, or tw
control over famili. „
community
es has decreased. "2 And in it
-tainly wrong to consider the changes that^ taken
inP°rtant? ** « thing it is because „e can le, "atJ w arnlot about the modern family by criticising them, but itiB mostly because his mistaken assertions are the result
°f his flawed (concordant) view of self.
Shorter says that the traditional world came apart as a
result of the changes wrought by early capitalist which
brought
.ore means to the middle and upper classes and an
egoism learned in the Marketplace to the lower classes 43
The result was a "sexual revolution" (as indicated by a
significant increase in the proportion of childbirths out
both^ess" a^^tiona^e'and^e^s^^t"6 medieVal west ™«had less sex and aid not as a ru?f They suP°^dlyAdditionally, he claims th»t if? lue lnfant life -
women before' the ^ghcee"^^^5 A^SL^ J"sayS/ a result both of force nl~Zi ?is was ' he
cSlu^1^
t^they^n^k^HT^ ^~ntlModern j^W
, PP ^4-53 ' on "* f°rCS ' See »«
203. on the |ueS?ion4of34rS?ic":Ct^2 Z*\l 22*
marries C0^ io^ "sent^ntaf, ^and'morear iage, see pp. 54-78 and 120-167. ^
43The Modern Family, p. 259.
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- w-lock) ana a child care ^
occurring first among ^ ^^^^^ ^ fche
occurring first anong the bourgeoisie44 ^
classes did not give fcQ ^^ ^
as the workers because, says shorter> ^
sustained their loyalty to the^ ^^
expressed their ne„ly do»i„ant desire ^
gratification in their concern with the welfare of
children, while in the lower classes the "wish to he free"
awakened by capitalism gave rise in women to the
expression of their desire ~a for personal independence and
sexual adventure." 45
The scholarship of Joan w. Scott, Louise Tilly, and
Miriam Cohen has refuted Shorter's interpretation of the
rise in the birthrate for single women. To start with,
they have established that the single women who bore the
children in question were in traditional and dependent
lower
r
anI workIng
t
classes
1
ln
9
p
ti,naCy eXPlOSion
" «>•
parentrarrsomeno„Pmorrf^ Sabers^
gt^rrS cla?L?^envann^ review^. 109-
45The Modern Family
r p . 2 61.
positions of employment and also away fro™ „m home at thetime. n
The mothers of ba^a >-^«,
And servanthood d!d no? make
°ften ^ants.
independent, for autf ^Lw™en economically
o&Se comb * tS"«
economically dependent J ?k
se5vant ^irls
they worked. 4 * °n the households in which
Shortens response is that these women were being
employers.
.M| therefore
, ^^^^^
beCaUSS they had
*»• ^ must have been because they
wanted to.*" This may he so, hut the guestion is: why
would they want to? According to Scott, Tilly, and Cohen
Many women were promised marriage and, for economic
reasons, they needed marriage. Far from a rebellion
against the old order, many liaisons were a desperate
attempt to continue to live in the traditional way. »m
most cases, families strategically adapted their
established practices to the new context. --"8 It is true
W
6S
22oft
0t
»^ S°
0lC rSVieW
'
and als° ^ise A. Tilly Joanw. sc t , and Miriam Cohen, "Women's o^v t y 'Fertility Patterns » Journal ~? t\ w?r*.and European
VI, 3 (Winter 1976) : 447-476. f ^"^'""'P ll nary HWnry ,
"Shorter, The Modgi-n Family
, p . 157 .
Tilly, scott and Cohen, "Women's Work," D 454 <;«
Famil^s."; ^ ^UiS* *• Til1^ "individual Lives and
ItZitZ
Strategies in the French Proletariat," Journal o fFam ly History, 4, no. 2 (Summer 19791 - 137I1S 1 n„Z k
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way to maintatn ^
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The atte»<Pt was to find a newi the family ties and, of course, survive.
that old constraints of family, local church, and
comity broke down as a result of population growth and
above all a new mobility, but women hardly experienced
this as emancipating. instead more women than ever "with
inadequate wages and unstable jobs found themselves caught
in a cycle of poverty which increased their
vulnerability...49 More men could make a promise of
marriage with no intention of keeping it. 50 (For similar
reasons many women, especially lower-class women, are
equally vulnerable today - the contemporary rise in
unwanted births and abortions is not the result of a
freely chosen new sexual adventurism!)
It is not at all clear that these changes led to more
sex. Jean-Louis Flandrin turns the tables entirely on
*************
Many daughters did, however, lose touch with theirfamilies, and this of course must have helped change someattitudes as well, in the long run the new context
spelled the end for the family as a productive unit
consisting of more than one generation.
49
"Women's Work," p. 463.
5°Jean-Louis Flandrin agrees, pointing out that, while inthe seventeenth century families of seduced (or raped)
women could force the seducer to marry the seduced, thisbecame unenforceable in the eighteenth century, due to the
church's opposition. "Thus, the rise of illegitimacy inthis age is not in any sense evidence of women's sexual
liberation: on the contrary, it seems to be evidence of
greater difficulty in effecting marriage with the men they
had intercourse with." "Repression and Change in the
Sexual Life of Young People in Medieval and Early Modern
Times," Journal of Family History . 2, no. 3 (Fall 1977):
203.
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Snorter's argument by claiming that an in^x^
repression of sex helped cause the rise in births out of
marriage while leading at the same time to an increased
eroticization of life, a threatened church, says
Flandrin, began to repress traditional forms of supervised
sex among young people and this, combined with the closing
of municipal brothels and (as discussed above) the
migration of more poor young women to towns looking for
jobs, led to the increased births out of marriage. 51
Whether there was more or less sex, it seems highly
simplistic to understand the changes that did take place
as "sexual liberation." More sex is not the same as more
sexual freedom (as many women discovered as a result of
their experience in "the sexual revolution" of the fifties
and sixties) any more than less sex necessarily means more
repression. As Flandrin suggests and Foucault argues,
both the denial of sexual urges and their celebration can
lead to an increase in the self-analysis of one's desire
and thereby to its transformation and its intensification.
What we have had, perhaps, is not a sexual revolution but
a "sexuality" revolution.
There are similar problems with Shorter's simplistic
claims of an increase in power for women, love for infants
and children, and privacy for everybody. On the first
"Repression and Change," p. 207.
point he overlooks two facts. While three hundred years
ago ween were defined as inferior to men, they were not
relegated, as they generally are today, to the non-
productive, relatively less visible, and socially isolated
household. 52 on the other hand, modernity has burdened
women (and men, anew by projecting onto them idealized
images that they can not live up to. The "revolution-
praised by Shorter meant that women were idealized as
"submissive, selfless, ceaselessly effective on behalf of
others," and men were given the sole responsibility to
ensure the family's economic success. 53
On the second point (the question of love for infants
and children)
,
Shorter first of all depends on the
questionable view that the popularity of the often deadly
practice of wet-nursing was due to a lack of interest in
infants, when it was just as much the result of ignorance
about disease and economic necessity. 5 * shorter second of
5
r l
Ti
^Z'>
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?
tt: and Cohen araue that "women in these[traditional] families were neither dependent norpowerless" ("Women's Work," p. 454). For a converse viewsee Mary Beth Norton, "The Evolution of White Women'sExperience in Early America," in American Historical
Review, LXXXIX (1984): 593-619.
53See John Demos, Past. Present, and Ppr^i, p . 12 andpp. 41-67. For a longer study on the effects on the
contemporary family of the imposition of the breadwinner
and homemaker roles see Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb,The Hidden Injuries of Class (New York: Vintage Books,
54For Shorter 's view, see The Making of the Modern Family -
p. 175. For opposing arguments see George D. Sussman,
"The End of the Wet-Nursing Business in France, 1874-1914
Journal of Family History, 2, no. 3 (Fall 1977): 255, and'
157
•U »a*es a judgnent about ^^^ ^
_
;
nderstandin9
°
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•
—
- of PhiUipe
-rter's thesis
. irifes indifference ^because
-nobody thought
, as we ^
that every child contained a man's personality "55
Centuries o f childhood, p. 39 . This u ^ ^
course literally false, and insulting to women. „any
People today thin* (incorrectly, in raany respeots, that
female children contain a wsmanis personality, c There
was, says Aries, no concept of child personality of any
Kind. People went from being disposable and vulnerable
infants, to being little adults 56a i . Children were depicted
in art as little adults, they mixed with adults in
everyday activities, and were given adult responsibilities
very early, childhood, says Aries, is a modern invention.
Aries throws into question Shorter's conflation of the
medieval absence of a concern with childhood with the
period's apparent relative indifference to infant life.
To Shorter, both were the result of the same absence of
affect. But this suggests that a rise in sentiment led us
*************
Scott, Book Review, p. 695.
55
»uB
56Centur ies of childhood
, p. 38.
158
o concede of cM^ooa." ^ would^ fae ^
seems Bore likely that a _ cQncern
•
r6SUlted fr°" Cha"-S in ^ expectancy and ohanged
attitudes, which in turn resulte<j fron a ^ ^
children
. The new concern ^ ^ ^^
overall, but the changes which led to it were hardiy
result of a liberation of affection.
argues, the community of the system of lineage had no
interest in eaoh child as an individual, only in the
existence of heirs. This should lead ^ ^ ^
not only about the liberation that resulted fron the
decline of the system of lineage, but also to wonder at
what new interests society had in ma*im izing and managing
the develops of the individual, m other words, what
was at the stake in the rise of "childhood?"
doc^rine-of j^l^rtalfty-of^veTsoul^
importance of the child personality ". 43? In szlTna™this Aries raises questions about hisown statement *
Tn?^"?"?
thS
" in?vit^iUty» of medieval indifference toi fant life, especially since the Church's started to
conlitions!
:Une be£°re *** Ch3nge in d*»°graPhic
159
Elites lea the way in developing a new concern for
childhood and domesticity, and they did so neither as a
simple expression of preferences newly set free, nor in
order to provide a substitute for a sexual revolution they
thought the middle classes should resist, but as a
response to the same changes in the social and economic
order that led to the rise in births out of wedlock.
Christopher l*sch remarks, "This withdrawal [from
immunity life]
... took place not because ^.^ ^
became wanner and more attractive, as shorter thinks, but
because the outside world came to be seen as more
forbidding.
"
58
Lasch emphasizes the role of elites in this process -
the new "privacy" was in part imposed on people, as "the
forces of organized virtue, led by feminists, temperance
advocates, educational reformers, penologists, doctors,
and bureaucrats" went on a "campaign to establish the
family as the seat of civic virtue". 59 The family was
championed as "a haven in a heartless world. "60 is
quite clear about the political implications of this.
In urging a retreat to private satisfactions, the
^n??ft?
nS
,°
f
.
d0meSti<
T
Virtue illicitly acknowledged
capitalism's devastation of all forms of collective
58
"What the Doctor Ordered," p. 51.
59
"What the Doctor Ordered," p. 51.
60See Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: ThP F^iiy
Besieged
, p. 6. '
x
aitempts^o repair IkTS™ they d^couraged
pri=e
P
that St!*?*?""* " «" theimprovement. 61 P r Bat«rial and moral
Shorter, then, is misleading on the third point as weU
Modern privacy, for all of its feal
_
to people on oertain conditions, namely that the right
"healthy" sorts things be done in private. This is of
course in keeping with the work of Foucault and Donzelot
who argue the rise of "domesticity., seen by shorter as a
surge of sentiment was in fact based in the imposition of
new disciplines upon the bourgeoisie by members of their
own class, similarly, by their account the "sexual
liberation" of the working classes was purchased only at a
price. New possibilities for the proletariat have indeed
come to be, but by virtue of a process linked to the
weakening of the system of alliance. This has meant a
considerable degree of hardship, particularly for women
(as we have seen)
.
There should be no mistake: to some
degree new chains were put in the place of the old.
Conflicts were necessary
... in order for the
»™i ? t0 be .
9
ranted a body and a sexuality;economic emergencies had to arise
. .
. ; lastly
, there
whth° h e?tablished a whole technology of controlich made it possible to keep that body and
sexuality, finally conceded to them, under
surveillance 62
"What the Doctor Ordered," p. 51.
The History of Sexuality. Vnl . 1 p. i 2 6.
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Shorter^ l iberal assumptions d . stort ^
interpretation of the contemporary situation. „e for
example endorses a face value reading o f today . s hedonism
as a logical extension of the evolution toward greater and
greater freedom At first
, says ^^ ^ ^
free emerges [among men and women] as romantic love. "63
It has since supposedly led to a more directly
instrumental hedonism, where sex is the major bond for
couples - ..»en and women come together ^ ^
as freight cars do in a switching yard...64 In general
Shorter accepts a consistent decline in emotional
intensity and community activity as natural. By his
reading, people who are free choose to cut their ties with
others, as if to stay free. For shorter the latest in
this line of natural and unproblematic development is the
understanding of parents as a kind of friend to their
children, rather than an educator or representative of the
63The Modern Family
, p. 259. This romantic love isunderstood by Shorter to be egoistic in nature? as can be
«£Ttt first"J°h\l0"in9 haSty and ""Pi-tic' remarks:
"*
Love at sig t means you are falling in love withyour mother, "The Modern Family, p. i56 . and "You took ?ntoanother person's eyes in the hope that you'll findyourself.
"
The Modern fa.iiy, p. 259.
64The Modern Famjly
, p . 8 .
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Uneage. 65 This
, says ^ ^ ^^ ^
-Kin, the peer groUp important once^ ^ ^
not as a representative of the demands of the community
but as a teenage subculture that
-is independent of adult
values.
"
66
Shorter endorses the individuaiist instrumental he
describes, first by reassuring M- ^ ^^
xs not breaking up because love is still connected to sex
and people who get divorced usually turn around and
remarry, and second by privileging the "Modern system of
values" as freely chosen. 67 „e need
, not
, Qf
follow hi* in this celebration, but unless we challenge
his view of self we can do little besides follow him in
the acceptance of the current situation as inevitable -
people are not liKely to give up their newly found power
to choose. At best we could advocate repressive
legislation in order to shore up "traditional values," and
this is - by his reading of self - i ike iy to be
ineffective.
in other words, Snorter's brand of concordance leaves us
with the options of celebration or despair. We can
celebrate the modern family as an expression of free
65The Modern Family
, p . 2 76.
66The Modern FaTni1 Y f p . 2 76.
6?See The Modern Family, p. 278 and p. 21, respectively.
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choice, or reluctantly accept it for the same reason
Bother way an important facet of politics is ruled out-
there can be no collective consideration of the different
ways "family.. and „ freedom„ ^ ^^ ^
constructed. Politics can only fae ^ ^.^^
struggle or accommodation between free beings, and those
not at home with this had by this reading best try to find
an "enclave" where they can be as they like or with wnom
they like. 68
The fact is, however, that a language of self-interest
self-development, and self-expression cannot adequately
characterize the cedents and practices of most of us,
even if it is by that language that we struggle to
articulate a vision of ourselves.« shorter himself is
much more confused about the issue of agency than his
ringing conclusions about the victory of free choice
indicate. 70 Modern instrumentalisn . g ^
6 8On the reduction of community to "lifecst-vi o „ ..American culture see RnherfV o 1 1 t style enclave" in
William m Gill i ?' , ob t N. Bellah, Richard Madsen,M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M Tin?™
American Jfe TncHvl^H^ and r^k^ 'Lif (Harper & Row, 1985), pp. 71-75.
MfrTiL^^611117 . 11^ °Ut a fuller sens* of purpose inli e than they can justify in rational terms ...» Robert
19sl),
HaMtS
° f *** H^rt (Harper i Row?
*
"l^r-noH ?
ne *and
'
Shorter speaks of modern "egoism" as
T ?l ln thG marketplace" and as required by the larger
"v rL oA?rn FamilY ^ P ' 259) ' On^he othL hand? ?he
sook nf L ,T1C egoism" taught by the marketplace isp en o as "the sexual and emotional wish to be free"
oftrL i?dlV^Ual - S!lf:fUlfillment " (P- 259 >< and the endr aditional society is described as a lifting of
ana straightforward nor as thoroughiy victoriQus ^
Shorter Sieves. Nor does . visio„ Qf ^
bargaining begin to a&t af^ ge t the ways our liv*^ w
t
...
1 w x J-ives are bound up
with power, involved with confiwonflict, and fatally linked tothe unsettled and the ambiguous.
Some_Critique of tho Mndern^amii^
in the last chapter I discussed the work of Ranya Rapp
and of Michele Barrett and Mary Mcintosh. Compared to
Shorter they accord a more central role in their
explanation to forces of economic constraint, and I hope
think that this difference is important. On the other
hand I also spoke there of how Barrett and Mcintosh's idea
of the family as "anti-social" is reductionist, and so
fails to fully explain the appeal of the family ideal. i
also said that their understanding of power as oppression
allows them to be somewhat naively enamored of "the
social" as the proper realm of genuine existence. On
these issues the distinction between their critique and
Shorter 's celebration disappears somewhat. For Shorter
the family is disappearing into the social at this very
moment; for Barrett and Mcintosh this is instead the hoped
*************
controls.
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for result of political action. i„ either casfi
C~nCe iS
'— " thought of prinarily as
oppression, the family is understood in^ Qf ^
of it, facets, ana the possibility of a fuuy liberated
existence is assumed.
These assumptions are not unique to these particular
theories, but are widespread in i iberal and radical^
thought on the modern family. Both tend
,
.„ Qther^
to take see of the worst from Hegel and leave out the
best. Friearich Engels provides an important example from
the critical tradition; while his outdated speculative
history has been for the most part rejected, his reasoning
remains more or less foundational. 7 !
1902). Engeis' Sort is based" on SwL^'^fhSociety. One of the
-others" (besides 2: rr»£? 2 Anclent-Mclntosh) who similarly looks forward to X! ! K- dof a genuine social existence is™he earlv El! ^HT'
that one day, when alientated labor is abolished thefamily and the personal will be transformed into'
"autonomous life activity," (Harper & r™ u nSupposedly the fulfillment of personal needs wlll^o ' "longer be restricted to the family but diffused
"throughout the entire society - and particularlythroughout the world of work" (p. 141) . it is worth
aSivIt^i.
2
^?^'; USe ° f "6 "h"Se "uronomous lifect ity" is similar to Marx's use of "species-beino »
human S both^ot*?,I™1 • °f • bei"g "here^ th* Sidualn is totally socialized and completely
h
eld^pated ' for a critique of this idea as denial of
us?na «L
C
S?
Pi?
X
!
hlstorical ly situated, and languagei g, see Elshtain, Public Man. Private Wnn,^, pp. £89.
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-Coring to Engels> ^^ nain
t.r"
the finai
°
ne being the
—
^
<* "civUization.^
Property destroyed equality betwee„ ^ sej£es ^^ ^ ^
"primitive., economic equality." New SQUroes Qf
came into being (above all class CQnfliot)( ^ fche state
became necessary to manage conflict, since it was men who
controlled the new private property (why is not all that
clear,
,
the state became the protector of men's oppression
of women. Conversely, where there is no property (in a
future socialise,
, the family, says Engels
, ^
"free love relations," by which he seems to mean . seria i
monogamy entered into on equal terms by men and women,
with no child-reering or household work to complicate
matters (these are left to "social industry",
. „omen
, he
goes on, will become full members of the productive
sphere, and »sex
-love» win blossom (capitalists
supposedly keep the proletarian family from going further
in this direction than it has already,. 74
This formula has concordance written all over it. One
kind of concordance is evident in Engels' idea of
oppression (which is taken more or less directly from
Engels, The Origi n of the Family
,
p. 90
3The Origin of the Family
, p . 91 .
4The Origin of the Fami1y
r pp. 91-92.
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Marx). The modern faBily is
, „ he sees u< sinpiy ^
Part o, a larger systen Qf „separat
.^^ ^ ^
capitalist system of private property
. ^
separations of class, of individuals
(who are estranged
fro. one another,, of public and priyate ^^ ^
based a unequal separation of gender), and of state and
society. Thus the state, private property, class
struggle, the oppression of women, and the instrumental
treatment of humans by other humans are assumed to be
neatly linked. They are all explained by the same
principle
- the imperatives of the productive system
(largely equated with the interests of the capitalist
class)
.
All forms of oppression are, in other words,
thought to be in concord with one another."
7 5
s~ °" ?S"£SS«ePm£s for &
an?°fhf lts . fYnoti°ns in the reproduction of "borrowerd t e provision of domestic labor (for an o? ?Zliterature she is referring to, see Terry ?ee "DomesticLabour: An Analysis of Housework and its Relation ?o t£»
8
r
(Spring
n ^^s.- Review of ^Sj**^^
o ^pring, 1976)). m fact one cannot explain all
ff^hf
65
?
f the
1
social world by referring ?he interests
?Li?v S J2 5 ^ Hum*hries a^ that to reduce the
5o iiYi ?
Unctions in serving economic imperatives is
is noi\>n^
re
?
PeCt th
? P°ssibil ity that the working class
inr-?H
ent^ely Powerless, that features of the socialworld are the result of resistance by them rather than thesuccessful exercise of power by capitalists. See "TheWorking-Class Family: A Marxist Perspective/' p. 198-201For similar criticism see Jane Flax, "The Family inContemporary Feminist Thought: A Critical Review ," in TheFamily in Political Thnn^f, pp . 236-237, and Eli
168
For Bngels the overthrow of the unifiefl forces ^
oppression gives rise to its ^^harmonious reality of liberati<Jn
. By ^^
-at 18 fundamental tQ identity wm ^ iBpQsed ^ h^ns
once private property is abolished; our determining
conditions „iU be freely ch0se„. »„an , s own soc^
organisation, hitherto confronting hi* as a necessity
-posed by nature and history, now beco.es the result of
his own free action."™ it is string krikin how much this
vision of the future is like shorter's naive
interpretation of the present, m both cases a concord is
thought to exist at the level of the liberated self.
Michael sandel has pointed out how this notion of
liberation as the end of determination and necessity
denies to us the very conditions that would have to
pertain if „e are even to be selves that could be in some
*************
9A
rSt
nn
y
'
CaPitalis™. The Family * Persona1 t.i fq pp 93_94 o another important note/many feminists haverightly pointed out that the insistence of the unity of
?i^i^e -?StS tn °ne st^9le has assisted socialists in
of iabor
U
it haS
C
^
Ue
H
g
? ^ ^"iona! sexual divisionK 3 , alSO helPed Permit them to take forgranted as natural the constructs of "masculinity" and
^femxnxnxty.^ See Barrett and Mcintosh, The^ntT-^
I!ade?
ia
^nonH
U^an and Sc^ntific,» The Marx-En^Eeg r, second Edition, ed. by Robert C. Tucker (New York
Marx Te°cL™T\« P n* 7"i alS° the similar vlewfof
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sense liberated. Engels , brand Qf^ ^
separate from, and incompatible with( what Sandel^
are the
"encumbrances., or "constitutive attachments," thatderive their special force from their connection to
personal identity and which *r-oWn C a e necessary to character
self-knowledge and friendship
_ These ^ cmatr^ta
of familial, ethnic, economic, national, ana cultural (in
a word, historical) determination. 7 ''
Sandel's work is, I think, consistent with a philosophy
of discordance, even if he does not take such a position
outright. His criticism of the liberal idea of autonomous
choice applies with equal force to Engels' notion of
liberation. Neither is possible and neither is desirable,
for both dispense with the idea of identity. By
definition nothing entirely freely chosen is part of one's
identity.
» For to have character is to know that I move
in a history I neither summon nor command ..." 7 8 Multiple
determinations give us each our own personal history, make
us each unique, and gives rise to reflective consideration
and conflict concerning shared meanings.
My final example in this section is provided by a
classic of early radical feminism: Shulamith Firestone's
77Liberalism and the Limits of Justicp (CambridgeUniversity Press, 1982), pp. 179-183.
78Sandel, Liberalism and The Limits of Justice
r p. 179.
170
The ni r, lectin nf Sex 79~- ^Se*- Fxrestone holds, on the one hand,that the oppression of women is historically universal and
entirely determined due to the biological natures of
»»ale- and -reBale ,„ and
, on ^^^ ^^
liberation is the transition to a world where there reigns
an agency entirely free of social determination and
oppression.80 History up ^ _^ ^ ^
determined by the fact of "sex-class- (said to be
inevitable given the fact of that women bear children,
.
in terms of power history is described as the ubiquitous
reign of
-patriarchy,
-
the rule of the male class over the
female, she believes, however, that women's liberation is
possible by virtue of the technological overcoming of
biological difference (the replacement of pregnancy with
the cultivation of babies in the laboratory)
. once
political action makes this new possibility into a
reality, we can put an end to all oppression and
hierarchy, even to the point where children bargain as
equal partners in households created by contract. 81
7
? i
r
-
e
_
Pij'leCtiC
° f S"* : The C»™ f"" Feminist EgvolutioB(The Women's Press, 1979) . " SHi =t 2n
-
«°The Dialectic of Sex
, pp. 9-12. These ideas are
See SS&iVSf10" 1 femi?ism ' a7beit i" different forms,
on ,7>A
dlSCUSSlon ln Public Man. Private WnMn
pp. 204-228. '
lll
h
i
Dialecti
;
of sex
, P. 233. For a discussion of howthe language of exchange relationships pervades
Firestone's vision of the future, even as she understandstotal freedom" to be identical to "total community," seeElshtain, Public Man. Private Woman , pp. 219-221.
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Firestone, Uka Engels
, shorter
, ^^
Mcintosh, uses an untenable idea of freedc tc
view r,f ^ «
i eeaom o support the
-e of the faBily as an oppressiye necessity which
—g
,
or should be, made obsolete by historical
Progress- HuBans are ^ ^^^
fron a condition where choice does not operate at all to
one where it operates free fro- any kind of
aeten.ination.S3 ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^thin view of the role of faBily in the creafcion ^^
and social life, as if it were an entifely ^
connected to children and long-teo, obligation only by
economic necessity, what Jean Elshtain^ Qf^
could as well be said of the* all, "Nowhere does one find
a complex, self-reflective subject in his account of the
past, his descriptions of the present, or his paeans to
o 2, *Christopher Lasch has shown that thi<= h = ~ u
commonplace of liberal academics as well as ofr^* i
S
ritlqUe ^aven in a Hearts World pp 21 f,f^Z*}Parsons, for examDle ^v<= fK?f p?' 2_43 ) • Talcott
through a pai It ^ L ^ family wil1 have go
of interacting personalities ""that TJ 2
tisntam's discussion of the simii^rif^. i~ 1
th!s
S
gIves rise"o Ke S "?,°0ral c°n"*"ntialis-»
applaud the^trScr^of'S ££E 3 Sres BOth
fS5lv°5S-S: ln thS mar°h t0 ^e SS when peop"
S
„in
Pr?vatl Sgn^aS" f5^; S6e Els«tain,Publ|c!^L
India ThC Ma^
P
Rn^?4
and Karl Marx, "On Imperialism in
Tucker el ^ I Reader , Second Edition, Robert C.
664 '
Y°rk:
"- W
-
N°rton
*
Co
'
1978
>
-
PP- 653-
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the future,-" None^ ^ ,^ ^^ ^
permanently in . condition Qf^^^ ^^
as speaking be ings who come to have ^
Visions only by means of a language „hioh also delifflits
and determines. As a result, none understand the
importance the idea of family has today as , locus where
the aspiration for moral community is Kept alive, albeit
in a tentative, vulnerable, politically disempowering,
exclusive, and so far fairly ineffective form.
Normalization and thP »T^H
t
<- tona1 F^ <1y.
Prior to the last section I discuss shorter <s somewhat
despairing liberal "celebration" of the modern family. It
is important also that I speak of an alternative sort of
celebration which is much more overtly critical and much
less passive with regard to the current situation. This
is the increasingly popular "conservative" view, according
to which a moral order is possible providing that we
(among other things) restore the "traditional" family to
its rightful place of honor and dominance. I have chosen
George Gilder and Michael Novak as representatives of this
view, not because their arguments are typical but because
they are especially thoroughgoing. By pushing the logic
of the conservative position to its limits, they bring out
Public Man. Private Woman
,
p. 262.
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Lt L
worst points
- Li*e Hegei
' —
—tru hs that have _ ra(Jical ^ ^^^^
suppress them in their^ ^ ^ ^
opening to discordance and on another level the
reassertion of concordance. On the one hand they am™Ufe as necessarily inclusive of injustice, sacrifice
burden, and pain. similarly, the Modern family is
understood not as an alliance freely entered into hut as a
system of discipline one is horn into. On the other hand
It is equally affiled that this travail and discipline
poses no fundamental ambiguities; it is, or can be<
instead an opportunity for moral redemption. The family
is touted as both the proper school for moral development
and the proper locus for its satisfactory fruition. i„
the process Gilder and Novak assert the naturalness both
of capitalism and the particular version of family
dominant in capitalism.
I begin with Gilder. He rejects both the idea that
humans are motivated by rational calculations of self-
interest and the notion that society is a simple aggregate
of individual desires, demands and aptitudes. He sees
people instead as ethical beings, and holds that for any
society to survive it requires in its participants some
shared faith in the moral goodness of its own reality:
174
past, present, and future 8 5 gunh *
* S c faith must be
SStabliShed ln <~ - • worl, Life say=
is based on chance
, marked by ascension
-
decline, and hedged in by insecurity.
unroSVraSa^"6^ i"3 the P^eant of
enlightenment ttan a saSa ofT" fnvisioned by thebrief bounty, the endlels dL^Ser\Wanderin9s andGod, between alienation an! between man andfor the ever-rising and recedina *S we searc"we can see most clearly „hen9u£romised ^nd, whichcourage to leave ourseLes'o^n It SK^'JE/W
These references to "man" and "God- indicate already
that Gilder has some ideas about how we can provide a
morally just mode of balancing security and risk
inspiring faith, and dealing with life's ups and'downs.
in fact he is quite specific - we need both "capitalism-
fa dynamic process of "gift-giving" and "creative
destruction" carried out by "heroic entrepreneurs", and
"the family" (the nuclear family where the father is the
sole or primary economic provider). 87 The combination Qf
l
5S
tt
"ealth and Poverty (New York . Ba t
Giv ng » pp'
0r
2 3
g
:?
eral
;^H
Cnapter Three
'
"The Returns of
weaitn,'.. Hi Hill'.
and Ch^ "The Nature of
"George Gilder, Wealth and Pm,»w
Yi pp- 314_315 .
wl,"^"
6
5
aPitalist nature of the "good society" seeWealth and Poverty, pp. 7-8. Gilder defines cani^?^™only as a system where "productive weaitn is diverseIv
S!StVanp Tk6d ln causes"
S
?We
y
alth
heJlfafTunSersknds
8 i?^traditional entrepeneurial ways. See Chapter Three "TheReturns of Giving," pp. 23-42, and Chapte? Five "TheNature of Wealth," pp. 64-82. '
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^ two oan
, he says> prQvide ^ ^
L°t?rr
piine whereby chance ana
—* «
—
the basis of moral redemption. „e are, in other
words, saved from discord (and frQB ,^^ ^
Pontics) by a deep concord that exists between the
(opposite but complementary, natures of men and women onthe one hand and the retirements of the production Qf
wealth on the other.
To be even more specific, Gilder tells us that
capitalism (and so morality itself) requires classes
social stigma for the poor, and the economic dependence of
individual women upon individual men within family-based
households. For all of this he ma.es no apologies and has
no regrets. This is because he believes that the
differences of class can function together with, first,
the productive channeling of men's «»v„=imy i sexual energy into the
familial role of provider and, second, the societal
harnessing of women's maternal instincts so that work is
properly rewarded, solutions are found to society's
problems, and people's faith in the order is redeemed. 88
^women, says Gilder, will be most fulfilled if thevaccept the loss of independence that allows their
*
weakefsex ^afdT'f- °" the or^hana^e "the
hard onlv if h2
Wl1
^
defer
.
gratification and workn a y e is the sole provider, without sDecialoutside help (welfare)
, for a wife aAd kids WeaUh and£2^, Chapter Eleven, -The Coming Welfare Boom'" PP?
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(says Gllder) there will always be poverty< ^ ^group will be "sturwt 4-k~ck there, and both wealth
"ill be moraUy redeened
_
We are not, Gilder warns< currently ^ ^
aiscipunary situation. The booming „elfare state and
foolish government policy have interfered (supposedly,
with the process of sublimation and creativity, thus
creating a ^pendent, fearful, defensive populace and a
smaller economic pie. He need to fir™ things up so as to
enforce the proper norms of behavior. He records that
we shore up male-headed Monogamous marriage through
serious cuts in social welfare programs and implement
supply-side style cuts i„ taxes and regulations in order
to give room for heroic entrepreneurs. 89
Gilder's wort suffers from a reliance on bad socio-
biology and bad economics. Regarding biology, numerous
men and women both reject Gilder's view of their natures
and fail to confer* to his rele prescriptions and yet
Poverty^1^ ^^ertv , chapter Six, -The Nature of
(Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 142-145.
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tr'6 t0 W°rk hard ' — —"-t. - haveWhen it comes to econo„icSi Qniy a
structural factors and about ^ ^
.dea that the lack , f social mobmty ^
reward in our class system are the fault simply of
wrongful welfare and tax policy. In fact cnanges^
encompass the global econony^ rendere(j ^^^^ ^
-biiity in the U.S. more or less ohsolete, not to mention
left the one-breadwinner family in dire straights. *1 In
faith" because of a fe„ policy changes of^
Gilder's blandishments.
At another level, Gilder is probably naive^ regard
to the foundations of "the American dream." Can the
legitimacy of capitalism be sustained after it is
acknowledged (as Gilder acknowledges) that it leads
neither to equality nor security? Gilder, like other neo-
conservatives, argues for the necessity of a restored
faith in the future and a shared commitment to the whole
without providing much in the way of reasons why people
workina
V
hfrd°?n T^-*; 1 haVe Spent a niMber °* years
29 - - " a varlety of ways without being the
cou?2 £T?r ln ?y hoVsehol <i (although I must
g
admtt Ild be better at saving money)
.
12f!i5o
arringt0n
'
7"e New American Povgrt-y especially pp.
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should have such fa . th and comm . tnent
_
92
a
-re. one. class position ^^
-n- really be_ as moraUy justmed? ^
a h.ghly stratified society like ours> those
the bottom suf£er
, is -no .„ Those who „ succeedn
their positions with the help Qf governnent ^
are at the bottom tend to either internalize a judgment
against themselves or turn to politics and demand some
redress. These demands are then threats ^ ^^
vision of the morality of the system, thus setting in
»otion the imposition of various disciplines to enforce
class difference and social stigma. The subsidies for the
middle and upper groups go largely unchallenged or
unnoticed, while even the crumbs going to the lower groups
are resented and challenged.
"Assistance" is tailored so
as to tear apart the living arrangements of the poor and
encourage them in the direction of relatively self-
destructive means of dealing with their situation. "Work
incentives" and the like are introduced to make welfare
punitive.
Gilder, then, is naive finally about the political
import of the "anti-family" provisions of the welfare
system which he seeks to reform. These provisions promote
Cu^n^tV 1^0 *™t -°f ' f°r examPle * Daniel Bell's The
Books Ig^ 10^ °f SaBifcaUsffl (New York: Basic"
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the
rms
the very family values thfiy^ ^ ^
-position of an utter lack Qf independence ^^ ^
system o f tutelage which, wnile it^ on ^ ^ ^
in that it does not utilize all bodies directly in
employment, nonetheless succeeds in providing an a
threatening alternative to the normalized world of
contract. The example of the
-welfare family. serves an
essential role in the maintenance of the norm of the
middle-class family. Because Gilder's analysis considers
the imposition of particular disciplines of class and
gender on people to be entirely in accord with nature and
justice, it provides the perfect theoretical justification
for the punitive imposition of these distinctions. People
may return to "work, family, and faith," and may thereby
come to see their world as moral, but only at great cost
to many, including themselves, and only in the context of
various disciplinary pressures. The background
requirements of Gilder's program are marginalization,
mental health treatment, institutionalization and
incarceration; if it is implemented successfully this will
mean self-loathing for some and a nervous kind of self-
congratulation for others.
In sum, the costs and requirements of maintaining both
adequate levels of production and high levels of
inequality are either lost on Gilder or thought to be
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entirely in accord with nature and morality.
„e denies
that capital or industrialism have any intrinsic
Proofs, instead asserting that „e need only the win andfortitude that brings "creative- (strictly traditional
capitalist, solutions. This is supposedly possible thanks
to the
.oral nature of chance, fate, and sexual nature
An assumption of concordance is, then, a fundamental prop
of his theory.
Michael Novak's argument is much more palatable to
liberal, feminist, and radical ears than Gilder's. This
is because Novak does not mix in supply-side economics or
define "the family" in the same narrow anti-female terms.
By his terms many different household patterns can qualify
as a moral family, on the other hand, he is much like
Gilder when it comes to the one-sidedness (lack of
ambiguity) in his defense of family and the unqualified
nature of his acceptance of capitalist order.
Even more so than Gilder, Novak sees the extra-familial
world of capitalism as discordant, although the word he
uses is "unjust."
The world around the family is fundamentally unjust.The state and its agents, and the economic system andits agencies, are never to be fully trusted." 93
93Novak, "The Family Out of Favor," Harper's Mapping
252, no. 1511 (April 1976), pp. 37-44~7~^
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Novak goes on to say more specifically^
world, by virtue of its mobility its hen •
.
Ut
'
l hedonisa, its workits systems of transportation, ana its wealth, isanti-Wly, and this even though it depends on the
-hard
work, competition, sacrifice, saving, and rational
decision making- nurtured by the family. 94
most internalized its values" and t^°
Se
.
Wh° have
marriages and families apart>5
hese for«s shear
Novak contrasts the sweetness and light of the family to
the conflict and pain of the extra-familial world. He
says "What strengthens the family strengthens society,"
and
-if things go well with the family, life is worth
living; when the family falters, life falls apart. »™
Of course there is the possibility that this is
unfortunate
y
true given capitalist and/or industrialist
realities. Novak makes some good points along these
lines. There is, for example, his conception of a
"realist" understanding which associates liberation
-with
the concrete toils of involvement with family or familial
communities.-" He has a healthy sense of the
94
"The Family Out of Favor, p. 37 and p. 38.95
"The Family Out of Favor, » p. 37. See also p. 43.
96,,The Family Out of Favor, » p. 38.
97,,The Family Out of Favor," p. 40.
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inevitabiiity in li£e of dirt( necessity ^ ^have this sense is to have experienced
"„oral
essential. 98
Saiffi. 0^^ one 2"S* to «spirit that „e long no^ to be of Trl?* of the "™an
oodiesV^' "WS.'i.S'tSf oragVour*0 ^
Here Novak echoes Hauerwas ana Headings in emphasizing
the lessons learned through obligation to and dependence
on specific others to whom one is tied. 100 ^ ^ ^
context of industrial society, this has by and large meant
families. I am sure that Novak is on firm empirical
ground when he says that strong family life of some kind
is fundamental in almost every instance of "success,"
however defined
- "educational achievement
...the
'
development of stable and creative personalities
...intellectual and artistic aspiration
...,» etc."!
On the other hand, Novak never criticizes the family on
a single score. Nowhere, for example, does he say that
the we should not have to rely so heavily on families.
Yes, family life is sometimes hard, painful, and costly.
9 8
"The Family Out of Favor." p. 39.
99
"The Family Out of Favor, p. 40.
ioo„Tne Family 0ut of Favor „ p< 41i
101
"The Family Out of Favor," p. 42.
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s
a
but this is entirelv 4-vLireiy for the good bv hie ,
stretches credulity and .
^ ™
critica,
i-Portantly, it provides
nti l prop for the legitimacy of the harsh extra-familial world of Maceclass, power, and labor, of course,
-vak might simply refrai„ from criticism because ^
d6Slre
"
emPhaSi
" the in a culture where thefamily is
-out or favor" among the influential well-off
and intellectual classes, x do not, however, accept this
interpretation.
, say this because> ^ _^ ^family is not "out of favor >• m„~> •r . More importantly, Novak's
argument depends on the idea of the family as
unambiguously a wonderful and moral institution. Novak is
not merely saying that the family ia SUXM ^ seat ^
Moral reality given the harshness of capitalism; he is
saying that capitalism is a fine thing if only it is
balanced by the moral wonder of families.
Take, for instance, Novak's defense of the family for
providing the "economic and educational disciplines-
crucial for the survival of members of the working class.
What working class people need to learn, by his account,
is that "they have to be docile, agreeable, and
efficient. "102 To Novak, this is just the way of the
world, rather than a feature of our occupational landscape
that should be changed. His idea of a what is to be done
"The Family Out of Favor," p. 44.
184
is si»Ply "a politics aimed afc strengthening faniues
and nothing else. 103 '
To sum up, Novak, like rii/i„_
.
Glider, assumes that a concord
-sts in the universe at a high enough^ ^^the discord that exists no more than potential tools forthe learning of moral lessons, herding to hcth we cantap this potential
- learn the right lessons - only by
-ans of the disciplines of fMlly
. They each^
southing to say ahout survival in a privatized and highly
unegual society, but thev f»ii „y fail to acknowledge just how sad
this news is. To take their approach is to universalize
and thus depoliticize, present day economic and familial
reality.
The Family, Ponrordanrp
,
ancj NoraaliaatiQn
The several perspectives on the modern family i haVe
examined are by no means the same. The positions of
Engels and of Barrett and Mcintosh are not cruel in their
immediate implications, as are the views of Gilder, Novak
and Shorter. Gilder and Novak do not think of liberation
as autonomy from forces of social determination, as do
Shorter and Engels. On the other hand, all these views
have something in common; they all postulate the
possibility of, the conceivability of, or the reality of,
3
"The Family Out of Favor," p. 44.
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Lews
a social world which is not fundamentally^justified constraint an(J loss
_ Thig nakes ^
complicit with forces of normalization.
snorter's way of contributing to normalization is the
-t indirect. „e simply takes fQr ^ ^^
choice can he freely exercised in the ahsence of tangible
cbstacles such as legal prohibitions, community tradition
whxch is enforced by obvious public sanctions, and direct
-thods of community observation. Thus he overlooks, even
denies, the ways choice is constructed, directed and
effected by various forms of assistance and advice, by
symbols and images of success, and by the indirect
sanctions of images and realities of failure, abnormality,
and illness, m addition, his view not only covers up the
ill effects of the modern family, but also denies to
people any leverage with which to criticize these effects,
should they discover them. After all, how can one
criticize that which is the product of free agency?
To Engels, free agency is more of a collective matter,
and is a potential of the future rather than a reality of
the present. This idea allows for the acknowledgement of,
and a struggle against, the harm done by today's family,
so it is in important ways less cruel than Shorter 's view.
On the other hand, any vision of the complete absence of
coercion has the potential to cover up the ways social
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f0rmS "^"^y fore, a shape upon people
. ^
Snorter's view denies the possibiUty of a pQUtics ^
self, Engels looks forward to the disappearance of
Politics altogether. This first of ali portends in forthe status of difference once victory is declared, as it
is all too easy to justify havering people into shape to
achieve the expected consensus. It second of all
Politicizes people's psychological state in the present
and, given the dichotomy it offers between ideological and
liberated consciousness, this easily has the result of
thematizing
"political correctness." People targeted for
the correction of their "false consciousness- have no
theoretical resource with which to defend themselves. 104
Gilder and Novak, in contrast to both Engels and
Shorter, do not include the achievement of radical free
agency in their vision of the good life, instead people
are seen as forming commitments and making sacrifices
within a determining context of shared beliefs and
aspirations. This does not, however, mean a repudiation
of concordance, as the determining context of the good
society is idealized by postulating its harmony with moral
rectitude and enduring human nature. Nor does it mean
that they fully repudiate the idea of humans as
D»l???n» % »" Haw*esw°rth's excellent discussion of thepo itics of "consciousness raising." "Re/Vision: FeministTheory Confronts the Polis," pp. 174-176. f
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indent centers of choice and as^
of value. Novak is less expUcit ^ this issue t^
o ia.r. but both assume such independence in their
«* tody's ills
. More specifically> they biane
problem on the attitudes of the well-off and the
government policies they ^ tQ 105
allows for the possibility that the attitudes he depiores
(e.g., hedonism, a decline of the work ethic, and an
aversion to commitment, are linked to the institutions he
oelebrates (in Gilder's case large scale markets, the
private family, and hierarchical work life)
.
Of course attitudes are not entirely determined and it
is fair to criticize them, but the focus on willful
wrongheadedness allows both Gilder and Novak to pretend
that all can be made well within the confines of corporate
oapitalism.106 To then the^ ^ ^^.^
imposed by the latter are just the costs of life in
general, and they can be put to good moral use by
capitalism, the family, and the morally formed self which
they situate. Thus, while Gilder and Novak give credit to
and «ltl T"* ab°Ut the ""asochistic intellgentsia"the defecting upper class", the latter being theleading architects of "the war against wealth." SeeWealth and Pnv.rty p . 8 and p- *25 _ »• fae
is
6
«i«£ ^°arkS at °De P°^nt that »ost ^erican monopoly
286
government policy. Wealth and Pnv»rtv p .
*
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people's co»c„ sense appreciation Qf^ _^
fundamental, their analyses cruelly condemn people to
forever rely on fanily to get the„ through g^^
(especially women, c«s at a terrible cost in isolation
abuse, powerlessness, and unhappiness. m the meantime
Gilder and Novak each thematize moral fitness, thus
abetting pressures on people adjust themselves internally
for the sake of the success of the order. We should all,
by Gilder's view, purge ourselves of hopes for security
and selfish visions of equality. For the poor and
marginal members of society this means fending off the
insidious liberal demon which promises rights and
entitlements.
To sum up, the threat of normalization stems from a
dream of overcoming ambiguity. Milas Kundera, speaking of
totalitarianism, has said,
The evil is already present in the beautiful hell isSlM C°fai2Sd in the dream of Paradise and if we
Ittt
u
£
derstand the essence of hell we must
ortginated'lO?
561106
°
f the paradise from whi<* it
The paradise we tend to seek is a concord outside of the
human condition, simone De Beauvoir is wrong when, in the
midst of a rather incisive critique of socialism, she says
107Milas Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgpi-i-inq (NewYork: Penguin, 1981)
, p. 234.
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that socialism at lea**-ast recognizes that "we are not an
animal species. "108 The n _, . .point is rather that we are an
animal species, and we should affirm this and the
ambiguity that it entails.
108
1952?,
B
p
aU
l7?
r
'
The Second York: Bantam Books,
CHAPTER 5
AMBIGUITY AND MULTIPLICITY:
A MINIMALIST DEFENSE OF FAMILY
don't want to suggest for a minute that today's
discourse is unified in a monotonous endorsement of
concordance. i have already indicated that different
theories postulate discordance at different levels, and,
while concordance always seems to surface when it comes to
the important issue of the self, the differences between
theories are nonetheless important.
Moreover, today's discourse includes more than one
perspective on the modern family which rejects the
possibility of a harmonious self, one of these is of
course the genealogical tradition represented by Foucault
and Donzelot. Given the way these thinkers have indicted
"psy» techniques for their role in processes of
normalization, it is perhaps suprising that the
psychoanalytic school of thought also has as its basis the
idea of the self as a fundamentally discordant entity.
This tradition take its clue from a great thinker of
discordance, Sigmund Freud, and like him it has been very
successful at combi„ing both critique and celefaration ^
its analysis.
The differences between Freud and Foucault are, along
with the various differences and oppositions operative
within the psychoanalytic tradition, important here for
two reasons. First
,
they point to the fact that there is
Plently of room for disagreement once an approach of
discordance is adopted. Second, they are of great
relevance when it comes to the question of what politics
of child-rearing and personal life flows from the point of
view of discordance. This question is the focus in this
final chapter. I argue that an approach to this question
based on Freud can yield insight but is rooted in too
fixed a view of the dilemmas of discordance and is likely
to unduly prioritize the issue of "personality." This
leads to a defense of family (and a critique of family)
which is too centered on domestic dynamics. The fact of
modern culture's focus on the all-importance of family is
reinforced rather than called into question, and the
apparently extra-familial spheres of political culture,
political history, occupational structure and the like
tend to be treated as secondary. Moreover, when the
latter are given their proper due as factors in the
shaping of our dilemmas and the viability of various
changes that might be made, the psychological evidence
appears inconclusive with r^r-n <-l egard to the question of whatis to be done.
As an alternative, ! offer what , call , ..»inimalist „
defense of family, where „ fanlly ,. ^ ^^ ^
particular form of child care but instead simply a
relation of see distance to the state and to the public
realm where everything is equally everyone's business
The ideal of family, by this vieWj shoul(J^
only to a fairly skeletal view of what counts as the
neglect of children and of what counts as care necessary
to the development of humans as ethical selves. I should
emphasize that the point here is not that the defense of
the family should be minimalist in its vigor, only that it
should be so in the vision of "family, that is defended.
This means that we should avoid detailing what constitutes
a family and instead provide vastly increased across the
board support for all the individuals who care for and
protect children. People need to have the power to create
a variety of sorts of family in accordance with their own
judgments about their personal needs and their social
situation. We need perhaps to be a little less
-pro-
family,-' as this phrase is usually intended, and instead
to make our societies more pro-parent, pro-guardian, pro-
household and pro-children. This has the promise of
making families less a policed and normalizing realilty
and More of an enabUng ^ enpowering^ ^
changes at both the
..micro" level of ^^^ ^
together and raise children and the macro level of
economic policy and economic structure. x conclude this
chapter with a discussion of these changes and the role
that the state can (ands perhaps cannot, play in bringing
them about.
The Family and the Fnnnomics nf instinct
Christopher Lasch is one of today's well known followers
of Freud.
1 as I have already noted, his critique centers
on the way the modern family rationalizes that to which it
is a response
-"capitalism's devastation of all forms of
collective life." Lasch is concerned to support the
reversal of this devastation in the form of a socialist
polity "in which collective needs rather than private
profit determine both the form and content of production,
"
and according to him the modern family now helps to
Lasch sees himself as reasserting the more "radical"insights of Freud, a task made necessary by the "socialscience cant" which he says dominates the left and rightand which understands humans as "oversocialized" pure
«2?2J?*5
°f culture and yet as capable, in potential, ofradical freedom, entirely in control of themselves andtheir destiny. This is, of course, the "cant" of
concordance, and it is indeed a problem. See Haven , pp.
ii P *. 8 ?' and pP* 13 2"133. Lasch's other major worksare The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Tim**(New York: W.W.Norton, 1984) and The Culture of
Narcissism: Amer ican Life in an Acre of Diminishing
Expectations, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979).
defend, of the private family> ag he argues ^^democracy depends on the construction Qf , certain ^ ^
Principled self which only it _ Unfortunateiy
this wonderful ,hesis Qf ambigu . ty . s ^
that lasch, thanks in part to the version of Freudian
psychology he endorses and in part to problem inherent in
a psychoanalytic approach, privileges a particular for™ of
family as the family without adequate justification and so
fails to adequately challenge today's processes of
normalization. Lasch ends up advising us more or less to
simply reverse a supposed takeover of the family by the
outside forces engendered by capitalism. To attempt this
is simply to repeat society's privileging of family and so
to repeat that which rationalizes the capitalist
institutions Lasch opposes.
Socialization
- "The only function of the family that
matters"- means for Lasch the positive acquisition of
identity. 3 It involves the transformation of biologically
given sex into socially constructed gendered subjectivity.
Lasch asserts that this process, if done at its best,
creates humans as ethical beings who create and critique
2Haven
. p. xxi.
Haven
, p. 130. See Barrett and Mcintosh's discussion ofthe concept of "socialization/' The Anti-social Famil y
pp. 105-110. iiX '
authority according to principle. For Lasch, as for
Freud, this a messy and costly struggle whereby
civilization is imposed on the multiplicity of the self
and its infinite and contradictory erotic and aggressive
demands.
4 Life necessarily involves profound loss,
separation, dependence and guilt.
Children, says Lasch, will handle their struggle with
these dilemmas for the best if they grow up in an
"orderly, predictable, loving," and emotionally intense
relationship between themselves and their parents. 5 The
combination of love and authority in the same powerful,
and attractive, figures allows the child to achieve
"identification," which means the mastery of inner rage
and fear of authority. 6 such identification is said by
Lasch to be necessary if children are to develop past
shame (the fear of ridicule) to guilt (the fear of
parental disapproval and self-disapproval)
. Although he
does not put it this way, Lasch's idea of successful
socialization involves a kind of acceptance of
discordance. "Mature freedom," he says, involves a
In Freuds's words, "there are difficulties attaching tothe nature of civilization which will not yeild to any
attempt at reform." Civilization and Tts Discontents
,trans, by James Strachey (W. W. Norton, 1961), p. 70. See
also pp. 51-60 on the necessity of instinctual
renunciation.
5Haven, p. 164.
6Haven, p. 123.
recognition ofW s contradictory place in the natural
order of things." 7
Inch's concern is that socialization of this sort is
today being undefined and displaced by another sort one
that supports the powers that be by making principled
opposition rare. The problem
, he sayS/ . g ^ ^ ^
typical personality being created: people have weak egos
are opposed to authority p^,, are afraid Qf being^
to live up to any expectations, and are dominated by a
concern with the present and with mere survival. 8 People
are dominated, in other words, by society's standard of
the "realistic." Put in terms of psychological
development, Lasch's thesis is that children fail to
overcome an original dependence on the mother, and this
derails the identification process needed to properly
create the superego. The children of our "shame culture"
are deeply dependent, resentful, and resigned - in a
word, "Narcissistic." 9
7The Minimal Se1f
r p. 2 57.
8see The Minimal Self
r especially pp. 60-99.
9The home, says Lasch, has, like the rest of society, hasbeen reduced "to a state of warfare" (or rather aprecarious truce), because ~he father is afraid of "thedangers of close personal intercourse
.., rationalizingpassivity in the form of an ideology of non-binding
commitments." The then dominant mother imposes "her
madness on everybody else" (Haven , p. 157)
.
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This Narcissistic (or Minimalist") self is, says Lasch
preoccupied with personality and its harmony. Th i s
concern
"originates in the ego's need to assert itself
•••in order to counter the forces that seem bent on its
annihilation. "10 ^other way Qne might ^^ ^
course, is that the modern self is overly bent on the
pursuit of concord. And indeed Lasch considers the
transformation and distortion of Freud's ideas, so as "to
redefine psychoanalysis as a theory of behavior," to be a
result of this concern with harmony.
H
The theory of interpersonal relations bases itself onthe premise that personality constitutes not abattleground (Freud's more accurate perceo?ion\ wan integrated, harmonious whole. " P PtlQn) but
The "forces" that, according to Lasch, make the self
feel deeply threatened seem to be a combination of events
and interventions. The events he speaks of are
totalitarianism, nuclear weapons and death camps; these
have he says promoted despair about the meaning of
individual political action and commitment. Thanks mainly
to Donzelot, we already know something about the
interventions he is concerned with, in Lasch 's language,
managerial and professional classes have "invaded" the
10Haven . p. 66.
1:LHaven, p. 65.
12Haven, p. 66.
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nd
family in suport of the interests of capitalism, a ki
of dual movement by specialists ("doctors, psychiatrists
child guidance experts, officers of juvenile courts") and
by social science (anthropology, sociology and psychology)
has simultaneously upheld the importance of the family and
attacked it for its incompetence, destroying the
confidence of parents and facilitating the takeover of
family functions by the school, the peer group and these
same professionals. while the family is purported to be
different from the outside world of instrumental
interaction, it is not, says Lasch, thus setting up a
cycle of personal failures, outside advice and
intervention, and continued acquiescence to the
desirability or inevitability of those larger structures.
The contemporary family fails to uphold "values" or work
on "principles opposed to the ones that prevail
elsewhere.
"
13
Ultimately, however, Lasch attributes the modern pursuit
of harmony to capitalism's imposition of a particular
version of the public/private split, a version which is
based on the separation of home from work and of work from
leisure. The rise of mechanized and market-structured
modes of work has, of course, been an integral element in
the history of this separation, and Lasch (following Marx)
Haven , p. 143
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believes that these forms of work life lead to people's
feelings of powerlessness and internal division. 14 ^sch
moreover considers the removal of work from the home to he
a psychological calamity in itself.
identifies with his Lr^-« ' Child no lo™rer
authority in the^L^^? °Linte™^ thei?hV^T 1?^^^?"internalizes their authority at a^^ lndeed he
This calamity is according to Lasch manifested in the
trend toward the transitory coupling of adults and the
standoffishness of youth. Lasch believes that these
developments, far from signifying freedom (Shorter's
view), indicate a failure of today's family, along with
other social institutions, to enable people to come to
terms with separation and dependence. This is said by
Lasch to spell a greater conformity, a more fragile sense
of self, and more total control by the state.
It should be clear by now that Lasch 's critique of
contemporary perspectives on family is in many ways in
keeping with what I have said thus far; indeed I commend
him for emphasizing the inevitability of discord and
imposition. His approach to the whole issue, especially
his thoughts about what is needed, are, however, flawed in
14Haven . pp. 7-8
15Haven . p. 130.
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important respects. sone of these problem ste» fro„ the
particular approach to psychology that he adopts, and see
are .ore deeply rooted in the psychoanalytic stance to the
question of discord. To put this another way, there are
flaws in Inch's approach to questions of personality, and
there are problem inherent to any theory that focuses on
personality.
Concordance as Narcissi g™
Lasch's concern with personality is plain to see.
Whereas I have concerned myself with locating what I see
as the problematic assumptions of concord implicit in
various views, Lasch is concerned with the way some of
these same views are expressive of different malformed
personality types. There is first of all "the party of
the superego" (neo-conservatives such as Gilder)
, who are
criticized for falsely understanding freedom as the
destructive and exciting unleashing of raw impulse. They
are said to seek an escape from the dangers of freedom
through the punitive imposition of a moral law. 16 There
is next "the party of the rational ego" (liberals such as
Shorter) and "the party of Narcissus" (psychoanalytic
feminists, pacifists, environmentalists, and democratic
It hankers for the restoration of punitive sanctions
against disobedience, above all for the restoration offear" (The Minimal Self
r pp. 258-259).
socialists -
.....
„adyocates of a cuifcurai revoiutionn)
whom r.sch critici 2es for rejectlng dependence ^
the true
"definition of selfhood as tension, division
co„fliot ,.17 These groups ^
Misunderstand freedom as the end of a guilty conscience
Serais in asserting the ability of the self to bring the
social under its control, and radicals in denying the
boundaries between self and world.
in contrast to these
-pathological- points of view,
Lasch defends the Aristotelian conception of practice as
"Purposeful activity" because it understands that humans
are both connected to and apart from nature." Lasch
first distinguishes this notion from the
-instrumentalist,"
of liberals, which he points out forgets that we are
natural beings.
Instrumentalism regards the relation of ends andmeans as purely external, whereas the oldertradition, now almost forgotten, holds that thechoice of the means appropriate' to a given end has to
17The Min imal Se1f
r p . 2 58
18
va?n^^- eXam5^ Lasch ' s critique of the modern
5J
102<°? lnstrumental reason (The Minimi self p247) The Minimal Self, p. 2 55. Lasch in some ways
? *
tradition
her
q
Cri
^
ifies of modernity based on the classical. See Wilson Carey McWilliams, "On Equality as
ITtT/t 1 F?Undation for Community," The Moral ^nnff*?^of the American Republic
, Second Edition, Robert H.Horwitz, ed. (Charlottesville: University Press of
llu^^'J^V^^ Alasdair Maclntyre, After yj^tue: *
fco
d
T
ln
0
Mora
^
Theory (University of Notre Dame Press,1984). See also the discussion of the decline of the
concept of a "calling" in Bellah, et. al., Habits of theHeart
, pp. 65-71. —
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be^ons^dered as it contributes to internal goods as
On the other hand Lasch says that this "older tradition-
is also superior to the prevailing Narcissism of the
radical left, which overly eguates humans and nature m
contrast the internal goods which Aristotle speaks of are
said by L*sch to be best conceived of, not as the
realization of a true essence (as in fact Aristotle
thought) or as the achievement of a communion with nature
(as the radical left supposedly thinks)
, but as a
technique of social construction, as the development of
proper forms of "compensatory gratification. "20
Creadon °S °£ , the inpasse ° f narcissism is thec ati of cultural objects, "transitional obiects "Slm"ltane°usly restore a sense of connectionwith mothers and with mother nature and assert our
on
S
m:t
r
nerror
n
natur4.?i
thOUt **n*ln° ™
What Lasch is doing here is restating Aristotle in terms
of Freudian psychology. Thus, while Lasch says that the
creation of transitional objects requires the
rescusitation of work and politics as realms of the
development of excellence, he doesn't speak very much
about his vision of work and politics. Instead he spends
19The Minimal Self, pp. 254-255.
20The Minimal Self
,
p. 246.
The Minimal Self, p. 246. On the human relationship to
nature, see also The Minimal Self , p. 256.
his time discussing its puported psychological
precondition: the coming to terms with the ambiguous human
relation to mothers and "mother nature."
I suppose that Lasch considers "mother" and "mother
nature" to be universal categories that apply with equal
force to the existential psychological situation of both
men and women. What he asserts, however, is that a being
called "man" must simultaneously master "mother" nature
and acknowledge his dependence on both "her" and actual
mothers if "he" is to achieve mature freedom. This seems
to me to amount to the claim, however obliquely made, that
a mature freedom depends on the maintenance of the
categories of man as culture and as human being and woman
as nature and as both more and less than human. If women
are so identified, is not the call to assert mastery over
nature also a call for men to assert mastery over women,
who represent mothers and nature? in fact the association
of women with nature constitutes a central prop by which
women have, in modern times at least, been excluded from
public life and been forced to speak or establish some
kind of identity for themselves largely within terms made
by men. 22
See Sherry B. Ortner, "Is Female to Male as Nature is toCulture?," Women, Culture and Society, pp. 67-87. Ortn«r
makes the case that the distinction of male/culture versusfemale/nature has served cross-culturally and universally
to ground the oppression of women. This may be the case,
but, given the difficulty of what constitutes oppression'
in different cultures, and given the unique content
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Perhaps a distinction between women and men along the
lines of nature and culture could, within a different
system of power, operate in a new way, with different
effects less prejudicial to women, or perhaps it could be
overcome
- left behind - as changes in attitudes to
nature mesh with changes in conceptions of selves and
gender. Lasch, however, does not make the case for the
former or the latter. Nor does he acknowledge that the
distinction is linked in any way to the problems faced by
women
.
In fact Lasch shows a considerable lack of sensitivity
to gender issues. This is indicated by the way he speaks
simply of socialization when he is in fact referring to
the boy's internalization of the father's authority. He
seems to see the problem of mature freedom in terms of the
problems male children face in dealing with dependence on
mothers, just as he in effect identifies the supposed
decline of the right kind of socialization with the
decline of the father's, rather than the parent's,
authority. 23 Additionally, Lasch spends little time*************
imputed by the enlightenment to "nature," to "culture "
and to the distinction between them, I limit myself hereto the claim that the assimilation of "women" to naturehas come to be more prejudicial to women as the
enlightenment idea of humans as subjects who center the
world and administer nature has become dominant.
23Hayen, p. 162. While Lasch says "The justice of women'sdemand for equality remains too obvious to ignore" ( Haven ,
p. xvi)
,
he follows Freud in talking mostly about the
psychic battles of little boys, rather than little girls,
and he argues that the psychic development girls must go
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be
considering the ^.ti™, of „hat else families could
besides patriarchal or invaded, and this despite the
considerable literature on the subject generated by an
alternative Freudian school of thought : psychoanalytic
feminism. 24 He fQr example say£ aimost abQut ^
school's central proposition, which is the idea that the
near-universal reliance on women for child care reproduces
what La.ch would call instruct alist raen and Narcissistic
women. One might especially expect him to deal directly
with Nancy Chodorow's argument, as she connects more egual
child-rearing arrangements with the achievement of the
very goal endorsed by Lasch i-h-,+- v^-t-wy W5CR tnat both men and women
strike a balance between, and comes to terms with,
*************
SceslLnv^Lf^Unt6r th6ir b°dies and become womennec s arily makes them more passive than men (Haven , pp.
^important examples of this literature include NancvChodorow "Family Structure and Feminine Personal i?^'p«fn^£ulture__aj^ Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and
Univ^«
L
rP5ere ' edS * <stan*>«^ California: Stanford
nJ Z fk ?
PreSS
'
19?4); Nancy Chodorow, The ReproductionQQlotherjLnq: Psychoanalysis and th ft .gonijT^Tr^-nrlcr(University of California Press, 1978); DorothyDmnerstein, The Mermai d and the Mjnotaur: SgxuaJ
^c?qeo!ntr a]?d -^m-an Malajse (New York: Harper and Row,19,6); Stephanie Engel, "Femininity as Tragedy," Socialist
SFJS*'-?0, 53 ' 198 °* PP * 77 "104; and Jessica Benj^mTn^Authority and the Family Revisited: Or, A World Without
iRl!j?
rS
'
Egg-GgEmap Critique, no. 13 (Autumn, 1978), pp.
!06
dependence and separation. 25 lMOhf however( ^
and proceeds to accuse her of rejecting rationality and
selfhood altogether. 26
Lasch's insensitivity on this score is in a way
suprising, given that, like Freud, he rejects the idea
that nurturance and purposive rationality are respectively
"male- and "female" characteristics. instead he considers
these options to be equally open to men and women, even as
he believes that both sexes are also equally given to the
errors of pursuing either self-sufficiency or mutuality
and relatedness, in responses to life's dilemmas. 27 But
Lasch's failure to consider alternative gender
arrangements makes more sense if we take his remarks on
"mother" and "mother nature" to mean that he favors
female-centered child-rearing arrangements as necessary to
achieve proper socialization (selfhood). This
interpretation is reinforced by Lasch's persistent use of
"Family Structure and Feminine Personality," Women
,
Culture, and Society, ed. by Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo
and Louise Lamphere (Stanford University Press, 1974).
Lasch criticizes the entire "party of Narcissus" for
rejecting purposeful activity entirely, along with its
instrumental version. The Minimal Self , p. 244, p. 247,
and p. 253. For a sympathetic reading of Lasch on this
point, see Kent M. Brudney, "Christopher Lasch and the
Withering of the American Adam," Political Theory, 15, 1
(February, 1987), p. 134.
2;The Minimal Self , p. 245.
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the word
.Recline.. „he„ speaking of ^ famUy
_
28
ot this he has been accused of supporting
"patriarchy ^
Whether this is fair or not depends on what one means by
the term. ^ch is not opposed (at least explicitly, to
economic equality for ween. He instead opposes the
equalisation of child care
-under existing economic
conditions" because, by his reasoning, it would only
result in a more politically vulnerable personality and
worse care for the young. 30 He sees ^ ^ ^
a defense of "patriarchy., but merely as the concern that
the authority of the mother will follow the example of the
authority of the father and gradually disappear, leaving
coniiX;/^ 2 ?; -There is a c°ntradiction here, as Lasch
as ErJ=?==*«^rats-ur^
declined L rLr-^ *?C™* the n00! as the latter
very well, so it is not clear how it could have declinpJIt is of course not contradictory to endorse In "idea?" nfsocialization and then argue that we approximate it less
ou?
n
It lilt**
\
bUt th
i
faCtS do not ^ar Sis thesif
.J'
eas\ ,?ot enough to merit Lasch 's privileqinq ofthe family, which he says has been "invaded!" This
v^uSarv
fa
m:re
y/^geStS that the oi more
the otdll' 1 auto"om?us vis-a-vis power relations and
MrTnfn h ' mu truly Priv*te . See Barrett andMcintosh, The_Anti-social Family, p. m and p. 115.
Familyf°p.
e
^
iPle Barrett and Mcintosh, The Anti-socia!
30Haven
r p. xvi
.
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nothing between the individual and the impersonal
interests of society. 31
On the other hand, Lasch's model of successful
socialization commits him to a defense of a breadwinner
and homemaker/nurturer division of family responsibility.
He and psychoanalytic feminists agree that these
arrangements tend to create strong ego-boundaries and a
weak sense of sexual identification in men, but he
strongly suggests a connection between these personality
characteristics and the creation of humans capable of
principled resistance to authority, while they criticize
them instead as both rendering men "psychologically
defensive and insecure," and guaranteeing male
"sociocultural superiority . "32 Lasch's argument can,
then, be said to be "patriarchal" in a certain sense, in
that he seems to assume a connection between the
achievement of mature freedom and the establishment of
"traditional" (modern) "male" and "female"
personalities. 33
Hay_en, pp. 115-116. To Lasch those who attack the (bynow largely egalitarian) family as authoritarian orpatriarchal miss the point and contribute to a process of
crisis and decay by undermining the credibility of the
"parent's" authority. The point they supposedly miss isthe problem of the passive and unprincipled personality.
32Chodorow, "Family Structure and Feminine Personality "
p. 66. 11
3 3 Lasch's critique of Narcissism can, in other words, belooked at as a critique of a "feminization" of
personality. It is because of this that Stephanie Engel
and Barrett and Mcintosh say that Lasch arrives "at a
209
Is the recovery of paternal authority necessary if we
are to achieve a recognition of discord? Were Hegel and
Aristotle right about the need for a strict division of
roles, even if the cost is much higher than either of the,
thought? I suppose that this is possible, but the price
to be paid is very high, especially for women, and I am
not at all convinced. m fact, Chodorwow's proposition,
that the homemaker/breadwinner division in modern
conditions perpetuates a disempowering pursuit of condord,
seems much more plausible to me.
It is hard to squarely confront Lasch on this issue
because his only overt claim regarding gender equality is
that a tradeoff between equality for women and mature
freedom exists now, "under current economic conditions.
«
Even on this count, however, Lasch is unconvincing. if
families are anywhere near as invaded by outside forces
and principles as he says they are, it is hard to see how
there is much to lose from women joining the work force
(as they already have)
. In fact I am inclined to agree
with Suzanne H. Woolsey and Mary Howell that children with
two parent-caretakers are benefited if both of those
*************
stance that systematically devalues women's experience as
well as feelings of attachment, mutuality, identification
and relatedness." See Barrett and Mcintosh, The Anti-
^Q^al_J^mily, p. 124, and see Stephanie Engel,
"Femininity as Tragedy," p. 88.
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caretakers work (at jobs that provide satisfaction and
self-esteem)
.
34
Suoh good jobs are of course a rarity, and the
compatibility of »odern occupational structures and the
creation of "empowered" or "mature" personalities is very
much open to question. This is however no reason to
bemoan the
-.decline" of the family or the entry of women
into the work force. On the other hand it is also not
enough (although still important) to call for more
equalized child care, if industrial society means that
bad, neglectful, or politically stifling forms of
upbringing will prevail regardless of how equally their
burdens and joys are shared. These considerations should
lead us also to ask questions of, for example, political
economy, and in general ask after the implications of
modernity for children. This is where some of the limits
inherent to a psychoanalytic approach become apparent.
Problems with the Psychoanalytic Aoprn^p
Neither Freud nor his followers engage in enough
criticism of the enlightenment understanding of nature as
fundamentally other to the subject. Rather they repeat
See Woolsey, "Pied-Piper Politics and the Child-CareDebate," Daedalus 106, no. 2 (Spring, 1977): pp. 141-142-
and Howell, "Employed Mothers and Their Families,"
Pediatrics
, 52, no. 2 and no. 3 (August and September,
1973). See also Ourselves and Our Children
r p. 195.
its terms by thinking of nature as both the U»it and
means to the satisfaction of individual instincts. Thus
we are told that there is a single and permanent dilemma
built into the human condition. The guestion becomes one
cf how to create the
-personality- that win best mediate
between the never directly seen
-instincts- and the
culture and
-sociability- that are valued only for the
instinctual satisfaction which we could not have without
them. The search for the social (in L*sch's terms, the
ideal of Narcissus) is turned into a universal and
inevitable psychological feature - it is said to be Eros
itself.
in Lasch's case the effect of this is to undermine his
own emphasis on the importance of political action as a
means to reorganize the world of work. First, his stress
on the central importance of the "right" family life acts
to reinforce both the depoliticizing idea that a good
family life is everything and the disempowering sense
people have that they don't measure up. This could pave
the way for the increased "management" of families.
Second, Lasch questions the assumption of the benign
character of the social by ruling out entirely the idea
that social and political life are somehow natural to
humans. He reduces ideals to "substitute gratifications."
Given this approach, he cannot translate his concern that
we become beings with principles into . statenent of^
these principles should be. virtue is seen as an
adaption, not as intrinsic excellence. Another way of
putting this is that Aristotle does not translate well
into the language of an economics of instinct, a more
promising approach from the point of view of enabling
Political action would be to argue that social and
political life are of intrinsic worth but at a cost. i„
other words, Aristotle should instead be rewritten from a
point of view of discordance.
As I have already said, Lasch's focus on the category of
"personality" as a means of responding to a relatively
fixed human condition also leads him to unnecessarily
pessimistic conclusions about the compatibility between
equality for women and men and the worthwhile
transformation of the realms of politics and work. This
makes his work vulnerable to appropriation by various
conservative political forces which he opposes. On this
score psychoanalytic feminism presents an preferable
alternative, as it points out that an increase in the
father's authority is not a prerequisite to the
development of politically empowered personalities. On
the other hand, by virtue of its similar reliance on
instinctual theory, psychoanalytic feminism tends to
follow Lasch in reifying the dream of a home as a feature
°f every human, not an assumption that can be more or less
problematized within different sets of social and
discursive practices. The focus is thus still on the
proper resolution of conflicts within the self, instead of
°n, say, the way
-homesickness" is nourished and the
resolution of conflicts is emphasized (by, among other
things, psychoanalysis). 35
One way to get at the problems with a psychoanalytic
perspective is to compare it to a genealogical one. Both
Donzelot and Lasch find a positive connection between the
weakening of family ties and new forms of social
management, but Donzelot 's approach points not toward
"personality" but toward structures, structures which
converge to locate people in private struggles managed by
an assortment of interventions at various levels.
Donzelot calls on us to challenge disciplinary practices
based on ideas of family, not to restore (or for that
matter abolish) the idea of family. 36
3 Psychoanalytic feminism has made for some powerfulaccounts and critique) of the creation of genderedsubjectivity. See for example Carol Gilligan? in aDifferent Voice: Psychological Theory anci Wnn,on~
Development (Harvard University Press, 1982). fhave
rkil0^ rath^ than Psycho^alytic feminism in myc itique for reasons of space and because his views are
5o
r
^- * I?
1
?
6
'
Zt is therefore more important to met distinguish between his perspective and my own. For agood general discussion of psychoanalytic feminism seeElsntam, Public Man. Private Woman , pp. 285-97.
3 6Barrett and Mcintosh criticize Donzelot and Lasch alikefor basing their criticism of the contemporary family on
an idealization of an "invaded" patriarchal family.While Donzelot would do better if did not so blithely
A genealogical perspective does not preclude one from
following Usch in his claim that humans will always be
tempted by some sort of ideal of complete harmony, and
Donzelot and l^sch clearly agree that the current fact of
this temptation is put to controlling political use, but
this is not to say that the situation is fixed, either in
terms of the harmony sought or the dangers involved. The
contemporary situation is the result of the combined
effect of many "discursive practices;" it results, in
other words, from the circulation and the absence of many
ideals, the fact of many practices, and the reality of
many constraints and liberties.
The fact that Lasch follows psychoanalysis in seeing
power as a negative law-like force over against desire
means that he cannot countenance the possibility that we
live within a situation (a series of discursive practices)
that give the dilemma-bound nature of human existence a
particular shape. 37 Perhaps, for example, it is only by************* 11
refer to the family of the "acien reaimp" as if it was not
construction, it is a mistake to equate him withLasch on this score. Donzelot 's critique of contemporarytimes can, because of his concern to reveal the family asa construction, be seen to refer as an alternative not somuch to the patriarchal family of old as to a possiblefuture in which "family," as a concept that organizes
nouseholds, is more contested and more varied in itsformulations than today.
3 7Foucault points out that psychoanalysis follows the
psychiatry that preceded it and Western political thoughtin general in that it understands power in a "juridico-
discursive" way, as that which says "no." Psychoanalysis,
says Foucault, only changed the repressive hypothesis byputting forward a new understanding of desire, as that
virtue of a particular way of thinking and speaking that
it appears as if the acceptance of freedom and the losses
it entails depends on the fixing of
-woman" as the mother
whom
-man- must both master and depend on. And perhaps
this way of thinking and speaking is already receding
behind us.
In fact there are many plausible notions of "maturity"
and "mature freedom," none of which is uncontestably
superior or politically neutral. For this reason it is
wise to proceed with caution when counseling reform in
accordance with any detailed model of the "best"
socialization. Instead reforms should be based on rather
minimal ideas about what constitutes good upbringing and
neglect, and should aim for the most part simply to create
space for people to have more say in their domestic
arrangements than they do now.
The Import of Alternative Modes of Childrearing
What, then, are the "minimal" ideas about good
upbringing which I endorse? Before answering this
directly, I want to further make the case that the theory
*************
which is only by virtue of, rather than despite, the
negative work of power. See The History of Sexuality
, pp.
81-91 and pp. 100-101.
and evidence as to what constitutes good upbringing points
in certain directions but is nonetheless inconclusive and
ambiguous on several counts. Rather than survey the vast
and varied an literature that pertains to this subject, i
limit myself to a review of some of the various and
opposing arguments about more and less "collective" modes
of child rearing and their effects on personality.
I should first say a few words about the terms I use in
this chapter, as there are of course a host of possible
living and child rearing arrangements. Following the
aUth°rS
° f Ourselves and our Chilean
, I use "cooperative
family living" to refer to a group of families who agree
to share some acitivities and some living space but retain
their separate identities. 3 8 There is also "communal
family living" where a group of families and individuals
choose to tie themselves more closely to each other by
sharing a house or perhaps a piece of land. At the end of
the continuum is "communal society." Here I have in mind
practices that make the community and its representatives
stand in the relationship of the protector and caretaker
for the children. In the Kibbutzim of Isreal and the
early Oneida community of New York state this is
accomplished first by having children live in a children's
house of some sort and visit (perhaps everyday) with their
38pp. 179-185
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biological parents, and second by organizing the daily
life of adults such that biological or familial
connections with others are not all that relevant. This
means some kind of relatively communal form of
householding, where work, play and the two together take
Place within the public space of the whole group.
Since the issue at hand is the effects of child rearing
on personality, I focus here on the question of the
differences between communal society and the private
nuclear family (partly because these two forms have been
the object of a great deal of study)
. LaSch of course is
part of this debate, as his critique of the "decline of
parental authority" commits him to an opposition to
collective child rearing, which he says is already with us
to a degree. His psychological theory is, however, like
many others in that it fails to settle the issue, and in
the meantime poses some threats of its own.
I begin with the argument of Barrett and Mcintosh who,
in opposition to Lasch, call for "increased social
responsibility" in the raising of children. Given that
they speak favorably of the kibbutzim and the Oneida
community, and since they argue that these communitities
teach us that "the strengthening of community requires the
weakening of family ties," I assume that they consider
communal society to be the ideal form of such social
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responsibility. 39 They stop short> Qf
explicitly for industrialized countries to adopt such
arrangements. This is perhaps done so as to avoid the
difficult question of whether or not the lessons
apparently taught by some small and self-selected
argricultural communities need to be reconsidered in the
light of very different conditions, it also might be
because their critique of the contemporary family does not
(despite their claims) add up to an argument against the
private family per se.
For example, one of the points they (Barrett and
Mcintosh) make is that child-rearing in the family tends
to produce "a highly individualistic personality
structure. "40 The details of their argument, however,
only make the claim that such a personality is the typical
product of "an enclosed family, with one parent [the
mother] mainly responsible for the children." 41 Then,
after they go on to describe this personality — one
marked by "a lack of concern for group support and
approval or group interests" — they compare it not to the
typical personality of children raised in other sorts of
families but instead to that of the typical collectively
The Anti-social Family
,
p. 53.
The Anti-social Family
,
p. 51.
The Anti-social Family
, p. 51.
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reared child, who is «ih <-„ v» said to have a greater dependence on
the peer group and more security of self. 42 This^
important questions unanswered, and it makes it all the
easier for them to jump to their conclusion - that the
family is "anti-social., and should be transcended.
Barrett and Mcintosh in other words fail to make a
thorough or convincing case that we ought to move to more
collective forms of child care. This does not, of course
»ean that we ought not to do so, and Barrett and Mcintosh
are on firmer ground when they argue that the typical
collectively reared child is different, rather than
inadequate, as compared to the typical family raised
child. This, at any rate, is a reasonable conclusion to
draw from Bruno Bettelheim's assessment of child-rearing
on the kibbutz, using Erik Erikson's model of psychic
development, Bettelheim says that that growing up on the
kibbutz creates an easing of feelings of shame and doubt,
as well as an absence of adolescent crisis. 43 He also
says that on the other hand the kibbutz personality has a
tendency to be
-flat," to lack imagination. "4 It does not
4 2Chodorow makes a similar move when she compares
collective child-rearing to exclusive mothering, but shemore sensibly limits her to the claim that "exclusive
single parenting is bad for mother and child alike." TheReproduction of Mothering
, p. 217.
4 3
icJj?? children of tn* r>rpam (Toronto, Ontario: Macmillan,
,
1969), pp. 313-317. "
^
4The Children of the Dream
, p. 172. See also Elshtain'sdiscussion of Bettelheim's work, Public Man. Private
Woman
. pp. 294-296.
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"deepen" as a result of having resolved crises
successfully.45 His evaluation ^^ ^
ter»s of EriKson's model
, despa . r is avQided ^ some
to personal identity, e.otional intimacy, and individual
achievement.
"
46
Such a "cost" is, of course, no small matter, as
Bettelheim knows. But on the other hand one cannot
conclude from his study that kibbutz-raised children are
not in some ways ethical, caring selves. The evidence
does nothing to impune Hauerwas' and Noddings' claim that
ethical development depends on experiences of caring that
children (and adults) have within ongoing and reciprocal
relations with specific others, but it suggests thac these
others do not have to be parents or a single set of adult
guardians. According to Bettelheim, "the kibbutz example
suggests that the infant can achieve basic trust even if
there is much less sameness and continuity of the outside
provider than we assume is needed, so long as continuous
providing is guaranteed. "47 of course it is one thing to
establish "basic trust" and another to establish "a
reciprocal relationship of caring," but in the kibbutz it
5The Children of the Dream , p. 315.
6The Children of the Dream
,
p. 318.
7The Children of the Dream
,
p. 66.
seems that the latter is established between the child on
the one hand and the Kibbutz, as mediated through peers
caretakers, and parents, on the other. 48
Adults can of course be uncaring, and communal or
cooperative arrangements stand the risk of encouraging
neglect or at least making it more convenient. The fact
that there are plenty of "parents" available could mean
that people only parent when they feel like it, and there
may be times when nobody feels like it. This is more than
an abstract concern, as many actual communes have been
based on a philosophy which sees children as more or less
equal to adults (able to choose parents) and which
understands liberation as more or less the absence of
obligation. 49 There is no shortage of psychological
evidence when it comes to showing that children are
confused and often disturbed as a result of being "freed"
from the certainty of reliance on and obligation to
specific others. 50
48The Children of the Dream
r pp . 70-71.
* 9See Alice S. Rossi's critique of communal child-rearing,A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting, Daedalus 106, no. 2(Spring, 1977), pp. 13-I6. See also R. Thamm, BevondMarriage and the Nuclear Family (San Francisco, 1975), p.124; R.M. Kanter, D. Jaffe, and D.K. Weisberg, "Couplinq,Parenting, and the Presence of Others: Intimate
Relationships in Communal Households," The Family
Coordinator 24, no. 4 (1975): 433-52; and Firestone TheDialectic of Sex
r p. 233.
50Rossi, "A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting," p. 15.
This just goes to show how often people's attempts to
live in a radically different way end up replicating much
of the society they are explicitly rejecting. People who
seek to "turn parenthood on and off and exchange children
as well as sexual partners" are at one level rejecting the
norms of "the family," but at another level they are
embracing the liberal vision of the family as a voluntary
grouping of like-minded people who get together for mutual
satisfaction. 51 Alice S. Rossi in fact argues that the
"sexual script" and the "parenting script" of many
communes is also found in the new family sociology; both,
she says, seem "to be modeled on what has been a male
pattern of relating to children, in which men turn their
fathering on and off to suit themselves..." 52
Modes of SMldJSearlag and Social Conformity
I conclude from this that we do not need to promote
models of healthy psychological development so much as
The kibbutz philosophy is quite unlike this in that it
entails the acceptance of strong obligations to the group
and a disapproval of extramarital sex ( The Children of fcheDream, p. 51) . Kibbutzniks are ready and willing to make
great sacrifices for the children (p. 131). Bettelheim
observes, however, that the radical child-rearing
arrangements of the kibbutz were an "afterthought." He
surmises that "a society that had no interest in children"
had to adjust to the fact of their existance in a way that
allowed the adults to continue with the intense collective
existence that was so important to them (pp. 17-18)
.
"A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting," p. 16.
critique bogus philosophies of liberation which make
obligations to children optional, and tear down, weaken,
or reform the societal structures that reflect and enforce
these philosophies (such as the occupational and housing
systems)
.
One might counter perhaps that this cannot be
done without transforming childcare so as to effect
personality for the better. This brings back the question
raised by Lasch: is there a relationship between modes of
childrearing and the development of an ability either to
acknowledge discord or engage in resistance to the demands
of one's community? 53
In fact it is (fortunately) no easy thing to manufacture
conformism, as the relationship of child-rearing practices
to the development of a political culture is quite
complex. On the other hand, the manufacture of
5 3 •This issue is complicated by the fact that socialdiscipline, while always impositional to some degree, is a
necessary part of human life. People should be capable of
resisting demands made by their community, but which ones?What is conformism to some are the minimal requirements of
social order or morality to others. For my part, I don't
want children growing up to take high levels of inequality
for granted as the only "realistic" way to organize
society, and I am upset that so many people insist that
all pain is justified, that we live in an entirely moral
universe, and that things can be made so right some day
that we won't need to put up with politics any more. On a
more affirmative note I want to people to be taught trust,
kindnes, cooperation and social responsibility. Of course
not everyone will agree with my idea of what discplines of
the self are acceptable or worthwhile, nor can I
demonstrate in some final way that I am right; thus I must
live with the fact that even the goals I cherish the most
are contestable.
nonconform and political^ ^ ^
task, consider again the case of the kibbutzim.
Bettelheim says that kibbut2 ^^ ^ ^
space to carry "on an internal, private monologue (or
dialogue," with themselves, and this he says cosines with
the lack of deep-seated differences among kibbutz members
to produce an inability to conceive of themselves as
different than thev are Thio *.y
'
ls m turn means a lack of
political imagination.
[There is] less doubt about the validii-v „u *.
says. Hence the greater inne si
Y
o"ut also™
6
later on, the only limited ability to aceot^ni'
I!mI?L
lnt
" ^
lid bUt 0ne ' s -n wh?ch n
JSi ™ i- - PaClty t0 deal With hypothetical Sectionsthat out in question one's own values or way^of
From the point of view of discordance, this is a very
serious criticism of the kibbutz way of life, but it is
not clear either that familial child-rearing does not
carry similar risks in some contexts or that the results
observed by Bettelheim flow from collective child-rearing
per se. 55 On the first score, the contemporary U.S., with
54The Children of the Dream
,
p. 173.
55From a psychoanalytic feminist point of view, thekibbutz offers an experiment of very limited utility in
assessing alternatives. The "meteplot" (those who overseethe care of the children in the children's houses) are all
women. Rossi points out that "men are rarely involved inthe care of the very young," in communes that prescribe
the equal sharing of child care. "A Biosocial Perspective
on Parenting," p. 25.
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its private households, is certainly no bastion of non-
conform (even if the hero who bucks the crowd while
affirming good old American values is a staple of popular
culture). This is, as we have discussed, partly because
of the effects of the family and its location in a class
society. The family is heavily valorized as the locus
both of harmony and fulfillment and of autonomy and
personal effectiveness, but life is organized such that
the family (like the rest of society) fails for the most
part to provide these things. People often feel isolated
and ineffectual, and these are not the conditions that
breed principled political opposition or a repudiation of
prevalent social norms.
A good deal has been said to this effect in the
psychological literature. Many investigators for example
agree with Urie Bronfenbrenner that "a warm, constricting
mother-child relationship maximizes dependency and
produces a child who is readily socialized to adult
standards." 56 Jerome Kagan has spoken of the
disempowering effects of class differences as mediated
through the family. He says that the situation of the
lower-class child is akin to that of the later-born child,
just as the middle-class child shares features with the
Bronfenbrenner, with the assistance of John C. Condry,
Jrw Two Worlds of Childhood: U.S. and U.s.s.R (New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), p. 70.
son
*»t born. The children of the former reauze
they have little of what the culture and/or their family
values, and then try to hide the resulting perceived
inadequacy. Kagan says that in the lower-class child thi
leads to "a readiness to take risks, an easier dispositi
for aggression, and a tendency to assign responsibility
for failure to external events. "57 The middle-class and
the first born child, on the other hand, "is pushed to
differentiate himself from the lower-class youngster once
he recognizes his presence, probably durng the early
school years. "58 The resul^ ^ ^ ^
less feeling of inadequacy but a more cautious and
conformist outlook.
On the second score (the relationship of collective
rearing and conformism)
, certain features of kibbutz
upbringing help to develop self-confidence, and so point
in the direction not of conformism but rather its
opposite. For example, according to Bettelheim children
who feel no good compared to their parents (typical of
western middle-class families) experience more shame and
internalize rules more throughly than the children of the
kibbutz, who want only to measure up to their much closer
1977V p
hi
50
in ^ Family/ " Daedalus - 106, no. 2 (Spring,
58
"The Child in the Family," p. 53.
Peers. * The result
, ne sayS/ ^ less ^
Kibbutzniks than among typical westerners. This may lead
to an ability to resist which is not immediately evident
as those who do not like it on the kibbutz can leave and'
often do (this in itself is an act of courage and
criticism which requires political imagination).^ This
also makes it unclear how best to interpret the tremendous
unanimity on the kibbutz. Were the kibbutzim to
constitute a whole society that somehow had to either
accomodate, normalize and/or repress all its members,
there might be a good deal more difference present. The
kibbutz under those conditions might of course also fail,
or fail to be in any fundamental sense true to the
original kibbutz mission. it may be, then, that (as
Bettelheim suggests) the lessson the kibbutz teaches is
the desirability of multiple child rearing arrangements in
any single society. "it is a fine system for some and not
for others." 6
1
In conclusion, while Lasch is on to something when he
claims that collective child-rearing is already with us to
a degree and has serious malignant conformist effects, the
key issue is one of concordance and normalization, not of
The Children of the Dream
,
p. 311.
The Children of the Dream , p. 295.
The Children of the Dream , p. 299.
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socialization and personality .« All sorts of
"personality types," including the guilt-based "ethical-
individual which Lasch defends, can potentially be put to
service toward the ends of order. 63 Nor is Lasch very
helpful when he posits parental authority as the only
alternative to "the socialization of reproduction." There
are in fact a host of possible forms of upbringing which
are consistent with the formation of an ethical self and
are uncertain or at least mixed in their political
implications. 64 The most important question we need to
9
k
these
.
llnes Lasch's thesis could be construed notas the bemoaning of the ascendency of the "feminine*"personally but simply as the claim that a new anS longoverdue valorization of experiences and personality traitslong thought of as "female" does somehow, in today's
context, play into the hands of, or provide a foundationtor, a new authoritarianism. Given the entirety ofLasch ;s work, I think this is a bit generous, but it
certainly is an idea to be found in his work. See Kent MBrudney, "Christopher Lasch and the Witherinq of theAmerican Adam."
63The current order was, for example, created by people
with the typical "male" and "female" personalities
engendered by the socialization process which Lasch
compares favorably to that of today. At one level, it isimportant to accuse Lasch of sexism because he fails to
ask by what system of the construction of gender we will
produce the kind of individuals who will engage in the
principled resistance he says that we need. At another
level the important question is instead how to structure
orders so that they have room for resistance.
64Kagan goes so far as to say "...it may be impossible to
state the principles underlying functional relations
between specific parental practices and particular
behavior in the child, except, perhaps, in the extreme,
where consistently harsh physical abuse creates serious
phsyical distress" ("The Child in the Family," p. 39).
ask about our rearing of children is not what personality
we create but in what manner, and toward what ends, both
adults and children are subjected to disciplines and
assimilated to norms.
The difference between these alternatives is perhaps
subtle, but nonetheless important. Normalization does of
course involve the structuring of self, and so the making
of "personality," but the point is to set one's sights at
taming forces of normalization, not simply at redirecting
socialization. We can perhaps go so far as to imagine an
order with reduced requirements regarding personality, or
for that matter one where personal style is less
valorized. We ought not limit ourselves to a comparison
of selves, as if we could pick the best one.
From a point of view concerned with concordance and
normalization, the private family gets a mixed assessment.
It provides many with much that is worthwhile and not
easily replaced, but at a significant cost - some costs
being born by all and some especially born by women, by
marginal economic groups, and by the institutionalized.
My overall conclusion is that we should, while working
within the framework of private households, aim to create
space (provide support) for more people to have more say
in the particulars of their domestic arrangements than
they do now.
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JUalm Accost of tuo nrnaLauaUtap
For all my criticism cf psychological approaches to the
Politics o f the fanily
, , do endorse
_
as s ^ saidj
"mxnimal" ideas about what constitutes
"good" upbringing
and these are not without their political implications, t
begin with the words of Jean Elshtain which 1 cited in
chapter two, that people are (1, in need of Uving anong
others
-in relations of concrete particularity," and (2)
bound by "an imperative
...to discover, to understand and
to create meaning. "65 ^
, regd here ^ ^
come to be (and continue to live) in a process of identity
formation (and reformation and adjustment)
. This involves
the creation of meaning and requires the presence of
specific others. Whatever the culture, children have
crises, experience stress, and have to cope with anxiety.
Their questions are "who am l?,» »„hat am I?,» "what is
the world?," and, very early on, "what good am I?
Distinctions of self and other, good and bad, desirable
and undesirable, and alike and different, come very
naturally and are reflectively applied by the child both
to her or himself and to others. 66 Children compare
themselves to others, make attachments to significant
"Public Man. Pri vate Woman
, p. 318.
66Kagan, "The Child in the Family," pp. 34-35.
others, perceive that certain attributes are desirable
ludge themselves according to whether or not they have
these attributes, and ma*e an effort to fashion themselves
so as to achieve a modicum of self-certainty and self-
value. An essential part of this process of becoming a
self is the development of a narrative about oneself; this
story becomes partly constitutive of the self; «i» exist;
for example, partly by virtue Qf ^^ ^.^ ^ ^
'
which tells me who »I- am. This story is filled with the
meaningful and the symbolic, it involves judgments, and
not just accounts; it is a memory of feelings as well as
events.
Even according to this minimal psychology normalization
is unavoidably a part of life; for to form a narrative-
based vision of oneself is to some degree to impose a form
on the self (or, one might better say, on the body) which
accords somehow with particular visions of what a human
should be. This inevitability of normalization is, put in
these terms, nothing more than the inherent ambiguity of
morality and the necessarily moral nature of human
identity. The only options we have (if we even have
them), concern how tightly drawn our identities are, how
fully responsible we are to a model of a coherent self,
how much slack is permitted by the larger order when it
comes to identity formation and transformation, and, of
course, the contents of the moral judgments we
internalize.
It follows from this that children at a minimum need a
certain level of predictability and sense in the world -
inner and outer
- which they experience, one cannot come
to be as a self in a particular world if what one does
seems arbitrary in relation to what else happens. Perhaps
-ore importantly, children need the means to develop and
sustain some good judgments about themselves. This might
mean roles to emulate, valued activity to perform, or the
apparently non-contigent and deep-seated approval of
significant others to merit. Modern society has made for
an emphasis on the latter, as identification with roles is
seen to unduly constrict autonomy, and as children, and
young adults, have been deprived of participation in
clearly productive or valued activity. 67
Even this minimal psychology suggests that the modern
desire for autonomy has been partially self-defeating
(perhaps I should say it has been
-taken advantage of),
as the focus on love intensifies the private family space,
makes caretakers vulnerable to normalizing advice and
assistance, and in general helps to point people towards
harmony and away from politics and conflict (see my
arguments in chapter two)
.
67Kagan, "The Child in the Family," pp. 40-43.
233
Adults also need roles to emulate, valued activity to
perform, and ways to come to good judgments about
themselves. m general, psychological science, while not
determinative, gives support to those who claim that "one
isolated parent at home with a child or children may not
be the best way to structure child raising for the parent
or for the child. "68 instead tne evidence suggests that
community forms of sharing child care, widespread until
the modern idealization of the isolated home and the
introduction of divisive systems of social mobility, are
good for children and adults. m such settings parents
can get relief from the enormous responsibility of solo
child care, and both parents and children can benefit from
a diversity of role models, peers, and friends. 69 Rossi,
in this context, refers favorably both to "growth centers"
and to "multi-family households." Both could be aided by
government and mostly privately controlled.
In the modern circumstance, growth centers in whichyoung children spend part of each day may help toteach humility to the oldest child and self-conf ienceto the youngest Multi-family households, in whichthe sexual and parenting lines of the nuclear familv
remain intact but which include overlapping and
shared living space, would similarly provide children
with access to peers and parents with built-in
support systems for alternating child care, coping
more easily with family emergencies, and easing the
Ourselves and Our Children
r p. 205.
Ourselves and Our Children, pp. 179-185.
both male and female household members. '0
The idea of development I have merely sketched here also
allows for a fairly definitive formulation concerning what
should count as abuse and neglect. These ideas are, i
think, not very controversial, at least among those Adults
that live with and care for children, and by the standards
they provide the modern private family is deserving both
cf serious criticism and considerable acclaim." on the
cne hand many, many families (of nil sorts) help to
provide many, many children with significant others,
predictability, and the chance to engage ln soae £ort of
valued activity. The intense love that often comes with
the intimacy of the private family helps people to forge
commitments, to make sacrifices for each other, in short,
to care for each other. On the other hand, our private
families often mean isolation for their members from any
sort of supportive community. Our families and households
are situated in a highly stratified class society, which
makes for all sorts of pressures, insecurities, and
feelings of powerlessness and inadequacy. 72 often these
7 0
"A Bio-social Perspective on Parenting," p. 23.
7
K
M
?
SLabUSers °f childre" believe, at some level, thatwhat they are doing is wrong. Many ask for help in avariety of direct and indirect ways. See Ourselves andOur Children, p. 224, and pp. 257-258.
7 2On the effects of class on children, see Kagan, "TheChild in the Family," pp. 47-50.
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factors help lead people „ho were^ mistreated ^ChUdr"n t0
' " Pare"ts
'
—
•
their children in turn
There are, as Bettelheim says n0re than once, no neglected
or beaten children on the kibbuts, as compared ^ ^ ^two mil lion cases each year in the United States."
&- "Minimalist-- catenas at Eaaily
This sober note
.akes an appropriate starting point for
»y "minimalist" defense of family, as
, far froffl
that the modern family has no drawbacks, I only argue that
we (of western modernity, need seething like it if we are
to strive to„ards a less normalizing and oppressive order.
I went however to make clear that
-minimalist- does not
mean tentative and uncertain. I refer instead to the fact
that I am purposely broad and lacking in detail in my
specification of what counts as a family and rather narrow
in what it is about this wide range of families which I am
defending. I am not for example arguing that
-the family-
makes the best selves or is necessarily the appropriate
locus of community. And I do not have a problem (per se)
with either the
-decline of parental authority- or the
proliferation of alternative householding arrangements.
I!°!^
the *ib*utz
'
see The Children of the nr»,
, p . 297 .Or^Abuse in th U.S., see Ourselves and our chnA.L p .
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On the other hand I am not tentative in my opposition to
large-scale state or comity run child care. On a more
affirmative note, j am arguing that we should aggressively
move to support people in their attempts to live in a
multiplicity of types of household. This means, as I said
at the outset of the chapter, that we should fight for
social and economic change and public policy which makes
our societies more pro-parent, pro-gaurdian, pro-household
and pro-child. I promise to give some examples of what
such change and such policy might be, but first some
defense of these various propositions.
Adrienne Rich, like Barrett and Mcintosh, is very
critical of the modern family and the institution of
"motherhood" that goes along with it. Unlike them,
however, she is careful to distinguish this oppressive
family
- the "patriarchal family" - from the family per
se. This is in part because of her concern with the
implications of collective child-care.
This book is not an attack on the family or on
mothering, except as defined and restricted nnH.,patriarchy
.
Nor is it a call for a mass system of
state-controlled child-care. Mass child-care inpatriarchy has had but two purposes: to introducelarge numbers of women into the labor force ...and toindoctrinate future citizens. 74
Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution(New York: W.W. Norton, 1976)
, p. 14.
in fact there is good reason to be suspicious of
collective child care under any conceivable Modern
conditions, not only under
"patriarchal- ones." Kor the
sake of the unregulated diversity essential to politics
for the sake of protection fro* normalizing or repressive
observations and interventions, and I think for the sake
of a richer, more multi-textured and multilply satisfying
life, we need to draw lines of some kind between the
public and the private. This means for one thing that we
should avoid state directed child care as much as possible
(while at the same time using the state as a vehicle to
support people in the caring of children)
. First I will
speak of modern conditions and their relevance. Second I
will discuss the need for a category of, and institutional
supports for, the
-private." And third, I will connect
this to the guestion of child-rearing and private
households.
To speak of the relevance of modernity I need only
return to the arguments I made in chapter one. Consider
the following. First, the modern ideas of legitimacy,
freedom, and authority place high demands on the self.
Modern order, and modern governments, demand more than
7 5And on the other hand, should people create forthemselves a society which is not systematically unfair to
women, it will probably nonetheless be deserving of some
attack. I discuss the issue of patriarchy shortly.
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obedience and
.ore than ritualized endorsement; they
demand reflective endorsement and they retire from people
behaviour that reflects endorsement.
Modern selves are indeed reflective, and this means not
only that they are capable of a variety of modes of
thought and action, but also that they are structured on
the basis of a good deal of self-discipline, and quite
able to impose still more. We (modern people) are
thematizers, aggressively defining reality and seeking the
self-conscious mastery of it. We therefore readily
construct catergories of normality and deviance, putting
pressure on ourselves and others to fit into the former.
Modern orders, like modern selves, are highly
structured; they are governed by demanding imperatives and
require considerable levels of self-conscious
administering. it is true that we ought to move to lessen
the imperatives that so constrict our decisions,
collective and otherwise, but it seems inconceivable that
we can in the foreseeable future either do without wide
scale (not merely local) "social policies" of some kind,
or make and implement such policy without imposing on
people in a variety of ways. As I said in chapter one,
normalization is not only made necessary by our complex
interdependence, it is also provided with a perfect
pretext.
And, of course, we of modernity are what^ ^
always have been: we are ^ ^
Philosophies of concord. These faots „f ^
not go away, ana so it is important^ we ^
distinctions between various arenas of activity and
experience. More exactly, we need to continue to
recognize some areas of life as "private-, relative to
others.
„
e ought to do this on the one hand for the sake
of democracy and politics, and on the other hand for the
sake of the preserving the possibility of the experiences
particular (in modernity) to more
-private" arenas.
Democracy under conditions of a high degree of self-
consciousness requires (consists of, at least two things.
It requires first the reality of a space where anyone can
speak and speak more or less to everyone. Talking counts
as "speaking" in this case only if it is of relevance to
possible collective action. This means there must be
structural room for different courses of action and a
cultural ethic in support not only of free speech but of
the importance of listening to what other people have to
say.
This can be called the realm of "the public/' although,
as Jean Elshtain has pointed out, it is important that we
conceive of this space, not as a pristine arena that
floats above everyday concerns but as the very realm where
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we contest the^ of what^ ^ ^^ ^ ^
important to idealize politics in the sense that „e
therefore believe that (in Connolly's words, it can be
"the „edium through which essential exiguities can be
expressed and given so»e redress," but we should not
idealize politics as a real™ of aisty ideals. This will
only lead some into public life for the wrong reasons
lead others to scorn politics as for the light-headed, and
create pessismism when people discover just how down and
dirty politics really is. 76
The second "thing" required by modern democracy are
Places where people can speak and not be entirely "in
public." This is important because the force of the
public world (with all its imposing definitions of
reality) can only be held accountable and possibly
transformed given the possibility of silence, of
concealment, and of the alteration of public discourse in
more private speaking. Moreover what is at issue here is
more than "room," or physical space free from
surveillance. Democracy and slack require multiple ways
of speaking, and this in turn requires a pluralism of
loyalties and dependencies. This means more than one mode
of existence; it means opportunities to play different
characters and to assume different stances, without an
76Public Man. Private Woman
, pp. 346-349.
unchecked insistence on a complete absence of
contradiction, x cannot resist the obvious metaphor
"Checks and balances- at the governmental XeveX do notnin,
to controx the power of normalization (and i„ the U.S. at
this tiae they do little more than abet private power,.
For this checks must exist- tist at the level of the social
construction of the self.
I want to stress that this idea of democracy includes
-re than this call for multiple institutions, loyalties,
and realms of experience. it is also the insistence that
any way of demarcating and constituting realms of society
is problematic, even hurtful, although at the same
necessary and inevitable. The fact of social forms hurts
us not simply, or primarily, at the level of a compromise
and sacrifice of individual interests, but at the level of
a compromise and sacrifice of possible ways of being, m
modern societies, or at Xeast in modern Xiberai capitaiist
societies, a good deal of such injury is disguised by
means of the public/private distinction. It does not
necessarily follow, however, that we should address the
injury by stripping away the status of private from all
arenas. Instead we need structural slack, multiple ways
of speaking, and politics both at the level of the public
and the private.
I am not, then, by any means denying the cogency of the
recent politicizing of the distinction between the public
na the private as carried out by feninisn
n pointing out that „the personai is poUticai ^
^
"
eW and Problematization of »thefamily," and this book ig therefore ^.^^ ^
footsteps. The personal is in(Jeed poUticai) ^^ ^
xs a contestable social construction that has positional
effects. This is not> by my reading; ^ argument
the private, hut a way to tear down the immunity from
critique claimed under liberalism for all that is
currently deemed private.
in fact, in my view the cause of gender justice is best
served hy the effort to preserve and expand the realms of
concrete human relations, and alternative spaces for
speaking and experience, without imposing on women a
construction of themselves as if they lived for mother's
day each year. Along these lines, a good deal of feminist
criticism rightly insists on the independent value and
validity both of the experiences women have in so far as
they are women, and of the experiences and relations
anyone can have in those realms, such as the household,
which are still socially marked as uniquely the province
of women. 77 Householding and the practices and
experiences that go with it have their own value; they are
11*** f°T
examPle .Gilligan's In a Different- v„i^ andNoddings'
-An Ethic of Caring" provide examples of Siskind of feminist criticism.
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not simply a neans tQ SOffie externai v^ ^that so many pe0ple find . great deal Qf^ ^ ^
experiences of "family- .. even in ^
normalized families
- is a point in favor of that
institution.
„or should we forget that we. as highly
structured, reflective, modem selves, are capable of
diverse loyalties, conflicting identifications, and
multiple modes of expression and action. The continuation
of a public/private distinction, enforced by the construal
of some claims to a "right to privacy" as legitimate, is
essential if we are to preserve, and to make, room for
such richness and diversity.
This defense of privacy is reinforced by the fact that
much of what we value most in the realms we deem private
cannot be replicated in more public contexts. This is
perhaps partly due to what Elshtain states as a general
human truth
- "particular experiences and spheres of
social relations exude their own values and purposes, and
have ends not attainable by, or within, other spheres."™
It is also partly due to the current, and likely
continued, nature of modern communities; they are large in
scale, complex in their requirements, and encompass a good
deal of diversity. In this context any attempt to rely on
public settings to provide humans with intimacy and
Elshtain, Public Man. Private Woman , p. 334-335.
spontaneity is likely to lead ^^ ^
ChariCatUr6d f0r
»' t° suit public iffiperatives
.
tttoaae^jMacracv. Pri„^- 1Iril| LhL L^u^
Tor the sa)ce of democracy and multiplicity, then, we
need a public/private distinction. This means, as x have
already just suggested, that „e need to continue to
organize daily U fe by „ea„s of small, relatively intimafce
and stable households in which children are raised and
which have some claim to shelter from the inquisitive eyes
of society. This is because privacy and democracy
require, at least in modern conditions, a multiplicity of
institutional spaces, none of which are entirely
answerable to the others. The private household can be,
and to some degree is, such a space, even if it is now
largely colonized by imperatives of order.
When I say "household" here I also mean "family," a
Place where people live together, sharing time and space,
exchanging unpaid services, committed to staying together
over time, and participating in rituals or traditions that
somehow mark the fact that one aspect of their identity is
as members of that group." when I say that we should
ir/ ™y , fv ° deflned ln Ourselves a nd Our chilH^n , p .154. The Authors of that text in turn cite Mary Howell,Helping Ourselves (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), Chapters 1
organize daily life by meang Qf
z^^
children should in general ^ ra . se(j ^ meubers ^
households, we have seen that the abolition of the
private family is compatible with the the minimal
grounding of identity, b,t the family/society distinction
helps give many a personal story that is distinct from
even though bound up with, society's story. The private
status of households is thus important because it helps
prevent the identity of the individual from becoming too
thoroughly bound up with the social order as a whole, m
an age where legitimacy itself depends on the internal
mental state of society's participants, this distance is
valuable. It helps to put people in a position where
reflection can allow for the critique of established
understandings, despite the pressures on them to put their
internal musings to work to bring themselves in line. The
particular (and intense) experiences of family can provide
a ground for resistance to the order or to some of the
order's particular norms and imperatives.
To put this another way, a public/private split can make
it easier to acknowledge the ambiguity of the worth of
each realm, and therefore of social forms in general. In
an age where power operates partially by catering to the
human penchant to be at home, the private family can be
(in certain conditions) a bulwark against the temptation
to treat society as a home, just as the fact that there is
seen as less than a home.
one possible response to my argument here is that I too
readily assume that collective household, arrangements
are necessarily invasive and authoritarian. Things may he
that way now, someone might say, but it could be
different. Barrett and Mcintosh for example acknowledge
that "increases in social control" over child-rearing
"currently take" the form of "interventions into private
life," and parents, who "bear most of the work and costs
of bringing up children" are not unjustified in their
resistance to these interventions. 80 They suggest,
however, in keeping with their assumptions of concordance,
that increases in social control need not take a
pernicious, interventionist form. After all
1*1 K°
C
^i slices departments of local authoritiesthe health visitors, the school welfare officers arescarcely the agencies that socialists have in mind
chUdren?"
1 "* '"'^ SOCial responsibility for
What then do they have in mind? No direct answer is
given, but their conclusion seems clear to me; they think
that one day there will be less of a private realm into
The Ant i-social Family
, p. 134.
The Anti-social Family
, p. 134.
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which there could be interventions by Qutside agencies
Affairs that use to he consider "private „
'
-eaxs, cleaning and housekeeping, and the work Qf caring
for people" - will be nanaged^ ^^.^ „
so "social control- wiU he achieved without the cists ithas now.
My response to this is two-fold on *-v,t , the one hand, the
ideal of people managing their own lives together
cooperatively, is both beautiful and important. People , s
lives are in fact Managed" in many ways right now, only
the appearance of "privacy" disguises this and prevents it
from being a political issue. Moreover, many of the tasks
Barrett and Mcintosh refer to can and ought to be more
cooperative affairs. indeed, the historically recent
demise (but not death) of various more cooperative forms
of living (everything from mass transportation to the
sharing of child care in urban neighborhoods) has meant
higher costs, more inequality, and more isolation,
especially for women.
On the other hand, it is very important, especially
given modern conditions that we either cannot or should
not dispense with, not to speak as if we can render our
social world and our processes for dealing with collective
issues entirely benign in their import. We cannot. We
cannot do so because to deal with collective issues is to
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in a
take part in a particular way of life and so in a
Particular, naroly benign
,
way of producing^
identities and systems of value.
"Intervention" is
-nse a part of the human condition; it need not come fro*
the "outside" to exist.
in fact the assumption of concordance involved in the
vision of entirely non-coercive
"social control" is likely
in practice to serve as a tool of a kind of coercion.
Harmony is the expected outcome, once the community is
deciding things "for itself » »„j ....y r . And the participants of
that community are then expected to "voluntarily" reach
the expected consensus. They are not only supposed to go
along with the result; they are expected to endorse it as
well. This is especially likely to result in a squelching
of spontaneity and difference for two reasons. First, in
modernity persons are subjects who seek to see themselves
as having freely endorsed the conditions of their
existence and who can police themselves for inconsistency
very thoroughly. Second, the collective issues that have
to be dealt with can all to easily be construed as
rational or scientific questions with only a few logical
outcomes. In these conditions, the establishment of
communal society promises to enhance forces of
normalization and oppression.
Practical ftBBiisafciana
This may see. to leave us in a difficult spot
. ^
an, as we have already seen, our families currently aid
and abet in the same forces of oppression and
normalization which would probably be enhanced in a modern
communal society. To summarize, the problem stems on the
one hand from the alluring but in many ways disempowering
nature of the promise of harmony offered by "the family,"
and on the other hand from the many-sided enforcement of
the norm of the privatized, successful,
"middle-class"
family. A central part of this enforcement is what
Donzelot calls the systems of tutelage and contract, and,
as the effects of class position on children suggest,
these systems are able to normalize partly by virtue of
the operation of the disparity between them. The world of
liberalized relations and middle class values has its
other (real and imagined) in the world of the dependent -
the former way of life is offered as superior to the
latter, as indeed it is, thanks especially to the stigma
and the deprivations this polarity creates; the person who
accepts the proffered norms can see themselves as "free"
and "responsible," relative to those who are "no good." 82
82Donzelot speaks of an "effective dynamic" between "the
working class pole and the bourgeois pole." Policing p
xxi. On the nature and political significance of
citizen/other distinctions see William E. Connolly,
Appearance and Reality in Pointing (Cambridge University
Press, 1981), pp. 157-172, and Richard Sennett and
Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of m agg (Vintage
Sidelines and some specific possibilities which are in
Keeping with the position I have taken regarding the
a^iguity of the modern family.83 There m^
issues from which to draw examples - we need to change
Public policies that deal with families, we need to change
schools, and we need to change the economic context in
which families make their way. i speak selectively,
beginning with possible changes at the level of families.
We need to distinguish carefully between cooperative
arrangements, communal arrangements and collective
arrangements. The latter will too thoroughly dissolve
distinctions between the public and private. Cooperative
and communal ways of living and raising children, on the
other hand, are typical alternatives modes of private
householding, and what we need is a proliferation, or at
least a legitimation, of alternatives, what we need, in
general, is to reduce normalizing pressures as far as
possible by supporting people better in their own efforts
to live in a multitude of ways. At this time many
*************
Books, 1973), pp. 135-141.
^Interestingly enough, the changes I recommend at thelevel of families are a lot like the recommendations ofBarrett and Mcintosh. Their specific ideas about what todo in the present are excellent; it is their long-term
vision and its assumptions of concordance that I question.See The Anti-social Family
r pp. 131-159.
government laws and employer policies ass.e that people
live families with one primary wage earner, with another
Parent available for full time day care. Policy should
neither assume that this is the case nor try to make it
so. one thing that governments can do is to provide
substantial
"child allowances- - parents or tax rebates
to households for each child that is raised there. (Many
governments provide these in some form already, but they
are not available in the Unites States. 84 There they
might fare well politically if they were conceptualized as
social insurance for children. 85 mat ig criticially
important is that they be provided as a universal benefit,
not as part of a means tested welfare program, and that
"household" be defined very broadly.
We also need government subsidies which make a wide
range of day care programs available and affordable. One
of the important principles here (and in general) is that
parental (or guardian) control should be maximized.
Efforts to help children and their caretakers should as
far as possible not replicate the bureaucratic,
standardized, professionalized school system. (We should
On child allowances in Europe, see Harrell R. Rodgers,
Jr
•
'
The Cost of Human Neglect: America's Welfare Failure(M.E. Sharpe, 1982), p. 106.
8 5See Mary Jo Bane, Here To Stav: American Families in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 129.
also try to reform the schools tQ ^
and no„-professional and parental^o insteaa
should be directed to help non.institutional foras Qf
sharing of care proli ferate .86 WoQlsey ^^
persuasively that parents prefer such forms of help, Tnis
is better for parents (they prefer it, and it is, as I
have already said, certainly fine for children."
People who are poor have for years used networks of
caring such as multi-family households to help share the
meager resources in the community and to help parents
work. m highly unequal societies, however, personal
solutions to public problems tend to perpetuate the
problems, and the networks of sharing can stand in the way
of the available upward mobility, even as they remain
essential for maintaining day-to-day living. Ranya Rapp
calls this effect "leveling."
No one gets ahead because individual upward mobilitvcan be bought only at the price of cutting off thevery people who have contributed to one ^survivalUpward mobility becomes a terribly scarring
experience under these circumstances. 88
8 6See the excellent discussion of what is needed inOurselves and Our Children
, pp. 204-208.
!u
W
f°,
1Sey haS shown that Pare"ts prefer forms of day carethat keep the responsibility with relatives, friends, orin the home. "Pied-Piper Politics," p. 132.
8 8
"Family and Class in Contemporary America," p. 179.
Matters are often made worse by welfare nr.y i programs, which
act to veaKen or dissolve these^ ^hey fail to provide their recipients ^
to success and make the* especially vulnerable to
surveillance and other actions in violation of rights
normally enjoyed by others.89 In general „elfare heips
set up the poor as an example for others; it helps people
marginally (and importantly 1) , but it helps also to
maintain the systen of ineguality in which so»e people are
poor.
This brings us to the issue of the social and economic
context in which families operate. Much can be done to
improve the welfare system - it could be less
stigmatizing, invasive, and destructive of actual families
-
but it will continue to have serious negative effects
as long as there is a high degree of structured inequality
and a high cost of living (as exist for example in the
United States)
.
Just to give one reason why this is the
case, in the United States there are so many people who
are poor, near poor, or seriously struggling to make ends
meet that any welfare system which provides adequate
^Colin C. Blaydon and Carol B. Stack show how welfareprograms fail to take the actual structure of poor
fn?n^!%Hnd housfnolds into account (perhaps in order toe force the normal route of upward mobility)
. "Theemphasis is on legal relationships, not living
arrangements." See "Income Support Policies and theFamily," Daedalus 106, no. 2 (Spring 1977), p. 149.
payments and does not seriously deter work would be
prohibitively expensive." si-ilarly. day care programs
by themselves can only have quite lifted results."
To state my position in the fona Qf a generai
we must make what counts for success in society compatible
with a variety of householding arrangements. This means
changes are needed both in the way work life is structured
and in the way goods are consumed, it means, more than
anything else, less inequality, it means, at a minimum,
full employment.
By "full employment" I mean a state of affairs where
there are enough good jobs for everyone, what a "good
job" must provide depends on what social benefits
government provides; the important thing is that one way
or another people are liberated from struggling against
each other to avoid or escape all that now goes with
membership of the lower rungs of society. Full employment
would increase the tax rolls, save the goverment money in
benefits that go to the unemployed, increase the
On the degree of inequality and the cost of living inthe U.S., see Michael H. Best and William E. Connolly, The
Politicized Economy, Second Edition (D.C. Heath, 1982),
pp. 49-59, and Harrington, The New American Poverty
r p!88. On the exorbitant cost of any goverment provision* of
adequate income within the confines of the curent system
of inequality, see Harrington's discussion of Nixon's
Family Assistance Plan, The New American Poverty
,
pp. 32-
3 3 •
91See Woolsey, "Pied-Piper Politics," p. 143.
bargaining power of all workers, give people more
breathing room to he political or different, work wonders
in reducing disparities in income that fall along racial
and se.ua! lines, and remove what is probably the number
one source of stress for people in families. mi
employment, especially if combined with reduced
inequalities at the workplace and in wealth and income,
could also lead to new political coalitions between the
middle and lower strata of society (now closer,
, and so
considerably alter the balance of power in the direction
of these groups.
There are a number of reforms in the workplace that fall
short of full employment but would still help people in
families. These include improved parental leave and sick
pay policies, an atmosphere where parents could bring
their children to work, and shorter work days and work
weeks. Changes in these areas are badly needed. But any
such reforms will fail to reach many unless there are
changes in "the structure of consumption" and the system
of occupational incentives which are such a central part
of contemporary western systems of inequality.
This means on the one hand moving away from a heavy
reliance on "external" and "individual" incentives such as
the promise of promotion, the fear of getting fired, and
the hope of becoming rich. We need rather to emphasize
internal and shared incentives, such as fumuing „ork
and social relationships and the chance to contribute »to
so»e collectivity
„ith which one identifies . ,. 92 ^^
on the other hand expanding society's provision of
"inclusive goods" whioh are for colleotive
Such goods
- mass transit, preventive health care - are
generally more cost-efficient and are clearly more
egalitarian. 93
A Note cm Patriarchy
One important objection that might be made to my whole
argument is that it fails to adequately confront the issue
of patriarchy and its links to the family. i want
therefore to say a few words about what I see as the
implications of my argument on this question.
I should say first that I don't use the word
"patriarchy" myself for several reasons. For one thing it
refers to a specific idea of political authority and
legitimacy
- the rule of fathers - which has been put
more or less to rest in the victory of liberalism over
patriarchal ism. More importantly for me it implies a very
total claim — that human life is uniformly marked by the
rule of men over women. I think this gives too little
92 Best and Connolly, The Politicized Economy
r p . 6 4.
93Best and Connolly, The Politicized Economy
,
p. 6.
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credit to „o,„en and is not the case. M
, perhaps most
importantly,
..patriarchy" to dm i»pl ies that the
subjection of wo»en is due to the rule by
, and ascendency
of men. This ! think insufficiently aCnowiea.es the way
"the social construction of gender- creates "Men- as well
as "ween,.- Thus
, whUe _ benefit ^ ^
of wo»en (although it is also to their disadvantage in
ways,
,
and at ti.es »en should be held accountable
for the subjection of women, they do not exactly
"perpetrate" it.
I must however say secondly that, while words are
important, we should not allow a word quibble to make us
lose sight of the point. The modern institution of family
is indeed centrally implicated in the process of
normalizing its participants into a set of gender
categories which disadvantages and disempowers women
relative to men. m modernity some very old categories
and practices continue still to be of great harm and
disadvantage to women. And, while some have faded in
power or been repudiated, there are new ones, m
particular the idealization of "home" in the mid-
"Tho ;^.
s°cial
tj
COnStrUCtion of g^der," see Gayle Rubin,e Traffic in Women: Notes on the ^Political Economy' of
~e?' Toward an Anthropology of Wompn
f ed. by Ranys rReiter (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), pp. 157-210. Rubin argues that biological sex is constructed
socially in the form of gender.
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nineteenth century not only rationalized new forms of
production and consumption, but also perpretrated new
forms of isolation and exclusion on women.^
This should not lead us to hastily conclude that the
subjection of women is inherently tied to distinctions
such as those between family, society, and government. it
stems rather first from the way those realms are accorded
value and constructed as most fully the province of one
particular gender (women)
, and second in the way that
gender is constructed so as to make society's valuations
and assignments seem rational, legitimate and even
desirable. Hegel is not wrong when he asserts that the
private household can be a locus of ethical life, but he
is wrong when he claims that this private version of
community is distinctly secondary to the mediated ethical
life of state, and he is also wrong when he argues that
women partake more directly of nature than men and so are
fit more fully for the home.
The first of these two claims is reversed to some degree
by the philosophy of liberalism, which understands the
essence of ethical life to be a private matter. The
second claim, that women are closer to nature, is still
alive and kicking, although under pressure. Men and women
alike tend to accept the idea that typically male
See Rich, Of Woman Born , pp. 46-49.
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activities are more r*ni t-u*. 9 icultural, more world-making and more
distinct from tho<5«a «^ose of other species than the typical
activities of women. It is in keeping with this that both
family and women are thought of as closer to nature, more
immediate, and perhaps even less uniquely human than men
and the extra familial realms of life. it seems then that
the secondary status of women has one of its key props
intact as long as the "natural" is taken to mean women
more than men and the family more than society.
The abolition of family is
, however, not the answer
here. Instead we need to challenge what from my
perspective is Hegel's most important mistaken claim -
that a moral concord exists in the cosmos. Hegel assumes
that nature provides that which is needed for ethical
life, and he holds out as a model for a good society one
free of mere necessity, dirt, inacessibility of reality to
reason, and ambiguity. The philosophy of discordance
challenges this hope as misguided, and demands that we
radically problematize nature on the one hand and reason
on the other. Should such a problematization take hold in
society, then the assertion that women and family are
"closer to nature" than men will, I think, become less
meaningful and less subjugating to women (whether or not
it disappears altogether)
.
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The reading of modernity provided by the philosQphy Qf
discordance locates the impetus of tyrannies Qf
normalization in the Operatives of growth and heavy
requirements of coordination of modern institutions in
the weakening of people's allegiance to these institutions
and the future they promise, and in the philosophies of
concordance which have been the historical partners of
modern institutions. Prom the point of view of
discordance, the modern western family is an agent of
normalization and a promoter of concordance, but it is not
exhausted by that description. If we are to give more
life to, or even merely sustain, the modern emphasis on
rule by the consent of the governed, and if we are to
avoid making a mockery of the modern commitment to the
equal worth of persons, then we must acknowledge that we
can never universalize the affluence or achieve the moral
rectitude (and superiority) our order is now geared to
pursue, we need to change our institutions so that the
future they are building is more worthy of our allegiance,
and at the same time acknowledge that no set of social
forms is ever going to fully worthy of human allegiance.
This historical possibility can only come to be given
transformations in many of our highly interdependent
institutions and ideas, including those of family.
Struggles at many levels wUl be ^^ ^
change, but this does ^^^ ^
of modern traditions is called for- „M r
'
instead we should hope
to witness a kind of wholesale shif*8 Milt, a rearrangement of
elements to accommodate the loosening of growth
imperatives and the cultural acknowledgment of the
inevitability of arbitrariness and justice in any social
form. The most complete change might not be noticed as
such: this would be a transformed understanding of
politics. The operative ideals of family, discourse of
the family, f„ily poliov> and actual households ^
some extent displace or disable the policing of families.
Such policing would, without thereby coming to an end, be
referred to by some metaphor which expressed its
impositional and political character, it would be
contested.
Speaking more broadly, family ideas and practice would
come to be in and help sustain a world governed by what
Connolly calls the "institutionalization of ambiguity."
This means that both discourse and the day to day
institutional practice with which it is bound up would act
to allow, and even enforce, the acknowledgement of a dark
underside of all our achievements, in such a world we
would all be regularly reminded of the fact that neither
the most enlightened application of reason, nor its most
careful attunement to . larger^ ^ ^ ^^
can render even our h ighest achievements unambiguously
'
legitimate. That
, at any^ ^ ^ ^ ^
ontology of discordance.
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